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Abstract (short version)
Most studies that explicitly or implicitly address the concept of social capital either emphasize
the focal actor's external relations or examine relational characteristics for collectives. This
dissertation addresses both these approaches by conducting a cross-level and mixed-
determinant network study on the emerging hydroelectric micro-power field in Western
Norway. The focal actor' s position in the organizational field comprises his external relations,
and the study shows a curvilinear relationship with the shape of a negative 2nd degree
polynomial between network distance to the center of the field at start-up and electricity
production per financial capital invested. With regard to relational characteristics for
collectives, the dissertation shows that structurally equivalent start-ups in densely connected
niches are likely to outperform their colleagues in a sparsely connected niche. In particular,
this seems to be the case ifthe focal actor accesses non-redundant information. Finally, the
dissertation addresses issues from population ecology theory and institutional theory and
questions whether the start-up success/failure of either an early or late adopter in an emerging
field is a possible outcome of population density or mimetic behavior. Analyses show a
curvilinear relationship with the shape of a positive 2nd degree polynomial, indicating partial
support for both arguments, but when this is controlled for network predictors of social
capital, the effect turns negative. Implications of the findings and avenues for further research
are discussed.
Sammendrag (abstract in Norwegian)
De fleste studier som eksplisitt eller implisitt behandler begrepet sosial kapital belyser enten
den fokale aktørs eksterne relasjoner eller studerer relasjonelIe karakteristika for kollektiver.
Denne doktoravhandlingen behandler begge disse tilnærmingene ved å foreta en kryssnivå- og
miksdeterminant nettverksstudie av det fremvoksende organisatoriske feltet hydroelektrisk
mikrokraft på Vestlandet. Den fokale aktørs posisjon i det organisatoriske feltet tilsier hans
eksterne relasjoner, og studien viser en kurvlineær sammenheng ·som tar form som et negativt
andregrads polynom mellom nettverksavstand til feltets senter ved oppstart og
strømproduksjon per investert kapital. Hva gjelder karakteristika for kollektiver så viser
avhandlingen at strukturelt ekvivalente aktører i nisjer med tette nettverksstrukturer er
tilbøyelige til å ha høyere produksjon enn sine kolleger i en nisje hvor det er løsere
nettverksstruktur, og spesielt synes dette å være tilfellet dersom den fokale aktør har tilgang til
ikke-redundant informasjon. Avhandlingen belyser også elementer fra populasjonsøkologi
samt institusjonell teori og stiller spørsmål ved om hvorvidt grad av suksess ved å etablere seg
tidlig eller sent som mikrokraft produsent kan tilskrives populasjonstetthet eller etterlignende
adferd. Analyser viser en kurv lineær sammenheng som tar form som et positivt andregrads
polynom, men ved å kontrollere for nettverksmål for sosial kapital blir sammenhengen
negativ. Implikasjoner fra funnene og retninger for ny forskning diskuteres.
Abstract (extended version)
Most studies that explicitly or implicitly address the concept of social capital either emphasize
the focal actor's external relations or examine relational characteristics for collectives.
Contributions that comprise external relations investigate, for instance, the possible effects on
parameters of performance from the focal actor's configuration of direct or indirect inter-firm
links (e.g. Ahuja 2000a; Baum, Calabrese and Silverman 2000; Baum and Oliver 1991;
Choonwoo, Lee and Pennings 2001; Shan, Walker and Kogut 1994; Smith-Doerr, Owen-
Smith and Powell 1999; Stuart 2000; Stuart, Hoang and Hybels 1999). Burt's (l 992a)
structural hole theory also belongs to this camp, arguing that the optimal strategy for the
player is to construct an ego-network with disconnected alters (for a review, see Burt 2000).
On the other hand, contributions that focus on collectives investigate the influence of
relational characteristics and abilities for given subsets of actors (Adler and Kwon 2000;
Gittel and Vidal 1998; Putnam 2000). For instance, Walker, Kogut et al. (1997), discovered
that structurally equivalent biotech firms had a larger propensity to establish ties within their
own subset of actors than to ally with organizations on the outside. Unfortunately, the authors
did not measure how the emerging structure affected performance. However, in a study of
Norwegian pulp and paper mills, Greve, Golombek et al. (2001) found that actors who were
structurally equivalent with universities and research institutions had lower pollution levels
than mills outside these subsets. This latter contribution indicates that certain relational
characteristics for collectives seem to have explanatory power in portraying whether social
capital is present or not.
In this dissertation, I have studied the concept of social capitalon the emerging hydroelectric
micro-power field in Western Norway by simultaneously investigating the focal actor's
external relations and relational characteristics for collectives. This implies that I have
conducted a cross-level and mixed-determinant network study. Cross-level models describe
relationships between independent and dependent variables at different levels, while mixed-
determinant models suggest that predictors at a variety of levels may influence a criterion of
interest (Klein, Danserau and Hall 1994; Rousseau 1985). Whereas methodological
approaches normally require a researcher to choose one particular level of analysis as the
primary focus of study, Gabbay and Leenders (1999: 5) argue that the very nature of social
capital runs through various levels of analysis and a "full study of social capital should thus
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incorporate structure ... at multiple levels of analysis." The concept of social capital is defined
as "resources embedded in social networks that are accessed and used by actors for actions. "
(Lin 2001: 25)
Data for this study was gathered from hydroelectric micro-power start-ups in Western
Norway during the fall of2002 and early January 2003. The plants were established
throughout the region between 1994-200 l. The sample of network data on start-up was 23,
representing a response rate of 92% from the relevant actors. l identified a total of 115
network ties between these entrepreneurs and other actors (i.e. vendors and consultants),
which I dichotomized and symmetrized. The focal actor's network position comprises his
external relations, and by applying Freeman's (1979) concept ofcloseness centrality, the
study showed a curvilinear relationship with the shape of a negative 2nd degree polynomial
between network distance to the center of the field at start-up and electricity production per
financial capital invested (discounted in real terms). This indicates that the actors in
intermediate network positions were superior in venture success, whereas their colleagues at
the core or at the margins of the field were inferior.
Regarding relational characteristics for collectives, I examined if density of contacts within
subsets of structurally equivalent niches (Burt and Talmud 1993) would affect outcome for
the same actors. By applying the so-called Concor (convergence of iterated correlations)
technique - developed by White and colleagues (White, Boorman and Breiger 1976; White,
Breiger and Boorman 1976) - I identified 3 different niches into which micro-power start-ups
are embedded. Structural-equation approaches can indicate roles distributed among actors
according to similarity in communication structures (Greve and Salaff2001) and identify
groups of actors with shared cognitions (Carley 1986; Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991). Niche
density is defined as the number of relations (I) among (n) actors that exist compared to the
maximum possible number of relations, 1/[n(n-l )/2], and analyses show that structurally
equivalent start-ups in densely connected niches are likely to outperform their colleagues in a
sparsely connected niche. By conducting interaction effects between the nominal niche
variable and the focal actor's access to non-redundant information - operationalized by
applying Freeman and colleagues' (1991) centrality measure of flow betweenness - I
observed that non-redundant information is positive for start-ups in densely connected niches,
whereas it is actually negative in a sparsely connected niche. The findings thus revealed that
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the concept of social capital could be inferred as both a cross-level and mixed-determinant
phenomenon.
The dissertation moreover hypothesizes that late adopters will outperform early adopters as a
result of increased density and legitimacy in the emerging field (Aldrich 1999; Hannan
1986). An alternative hypothesis suggests that the relationship might be the reverse due to
mimetic behavior among late adopters (DiMaggio 1991). Initial analyses give partial support
for both hypotheses; between 1995 and 1998 the trend is negative, which supports the
argument behind mimetic behavior (DiMaggio 1991). From this year on, however, the curve
becomes positive, indicating support for the density argument (Hannan 1986). We
accordingly observed the contours of a non-linear relationship with the shape of a positive 2nd
degree polynomial between start-up year and venture success, where 1998 is the turning point.
The most likely interpretation ofthese findings is that both ofthese opposite causal forces are
at play. In the early years, it seems that the negative effect of mimetic behavior is superior in
predictive power, whereas the increased competence and learning that is developed
throughout the field more than outweighs this negative trend beyond 1998.
However, when I controlled for network predictors of social capital, the positive polynomial
effect is faded away and a genuine negative linear trend between start-up year and venture
success appeared. My interpretation ofthis finding is that in order to gain from the increased
level of organizational learning that has taken place in the emerging field, it is essential to
acquire this competence through access to social capital. In other words, despite an overall
increased knowledge base throughout the field, this asset does not benefit late adopters per se,
but has to be gained by the specific network constellations that this dissertation has
uncovered.
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1. Introduction
Positioning and Contribution
Practically no organization stands on its own. Ongoing exchange relationships with suppliers
and buyers, as well as other interactions among stakeholders within and across industries, are
translated into more or less stable inter-organizational networks that one way or another will
affect the actors. Over the last decades, scholars in the area of strategy and organization
theory have attempted to explain this phenomenon (for reviews, see for instance Grandori and
Soda 1995; Gulati 1998; Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer 2000), and in the 1990s the concept of
social capital gained prominence as a potential answer to researchers' call for "a good
network theory of organization" to describe "how structures of interactions enable
coordinated interaction to achieve collective and individual interests" (Salancik 1995: 348).
Most studies that explicitly or implicitly address the concept of social capital emphasize either
the focal actor's external relations or examine relational characteristics for collectives (Adler
and Kwon 2000; Gittel and Vidal 1998; Putnam 2000). A number of contributions that
comprise external relations investigate, for instance, the possible effects on parameters of
performance from the focal actor's configuration of direct or indirect inter-firm links (Ahuja
2000a; Baum, Calabrese and Silverman 2000; e.g. Baum and Oliver 1991; Choonwoo, Lee
and Pennings 2001; Shan, Walker and Kogut 1994; Smith-Doerr, Owen-Smith and Powell
1999; Stuart 2000; Stuart, Hoang and Hybels 1999). Burt' s (1992a) structural hole theory also
belongs to this camp, arguing that the optimal strategy for the player is to construct an ego-
network with disconnected alters (for a review, see Burt 2000).
On the other hand, contributions that focus on collectives investigate the influence of
relational characteristics and abilities for given subsets of actors (Adler and Kwon 2000;
Gittel and Vidal 1998; Putnam 2000). An example ofsuch a study is Walker, Kogut et al.'s
(1997) investigation of the formation of an industry network among young biotech firms.
They discovered that structurally equivalent actors had a larger propensity to establish ties
within their own niche or subset than to ally with organizations on the outside. Unfortunately,
the authors did not measure how the emerging structure affected performance, but in a study
of Norwegian pulp and paper mills, Greve, Golombek et al. (2001) found that actors in niches
who were structurally equivalent with universities and research institutions, had lower
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pollution levels than mills outside these subsets. This latter contribution indicates that certain
relational characteristics for collectives seem to have explanatory power in portraying whether
social capital is present or not.
In this dissertation, I have studied the concept of social capitalon the emerging hydroelectric
micro-power field in Western Norway by simultaneously investigating the focal actor's
external relations as well as examining relational characteristics for collectives; i.e. niches of
structurally equivalent actors (Burt and Talmud 1993). This implies that I have conducted a
cross-level and mixed-determinant network study. Cross-level models describe relationships
between independent and dependent variables at different levels, while mixed-determinant
models suggest that predictors at a variety of levels may influence a criterion of interest
(Klein, Danserau and Hall 1994; Rousseau 1985). Whereas methodological approaches
normally require a researcher to choose one particular level of analysis as the primary focus of
study, Gabbay and Leenders (1999: 5) argued that the very nature of social capital runs
through various levels of analysis and a 'full study of social capital should thus incorporate
structure ... at multiple levels of analysis. "
DiMaggio (1986: 341) held that there are instances in which causes of organizational
outcomes may have different consequences for organizations that occupy different niches in a
field, " ... [and} many of our theories, explicitly or implicitly, lead to expectations about
relations among sets of organizations, rather than single organizations. " Research on
emerging fields, however, has been scarce (for exceptions, see DiMaggio 1991; Galaskiewicz
1991), and to my knowledge so far no study has undertaken the task of concurrently
examining the actor' s network position and niche characteristics within a field. Organizational
field has been defined as "those organizations [or corporate actors} that, in the aggregate,
constitute a recognized area of institutionallife ... " (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 64-65).
The start-up's network position comprises his external relations, and I studied how such
connections - bringing the plant close to either the center, the margins, or intermediate
positions of the field - may enable him to overcome its "liability ofnewness" (Stinchcombe
1965). Regarding relational characteristics for collectives, I examined ifthe density of
contacts within subsets of structurally equivalent niches (Burt and Talmud 1993) affects the
outcome for the same actors. Next, I studied ifthe effect from non-redundant network ties is
contingent upon the plant's ecological niche into which it is embedded, and this implies that I
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simultaneously addressed focal actor's external relations and characteristics for collectives.
Embeddedness has both a relational and a structural aspect, and Granovetter (1992: 33)
emphasized that ignoring the social structure only gives a partial picture, warning that one can
easily slip into "dyadic atomization ", a type of reductionism. Drawing upon the
embeddedness perspective (Granovetter 1985; 1992), the dissertation thus examines ifthe
intensity of contacts within niches moderates the value of accessing information from
disparate sources. Accordingly, here I study how the structure ofrelationships in these subsets
is expected to influence outcomes from the focal actor's relational ties that are considered to
provide non-redundant information. The primary contribution in this dissertation can be
summed up in the following research question: I
Research Question: Do we observe unique effects or interaction effects on focal actor outcome from his
external relations in the field and niche characteristics? Thus, to what extent do we observe cross-level or mixed-
determinant network predictors of social capital?
The dissertation furthermore addresses issues from population ecology theory and
institutional theory and questions whether the start-up success/failure of either an early or late
adopter in an emerging field is a possible outcome of population density and learning (Aldrich
1999; Hannan 1986) or mimetic behavior (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Statistical analyses
reveal a curvilinear relationship with the shape of a positive 2nd degree polynomial on venture
success, but when controlling for network predictors of social capital the effect becomes
genuinely negative. The way I interpreted this finding is that in order to gain from the
increased level of organizational learning that has taken place in the emerging field, it is
essential to acquire this competence through access to social capital. In other words, despite
an overall increased knowledge base throughout the field, this asset does not benefit late
adopters per se, but has to be gained by the specific network constellations that this
dissertation has uncovered. These findings thus indicate that the inclusion ofboth network
methodology and institutional- and ecological approaches can enrich researchers'
understanding of social phenomena by revealing a conceptually interesting interplay between
different structural levels. I discuss these issues in length in Chapters 5 and 6.
I In chapter 2 I elaborate this research question in length.
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Social Capital and Informal Network Ties in an Emerging Field
Lin (2001 : 25) defined social capital as "resources embedded in social networks that are
accessed and used by actors for actions. " The concept has two important components: First,
it represents resources embedded in social relations rather than individuals. In my empirical
context, this implies the start-up's network position through its external ties in the emerging
field, and characteristics of the ecological niche into which it is embedded. It is important to
note that we do not capture the concept by its effects or outcomes, which implies that we
avoid a functionalist view. Lin (2001: 28) warns that such a view "may implicate a
tautology .. .It would be impossible to build a theory in which causal effectual factors are
folded into a singular function [and} incorrect to allow the outcome variables to dictate
the specification of the causal variable. "
He emphasizes, however, "[t}his is not to deny that afunctional relationship may be
hypothesized ... "(Lin 2001: 28), which shifts the focus to the latter part of the definition.
Social capital "should explain how access to social resources can be mobilized for gains - the
process of activation" (Lin 200 l: 29), and if we apply this aspect to corporate life, a logical
implication is emphasizing the attainment of gains from what has been implemented in a
given project. Accordingly, the dependent variable in this study is average yearly electricity
production at the focal plant per units of financial capital invested, discounted in real terms.
Hence, the intention is to reveal how network predictors of social capital at different levels of
analyses are expected to be reflected in gains (or losses) for (mostly) novel entrepreneurial
actors in the emerging micro-power field?
It is furthermore important to note that this dissertation emphasizes "informal" ties among the
actors. This is in contrast to most other network studies on start-ups, which one way or
another examined formalized relationships like contractual agreements or strategic alliances
(e.g. Baum, Calabrese and Silverman 2000; Baum and Oliver 1991; Choonwoo, Lee and
Pennings 200 l; Shan, Walker and Kogut 1994; Stuart, Hoang and Hybels 1999; Walker,
Kogut and Shan 1997). A liability ofthese contributions is that very few start-ups have any
formalized alliances prior to, or around incorporation (or later). With the exception of Baum,
2 Only two respondents in this study reported that they had any prior experience with small-scale
hydroelectricity before building their present plant.
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Calabrese et al.'s (2000) study of start-ups in the Canadian biotech industry, these
contributions accordingly missed essential information of how contacts among actors In a
very early stage affect later outcome.
Moreover, by examining informal network ties I captured relationships that would otherwise
never have been discovered. When W. Powell presented the CEO ofCentocor - a dedicated
biotech firm - with a list of the firm's formal agreements, the CEO's reaction was: "[This is
just} the tip of the iceberg - it excludes dozens of handshake deals and informal
collaborations, as well as probably hundreds of collaborations by our company's scientists
with colleagues elsewhere" (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr 1996: 120). Beneath most
formal ties then, lies a sea ofinformal relations, and ifresearchers ignore these, I argue that
valuable information of corporate life will be lost. It is important to note, however, that this
study focuses on the very structure of the ties that make up the social network, rather than
focusing on the content of these ties. Hinde (1976: 8) referred to the term structure "as a
patterning of relationships that is independent of the particular individuals concerned. " He
furthermore stated that "[iJn moving to this more abstract level wefocus on aspects of the
content ... that show regularities across individuals and across societies ... "
Finally I expected that actors' access to social capital through informal network ties is
particularly essential in young fields, where entrepreneurs have to learn new roles without the
benefit of role models to discover and create effective routines and competencies. Whereas
entrepreneurs in mature industries can benefit from already established templates and adopt
those that are more preferable, well-developed templates are less tangible in emerging fields,
and pioneering entrepreneurs must accordingly learn new schemata from a less developed and
more fragmented knowledge base (Aldrich 1999; Barron 1998; Spender 1989; Stinchcombe
1965; Walsh 1995). A certain level ofknow-how is established, or at least in the process of
being established, but it is probably not evenly distributed among the actors throughout the
field. What can be gained by the means of approaching the "right" players with the "right"
knowledge at the "right" time, or being part of a niche with the highest competence level will
therefore particularly be reflected on start-ups in an emerging field, I argue.
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Motivation for Empirical Setting and Applied Methodology
The Rise of the Micro-Power Field in Norway and Internationally
There is no agreed upon, international definition of what constitutes a hydroelectric micro-
power plant. The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), however, uses
following definitions: Micro-power stations (maximum capacity up until 100 kWh [kilowatts
produced per hour]), miniature-power stations (maximum capacity between 100-1,000 kWh),
and small power stations (maximum capacity between 1,000-10,000 kWh). The micro-power
stations are exempted from paying six øre (almost one cent) in consumption tax (in
Norwegian: forbruksavgift) for each kWh they seIl.
If we look at the dynamics of the start-ups in the sector between 1985 and 1999, the
distinction of the different size classes in Figure I.l reveals an interesting picture (Based upon
data from NVE 2000).
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Figure 1.1 Start-ups of small-power, miniature-power and micro-power plants in Norway.
We observe that for small-power plants there has been a steadily decreasing establishment
rate since 1985. For miniature power stations there were relatively few entrants between 1985
and 1994, but they took off somewhat in 1995. Regarding micro-power, there were practically
no start-ups between 1985 and 1994, but we see a dramatic increase from 1995.
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Moreover, the figure reflects a conservative illustration of the contrast between miniature- and
micro-power start-ups. A number of the start-ups in the late 1990s reported a size of 100 kWh
maximum capacity, and I have modeled these "borderline" cases (between what is considered
to be miniature- and micro-power) as miniature plants. 1fthese had been identified as micro-
power plants, the contrast between the two categories would have been even more marked.
Another issue, which possibly masks the distinction in the "take off' of micro-power
compared to miniature-power, is that it is more difficult to gather reliable data on smaller
plants compared to larger ones. Regarding micro-power, there is thus a stronger likelihood to
expect a bias in underreporting than for the larger start-ups. Therefore, it is likely to assume
that the marked shift in start-ups for micro-power plants has been considerably stronger than
what we observe in Figure 1.1.
The potential for hydroelectric small power electricity production in Norway is estimated to
be around 7 billion kWh, and for micro- and miniature plants about 3 billion kWh. The total
yearly hydroelectric production in the country has been between 120 and 140 billion kWh
over the last few years, so the potential is considerable. In 2000, the total production from
micro- and miniature hydroelectric generators was roughly estimated to be 235 million kWh,
which implies that even now only a marginal fraction of the estimated capacity has been built
out (NVE).
Another central issue regarding micro-power is that these plants are considered extremely
environmentally friendly - not only in the aspect that they produce renewable, practically
clean and emission free energy compared to their larger siblings. The smaller the plant the
less visible it is. Whereas large hydroelectric stations most often require the construction of
large dams, smaller generators in many cases can be adapted to rivers that require few or no
modifications, and they can also be easily removed with practically no permanent damage to
nature. Hydroelectric micro-power plants are also established close to the end-user. This
reduces the transmission costs and also adds to depressing the demand for extension of the
grid-capacity, which entails both large investments and environmental degradation.
Finally, the emergence ofmicro-power stations is a typically rural phenomenon, and a number
of the entrepreneurs are farmers who have property rights to a nearby river. Over the recent
years there has been increasing political pressure towards reducing subsidies to rural farmers
living on marginal farmland, and accordingly, many ofthese are striving to survive
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economically. In addition, a great number have already abandoned their land. The possibility
of gaining some extra income (and also of saving money on the electricity bill for both the
household and the farm) might enable a number of actors to avoid giving up their farm, and
even encourage others to breathe new life into abandoned farms and rural communityareas.
In a country that highlights the importance of constraining pressure towards urbanization and
encourages efforts that keep alive local communities, the rise ofhydroelectric micro-power
therefore has positive effects beyond what can be gained and measured in macroeconomic
terms, I argue. Personal conversation with a representative of the technical department in a
local municipality (in Norwegian: kommune) also revealed that they considered the
emergence of efficient small hydroelectric plants as a potential for new economical growth in
the area.
Despite that per capita consumption of electricity in Norway, for instance, is roughly twice as
large as per capita consumption in the U.S., domestic demand seems to be constantly
increasing (Encyclopedia Britannica Online 2003; NVE). In a country that gets 99% of its
production from hydroelectricity (Microsoft Enearta Encyclopedia 2002), with limited
capacity of import, and where public opinion to a large extent is skeptical about building large
scale gas-fired power stations, it seems that the overall production of electricity in the future
has to come also from hydro turbines. This, however, may represent a great challenge. Figure
1.2 illustrates yearly total investments in hydroelectricity in Norway between 1960 and 1999
(in 1997 kroner [crowns]). We observe a peak in 1980 and a steady decline in the following
years. Since 1993, the investments have been relatively low. The major reason for reduced
investments is that the remaining two-fifths of economically exploitable hydroelectricity is
totally or partly constrained from being built on as result of increased concern for
environmentalism (Encyclopedia Britannica Online 2003; Stortingsmelding [Parliamentary
Report] nr. 37, 2000-2001). Thus, the period oflarge-sca1e investments in hydroelectricity
definitely seems to be over.
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Figure 1.2 Investments in hydroelectricity in 1997 million kroner between 1960 and 1999. Adapted from the
web-edition of Stortingsmelding (Parliamentary Report) Nr. 37 (2000-200 I).
Altogether, the development of new technology enabling small power plants to become
economically feasible, the ever increasing demand for electricity, the limited capacity for
import, the constraints on large scale domestic investments, and a general enhanced interest in
renewable and environmental friendly energy have paved the path for the appearance of
hydroelectric micro-power in Norway. The take offthat I have described above reflects the
emergence of a new organizational field. A web search indicates that in addition to start-up
plants, we now have an array of vendors and consultants of micro-power systems nationwide,
and interest groups have been established as well. Sintef, a Norwegian technological research
institute, is also involved in developing efficient and economically feasible hydroelectric
micro-power generators.
Micro-Power in Norway as Part of an International Trend. It is moreover worth noting that
the rise of micro-power in Norway is part of an international trend. Figure 1.3 portrays a
marked shift in U.S. venture capital investment in micro-power technology from t 996 - about
the same time that it took offin Norway - and within the next 7-8 years the market for such
equipment may be estimated at more than $60 billon a year (The Economist 2000).
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Figure 1.3 U.S. venture- capital investment in micro-power technology, $m. Adapted from the web-edition of
The Economist (2000).
According to The Economist (2000), there are three reasons for the increased interest in
micro-power. One is market liberalization. About half of America's state governments have
now forced their electricity monopolies to face competition. In the European Union, a
directive that took effect in 1999 ordered member governments to face competition in their
wholesale market for electricity. Many developing countries as well, from India to Argentina,
have embraced deregulation and privatization. Small, local plants offer a cheap way into such
markets. New micro-power plants - using either natural gas or renewable energy - are not
only smaller, nimbler and cleaner than older and larger plants, they are also closer to the end-
user. Even ifthe power they produce is more costly at the source - which it often is - they do
not suffer huge transmission losses when sending it to consumers. On top ofthat, the surplus
heat they generate can be employed for useful purposes, such.as warming buildings, whereas
the excess from big generators located in the middle of the countryside is usually wasted.
When Thomas Edison set up his first heat-and-power cogeneration plant near Wall Street
more than 100 years ago, he thought the best way to meet customers' needs would be to set
up networks of decentralized power plants in or near homes and offices. Now, after a century
of power stations becoming ever larger, transmission grids spreading ever wider and central
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planners growing ever stronger, this may change. Local generation for local consumption is
back in fashion and Edison's dream is being revived (The Economist 2001).3
A second reason for the rise of micro-power is environmentalism. Ever-higher emission
standards have made it unattractive to build new coal-fired plants in the rich world. America
still gets more than half of its electricity from coal, but only because many older plants have
been "grandfathered", and do not have to meet strict newemission standards. Europe has been
more aggressive than America in pushing industry to adopt cleaner forms of power
generation. In addition, micro-generators are extremely clean. The worst ofthem burn natural
gas - a reasonably benign fuel. Others use hydrogen, wind, sunlight, manpower, and some
produce renewable hydroelectricity.
A third reason is the demand for reliable, uninterrupted power. Karl Stahlkoph, the head of
the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), an industry-financed, American research body,
reckons that micro-power will take off in the U.S., where brownouts and blackouts are an
ever-increasing problem (The Economist 2000). These issues have altogether stimulated the
search for small, clean, reliable and above all, relatively cheap generating technologies that
now are emerging.
The dawn of decentralized micro-power means that society at large no longer has to depend of
the vagaries of the grid to the same extent, and it is more responsive to the needs of the
consumer. This is a compelling advantage in rich countries, where the digital revolution is
fuelling the thirst for high-quality, reliable power that the antiquated grid seems unable to
deliver. California provides the best example: although the utilities have not built a single
power plant over the last decade, individuals and companies have added 6 billion kWh of
non-utility ofmicro-power over that period, roughly the equivalent of the state's installed
nuclear capacity (The Economist 200 l).
The argument in favor of micro-power is even more persuasive in developing countries,
where the grid has largely failed the poor and 3 billion people are without reliable access to
3 It is, however, also necessary to mention that Edison's dream of small decentralized micro-power plants was
conceived at a time when the transformer technology had not yet been developed. 100 years ago it was
impossible to transport large amounts of electricity over long distances.
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electricity (The Economist 2000). Gary Mittleman, the boss of Plug Power, estimates that it
costs between $1,000 and $1,500 per kWh to build or replace electricity grids in developing
countries. In such places, micro-power is already an attractive option, and international
agencies such as the World Bank, as well as private sector operators and non-governmental
groups, are devising "rnicrofinance" schemes to help bring electricity to the poor in such
countries as Mongolia and India (The Economist 2000).
Nevertheless, the rise of micro-power does not mean that grid power is dead. On the contrary,
argues CERA, a robust grid may be an important part ofmicro-power future. In poor
countries, the grid is often so shoddy and inadequate that distributed energy could well
supplant it. However, in rich countries, where nearly everyone has access to power, micro-
power is much more likely to grow alongside the grid. Not only can the owners of distributed
generators tap into the grid for back-up power, but utilities can install micro-power plants
close to consumers to avoid grid bottlenecks (The Economist 2001).
Micro-power may also change the way electricity grids operate - turning them from
dictatorial monopolies into democratic marketplaces. Add a bit of information technology to a
micro-generator and it will be able to both monitor itself and to talk to other plants on the
grid. Visionaries see a future in which dozens, even hundreds, of disparate micro-power units
are linked together in so-called "micro-grids". These networks could be made up of all sorts
of power units, from solar cells to micro-turbines to fuel cells, depending on the needs of
individual users and the abilities and comparative advantages of different producers (The
Economist 2000).
The Western Region of Norway
As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, this study addresses the concept of social
capitalon the emerging hydroelectric micro-power field in Western Norway. The region
constitutes the four counties (in Norwegian: fylker) Rogaland, Hordaland, Sogn & Fjordane,
Møre &Romsdal. There are three reasons why I have limited the study to start-ups in this
area.
First, data provided from NVE (2000) on the development of the micro-power field clearly
shows that this is a phenomenon that predominantly has taken place in this region. With the
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exception of Nord-Trøndelag (the northern part of Mid-Norway), there have by and large only
been sporadic startups in other counties. In Nord-Trøndelag, however, the startups have not
reached the same number as in any county in the Western Region of Norway. Thus, the four
counties Rogaland, Hordaland, Sogn & Fjordane, and Møre & Romsdal compose a
geographically connected area with the largest numbers of start-ups.
Second, the western region of Norway constitutes a relatively homogenous climatic zone
where temperature and westerly winds create abundant precipitation. The eastern region, on
the other hand, receives comparably little rain, due to the range of mountains that separates
the regions and has a much colder climate in the winter. Other regions in Norway also
represent different climatic zones. In this study, I have controlled for deviations in
precipitation, yet by gathering data from micro-power start-ups only in Western Norway, I
avoided disturbances in the dataset created from possible complex interaction effects between
average rainfall, deviation in precipitation and other climatic conditions such as the amount of
snow and ice. The latter issue here is of great importance since temperature and hence the
snow and ice partake in predicting the distribution of the flow of river water throughout the
year. Other things being equal, there will be little water in the river as long as the ground
temperature in the catchment area of the water system is below oDe, whereas melting snow
increases the level. Personal communication with entrepreneurs has also taught me that in
manyoccasions, ice complicates the intake ofwater into the production systems, and this is
likely to affect total electricity production.
Third, regarding geological ground conditions, Western Norway represents a comparatively
homogenous area. The soil is barren in this region, which implies that the terrain absorbs
relatively little rainfall. This makes the level of flowing water in the rivers vulnerable to
variations in precipitation. In the eastern part of Norway, on the other hand, the soil absorbs a
larger percentage of the rainfall, and a consequence ofthis is that the water level in the rivers
is less vulnerable to such variations. In other words, the western region of Norway lacks a
natural water regulation mechanism for the level of flow of water in the rivers due to the
overall barren soil in this area (personal communication with an engineer and expert in small-
scale hydroelectricity).
Summed up, the growth ofhydroelectric micro-power plants in Norway has predominately
taken place in the Western region of the country, and this is the major reason for why I have
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constrained the empirical setting in this study to the four counties Rogaland, Hordaland, Sogn
& Fjordane, Møre & Romsdal. In addition, this area represents a relatively homogenous zone
for both climatic and geological conditions.
A Short Introduction to Applied Methodology in this Study
I conducted a network study on social contacts among actors within the emerging
hydroelectric micro-power field in Western Norway. The phrase "social network" refers to a
set of actors and the ties among them, which implies that theories, models and applications
within this perspective are to be expressed in terms of relational concepts or processes
(Wasserman and Faust 1994). Relations defined by linkages among units are considered
fundamental. Wasserman and Faust (1994) emphasized that actors and their actions are to be
viewed as interdependent rather than depicted as independent autonomous units, and
relational ties between actors are channels for transfer of information or material assets.
Thus, what characterizes a social network approach is the sharing oftangible or intangible
resources on relationships among the units. This perspective differs in fundamental ways from
standard social and behavioral science research. Rather than merely focusing on the attributes
of autonomous individual units, this approach views characteristics of the social units as
arising out of structural processes where relational ties among actors are primary and
attributes of actors are secondary (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Given a relevant collection of
actors, social network analysis can then be used to study the structural variables measured for
actors in the set.
Network data for this study was gathered from hydroelectric micro-power start-ups in
Western Norway between September 2002 and January 2003. The plants from which I
gathered data were established in the region between 1994-200 l. I applied a so-called "snow-
ball" sampling procedure where previously unrecognized candidates were captured by
indications from already identified and approached actors. The total sample of start-ups from
which I have network data is 23, representing a response rate of 92% from relevant actors.
Network variables at actor level and niche level represent predictors of social capital and
comprise independent variables in this study. I also gathered data on autonomous actor
attributes such as total financial investments at the plant and yearly electricity production,
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which was modeled as the dependent variable. Details about how I modeled network variables
and the dependent variable are given in Chapter 4. There I also depict a number of control
variables that I have applied in the study.
Outline
The outline of the dissertation is as follows: In the next chapter, I first discuss the concepts of
organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) and ecological niches (Burt and Talmud
1993; DiMaggio 1986). Next, I present a general overview of the term social capital and
describe how the concept can emphasize either the focal actor's external relations or relational
characteristics for collectives. I furthermore argue how cross-level and mixed-determinant
models possessing both these approaches to social capital can enhance a researcher' s
understanding of the concept. For illustrative purposes, I address level issues by analyzing
two different networks. One is artificial, whereas the second is adapted from Padgett's (1987)
study on marital relationships between 15 prominent Florentine families during Italy's
renaissance. The last section, which concludes the chapter, is intended to explain in particular
what the two approaches to social capital - focal actor' s external relations and relational
characteristics for collectives - entail. I also clarify limitations of the scope of the study, and
finally address a research question.
In Chapter 3 I elaborate a number ofhypotheses where I first apply each start-up's network
position in the field (i.e. focal actor's external relations) and niche characteristics (i.e.
relational characteristics for collectives) as the independent variables. This accordingly
implies cross-level and mixed-determinant approaches to the concept ofsocial capital. Next, I
shift the focus outward from network variables and address issues from population ecology
theory and institutional theory. Here, I question whether the start-up success/failure of either
an early or late adopter in an emerging field is a possible outcome of population density
(Hannan 1986) or mimetic behavior (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).
Chapter 4 addresses the research methodology that I have applied in this dissertation. I
describe in detail how I gathered the data and modeled the dependent variable, independent
variables and control variables.
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The hypotheses are empirically tested in Chapter 5. In addition to presenting and discussing
the results, I also give emphasis to other potentially interesting findings that are not
necessarily reflected in the proposed hypotheses.
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation. Here, I highlight the study's contribution to the field of
organization studies in general and social capital theory in particular. I portray a few practical
implications from the findings in this study, address some limitations, and finally point out
avenues for further research.
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2. Theory, Conceptual Clarifications, and Research
Question
In this chapter, I elaborate the concept of organizational fields within the social network
perspective first. l also argue that a convenient approach to study subsets of organizational
actors in a field is to conduct block-modeling techniques to distinguish structurally equivalent
actors, defined as ecological niches (Burt and Talmud 1993). Next, l present a brief overview
of the very concept of social capital, and describe how a focus on focal actor' s external
relations and relational characteristics for collectives entail different approaches to the term. I
furthermore illustrate how cross-level and mixed-determinant models possessing these forms
of social capital represent metaphors of focal actor's network position in the field and niche
characteristics, respectively. For illustrative purposes, I address level issues in the study of
two different networks. The first is artificial, whereas the second is adapted from Padgett's
(1987) study on marital relationships between 15 prominent Florentine families during Italy's
renaissance. The last section, which concludes the chapter, is intended to explain in particular
what the two approaches to social capital- focal actor's external relations and relational
characteristics for collectives - entail. I also clarify limitations of the scope of the study, and
finally address a research question.
Organizational Fields and Ecological Niches
Organizational Fields and the Social Network Perspective
Organizational Fields. The emergence of the organizational field paradigm in organization
and political studies has challenged scholars throughout the research community about how to
approach and uncover corporate and political issues within this framework. The concept is
defined as "those organizations [or corporate actors} that, in the aggregate, constitute a
recognized area of institutionallife: key suppliers and product consumers, regulatory
agencies, and other organizations [or corporate actors} that produce similar services and
products" (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 64-65).
Lauman, Galaskiewicz et al. (1978: 456) held that functional differentiation of organizational
roles, reliance of individuals on bureaucratic organizations, and increasing rates of individual
mobility all create situations where corporate actors are the most stable and efficacious
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participants in community life. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1991), the virtue of the
field approach is that it directs the attention not simply to competing firms, as does the
population approach (Hannan and Freeman 1977), but to the totality of relevant actors. At the
nationallevel, Scott and Meyer (1983) observed a trend toward "societal sectorialization,"
whereby the key actors in functional areas such as health, communications, or education are
national systems of organizations coordinated through potent but fragmented network ties.
Studies of organizational fields, thus, promise to reconstitute large portions of macro-
sociology at the inter-organizational rather than the societallevel (DiMaggio and Powell
1991). For instance, if earlier work on education tended to regard the structure of schools as
"emerging" out of macro-social changes in value systems (Dreeben 1968), or the needs of
corporate elites (Bowles and Gintis 1976), later research located changes in the organization
of schools in the specific structure of relations between federal, state, district, and school-level
educational authorities (Meyer 1979). Furthermore, more recent research has focused on the
market and inter-organizational factors that affect market-segmentation strategies of specific
media organizations (DiMaggio 1977), and political scientists have focused on the specific
relationships between state agencies and external organizational constituencies as
determinants of public policies (Block 1977; Skocpol and Finegold 1982; Useem 1984).
The Social Network Perspective. In order to get a better understanding of the organizational
field paradigm, it is helpful to give a brief presentation of what the social network perspective
implies. Compared with the organizational field paradigm, I hold that the two lines of
thinking complement one another. Whereas the former portrays conceptual content, the social
network perspective establishes a methodological framework (which - in addition to
organizational fields and ecological niches - can be applied to numerous other theoretical
approaches within the area of social science). The phrase "social network" refers to a set of
actors and the ties among them (Wasserman and Faust 1994). This implies that theories,
models and applications within this perspective are to be expressed in terms of relational
concepts or processes. Accordingly, relations defined by linkages among units are considered
fundamental. Wasserman and Faust (1994) emphasized that actors and their actions are to be
viewed as interdependent rather than depicted as independent autonomous units, and
relational ties between actors are channels for transfer of information or material assets. Thus,
what characterizes the social network approach is the sharing of tangible or intangible
resources on relationships among the units, illustrated in the following example:
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Let us suppose we are interested in corporate behavior in a large, metropolitan area, for example the level of
types and monetary support given to local non-profit and charitable organizations (see, for example,
Galaskiewicz 1985). Standard social and economic science approaches would first define a population of
relevant units (corporations), take a random sample ofthem (ifthe population is quite large), and then measure a
variety of characteristics (such as size, profitability, level of support for local charities or other non-profit
organizations, and so forth). The key assumption here is that the behavior of a specific unit does not influence
any other units. However, network theorists take exception to this assumption. It does not take much insight to
realize that there are many ways that corporations decide to do things they do (such as support non-profits with
donations) In order to get a complete description ofthis behavior, we must look to corporate relationships,
such as shared board of director members, mutual acquaintances of corporate officers, joint business dealings,
and other relational variables (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 7).
Thus, the network perspective differs in fundamental ways from standard social and
behavioral science research. Rather than merely focusing on attributes of autonomous
individual units, or - as described above - emphasizing "something" emerging out of
macrosocial changes in value systems (Dreeben 1968), this approach views characteristics of
the social units as arising out of structural processes where relational ties among actors are
primary and attributes of actors are secondary. Given a collection of actors, social network
analysis can then be used to study the structural variables measured on actors in the set. The
concept of a network thus emphasizes the fact that each individual actor has tie(s) to other
actor(s), each ofwhom in turn is tied to one or a number of others.
An analyst using this approach would seek to model these relationships to depict the structure
of actors, and next he could study how this structure evolves over time or investigate the
impact of the structure on actors in the network. To be more precise: Structural variables are
measured on pairs of relations/ties among actors. Examples of such ties can be individual
evaluations such as friendship, liking and respect, transactions of material resources, strategic
alliances between otherwise independent firms, exchange of information and advice, direct
interactions, etc. A variety of different measurements can be applied in order to uncover
network properties for the network as whole, subsets of actors, or individual units within the
observed structure. Statistical methods can, in turn, be exercised to model relationships
between different network properties, or relationships between network properties and actor
attributes (Wasserman and Faust 1994).
28
Ecological Niches
The outline above describes how the social network perspectives can be applied to the study
of organizational fields. Thus, if a researcher is interested in conducting research in a given
field, this line of attack proposes (among other things) careful examination of structural
relations between recognized and relevant actors. Of course, the research question and motive
of the study should serve as primary guidelines in how to undertake such tasks, yet one
recommended technique - which I also implicitly mentioned above - is to somehow partition
the field into subsets of actors. Aldrich (1978), Knoke and Rogers (1979) refer to the tendency
of inter-organizational networks to develop "stable action sets" or "central cores" of dominant
organizations, whereas DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 471) refer to "the emergence of sharply
defined interorganizational structures of domination and patterns of coalition" in the
development of organizational fields. Thus, partition is often desirable on practical grounds as
a means of representing complex relational patterns with clarity (Aldrich and Whetten 1981:
385).
A central issue is how to conduct proper partitions of organizational fields into sets of
corporate actors, and a number of approaches have been suggested. Below, I briefly illustrate
partition based on the naturalistic approach, partition based on classification of attributes,
partition based on structural cohesion, and finally emphasize why partition based on structural
equivalence is perceived to constitute the better option.
The simplest way to partition an organizational field is on the basis of a priori commonsense,
to categorize organizational forms such as distinction between firms in manufacturing,
finance, or extraction field. This has been called the naturalistic approach. Yet in a number of
cases "researchers who use naturalistic definitions of subgroups run the risk of missing
aspects ofstructure that should be central to analysis - as when ... a population of
organizations that share a simple nominalist label (e.g. universities) contains subsets of
organizations that behave in systematically different ways with respect to some outcome with
which the investigator is concerned" (DiMaggio 1986: 341-342).
Classification on the basis of attributes can imply using bimodalities in percentage of industry
sales to partition industry leaders from other firms, or more complex; partition on the basis of
discriminant analysis of organization scores on a battery of variables. However, such
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partitions are likely to confound relational concepts with attribute measures that are more
appropriately treated as variables that can explain the formation of relational networks, or
dependent variables resulting from firms' structural position (DiMaggio 1986: 342).
Partition methods based on cohesion use matrices or graphs to represent presence or absence
of ties between pairs of actors in order to partition those who interact maximally with one
another, and minimally with other members in the field. Such methods range from informal
approaches to clique detection techniques (Alba 1973), and N-dimensional space
(Galaskiewicz 1979; Laumann and Pappi 1976). DiMaggio (1986) argued that such partitions
are far superior to naturalistic attribute-based classification, in that they permit assignment of
organizations to subgroups independent of factors thought to affect or be affected by the
structure of group relations. Nonetheless, cohesion-based partitions do not fully exploit the
data available in sociomatrices (Burt 1982), and are consequently often unable to discern sets
of corporate actors that share similar relations to other actors without necessarily interacting
with one another (Arabie, Boorman and Levitt 1978).
The alternative means of partitioning a field based on observed relations among the members
is to divide it into structurally equivalent positions; actors in each subset share similar
relations with actors in other subsets, whether or not they are connected to another. Imagine a
field of organizational actors connected by flows of information. Subset A shares information
with subset B, yet neither A nor B share information with one another. An attempt to partition
this population based on cohesion would be unlikely to discern any cliques; it would instead
yield a picture of an amorphously structured field consisting of no center and a large
periphery. By contrast, structural-equivalence analysis would yield two clearly defined
structural positions, occupied by the actors in subsets A and B, respectively (DiMaggio 1986).
Structural-equation approaches are thus more likely than cohesion approaches to identify sets
of non-cliquing patterns familiar to scholars conducting research on inter-organizational
fields. Among other things, they can indicate roles distributed among actors according to
similarity in communication structures (Greve and Salaff 200 I), discern patron-client patterns
at the subpopulation level, identify occupants of positions in center-periphery structures,
where outliers transact only with dominant actors (Meyer 1979), and elucidate brokerage or
agency structures (White 1983). Structural equivalence also indicates groups of actors with
shared cognitions (Carley 1986; Galaskiewicz and Burt 199I).
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A clique is ordinarily a special case ofstructurally equivalent positions. Consequently, where
c1iquing patterns are present in the data, analyses based on structural-equivalence criteria will
converge with cohesion approaches in the identification of subgroups (except the special case
in which clique members' relations are so systematically different as to outweigh their shared
mutual ties) (DiMaggio 1986). Cohesion analysis is consistent with Homans 's (1958) version
of exchange theory, particularly the proposition that interaction creates liking and liking
creates interaction. Structural-equivalence analysis, on the contrary, is akin to (and in fact,
theoretically derived from) role theory, where the premise is that actors with similar patterns
of relations to other units are more similar even ifthey do not interact with one another
directly (White, Breiger and Boorman 1976).
Burt and Talmud (1993) defined an ecological niche as a subset of structurally equivalent
actors, and block model techniques can be applied to identify such partitions (White, Breiger
and Boorman 1976). A block-model splits actors in the network into discrete ecological
niches, and each such pair states the presence or absence of ties within or between them
(Wasserman and Faust 1994). Previously, I have referred to tendencies ofinter-organizational
networks to develop "stable action sets" or "central cores" of dominant organizations (Aldrich
1978; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Knoke and Rogers 1979) as motivating factors of
somehow partitioning organizational field into subsets. Moreover, there are many instances in
which structural causes of organizational outcomes may have different consequences for
organizations that occupy different partitions in an organizational field, ... [and] many of our
theories, explicitly or implicitly, lead to expectations about relations among sets of
organizations, rather than single organizations" (DiMaggio 1986: 341). Partitions of fields
are particularly important for research on flows of innovation (DiMaggio and Powell 1983),
personnel (Baty, Evan and Rothermel 1971), or information (Boorman and Levitt 1983).
Accordingly, a block-model approach to study such patterns should serve as a viable option to
uncover complex issues regarding ecological niches.
Later I describe how statistical techniques can be applied in order to perform block-modeling
tasks. Armed with the outlines of fields and niches above, [ also elaborate how these concepts
are congruent with approaches to social capital that emphasize either focal actor's external
relations or relational characteristics for collectives. First, however, [ present a brief and
general overview of the very concept of social capital.
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The Concept of Social Capital
A Brief Historical Overview
The first appearance of the concept ofsocial capital in the scientific literature was in
Marshal' s (1890) book on the "Principles of Economics". Yet, he used the term to refer to
different kinds of physical capital. Hanifan (1920) was the first scholar who employed the
concept in its present meaning to describe how people get help and support from those in their
social network. Yet it would take a period of more than 40 years before the term reappeared in
a similar context on community studies (Hannerz 1969; Jacobs 1965).4Loury (1977; 1987)
used social capital in the area of child psychology, whereas Bourdieu (1972; 1980) developed
the term in reference to cultural capital. Wellman (1981) applied the concept in his network
study on social support. The first researchers who explicitly used social capital in studies of
organizations were Flap and De Graf (1986) in their investigation of job mobility.
Seminal works ofColeman (1988; 1990), Burt (I992a), and Putnam (1993; 1995; 2000) have
further pioneered the proliferation of social capital in the social sciences. Coleman developed
a general wide-scale theory of social capital in relation to the study of actors who are pursuing
interest driven goals, in describing how "closed" and dense networks may create normative
sanctioning mechanisms, finely grained information sharing, higher levels of trust, and
consequently decreased fear of opportunism. It is probably to date the most widely used
framework by organizational scholars (Gabbay and Leenders 1999).
The work of Burt (1992a) was important in its wide visibility among researchers along with
his explicit emphasis on actors who are described as competing players in the market place. In
his study of managerial mobility in a high technology firm, he was also the first to introduce a
quantitative measure for social capital. Whereas White, Boorman et al. (1976) suggested that
the absence of ties could provide an advantage, Burt (l992a) showed that actors who were
connected to disconnected others (i.e. spanned structural holes) advanced faster in the
corporation under study. The causal motor behind this pattern, he argued, is the advantage of
playing the role as gatekeeper, in addition to accessing non-redundant information from
different sources.
4 Before this, use of concept reappeared in Hicks (1942) but with the same interpretation as Marshal (1890).
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Putnam (1993) has been influential in his application of social capital to macro development
policy issues, some ofwhich are used by macro world-bank policy makers. In another
influential contribution, "Bowling alone", he argued that social capital has declined in the
United States since the population is now far less likely to become members of community
organizations, clubs or associations than they were in the 1950s. Putnam (1995; 2000)
illustrated his thesis by charting the decline of bowling leagues.
A number of network studies that did not explicitly employ the term social capital, have also
been important in the discussion of the concept. Laumann (1973) presented a comprehensive
overview of the form and substance of plural urban networks, whereas Granovetter (1973) in
his seminal paper, "The strength ofweak ties", greatly influenced the framework when he
proposed that weak ties enable the focal actor to access non-redundant information from
disparate parts of the system.' Lin and colleagues (Lin 1982; Lin, Ensel and Vaughn 1981)
have shown how the status and information availability of an alter positively influenced the
attainment of occupational status. Scholars have also argued that possessing a central network
position is most likely expected to be positive for the focal actor. It is interpreted to represent
efficiency, visibility, independence, more alternatives available, and avoidance ofrelying on
mediating positions for access to vital information (Brass and Burkhardt 1992; Freeman 1979;
Stephenson and Zelen 1989).
Central Aspects
Social capital has now gained increasing attention in a variety of disciplines and schools of
thought, such as economics, political science, management science, and sociology. This is
also reflected in an increasing body ofliterature that discusses the term (for reviews, see for
instance Adler and Kwon 2000; Adler and Kwon 2002; Burt 2000; Foley and Edwards 1999;
Lin 1999; Lin 200 l; Partes 1998; The Economist 2003; Woolcock 1998; Woolcock and
Narayan 2000). Moreover, the concept has achieved prominence as a potential answer to
researchers' call for "a good network theory of organization" in describing "how structures
5 Granovetter's (1973) "weak ties" argument has been criticized by Burt (I 992b: 73) who stated that the causal
agent in the phenomenon is not the tie itself, but rather the structural hole it spans. "The weakness is a correlate,
not a cause ", he asserted. But after controlling for "redundancy effects", Hansen (1999) still found that weak
interunit ties helped project teams to search for useful knowledge in other subunits. This effect he attributed to
the low cost of maintaining non-binding relationships.
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of interactions enable coordinated interaction to achieve collective and individual interests"
(Salancik 1995: 348).
However, despite its popularity, or perhaps even because of it, until recently social capital has
not been uniformly defined and scholars have argued that lack of conceptual consistency may
risk the term being used as a metaphor per se (Burt 1992a; Gabbay and Leenders 200 l).
Skeptics have characterized social capital, for instance, as "a wonderfully elastic term"
(Lappe and Du Bois 1997: 119), a notion that means "many things to many people" (Naryan
and Prichett 1997: 2), and that has taken on a "circus tent quality" (De Souza Briggs 1997:
111).
In a recent influential contribution on social capital, Lin (200 l) tried to provide an answer to
such critical voices by building a coherent and explicit theory of the concept. One ofhis major
concerns was to explain what the term "capital" entails. After taking the reader through the
classic Marxian view of capital, followed by a discussion of human capital along with cultural
capital, he addressed a thesis of social capital as capital captured through social relations. In
this perspective, he argued, "capital is seen as a social asset by virtue of actors' connections
and access to resources in the network or group of which they are members" (Lin 2001: 19).
He also strongly emphasized that scholars must avoid a functionalist view of the term as
adopted by Coleman (1990: 302), who stated that "social capital is defined by its function ".
Lin (2001: 28) warned that such a view "may implicate a tautology ... It would be impossible
to build a theory in which causal effectual factors are folded into a singular
function [and} incorrect to allow the outcome variables to dictate the specification of the
causal variable. " He defined social capital as "resources embedded in social networks that
are accessed and used by actors for actions" (Lin 200 l: 25). The concept has two important
components: First, it represents resources embedded in social relations rather than individuals,
and this implies that we are avoiding a functionalist view by not capturing the concept by its
effects or outcomes.
Nevertheless, Lin (200 l: 28) emphasized, "[t}his is not to deny that a functional relationship
may be hypothesized ... ", which shifts the focus to the latter part of the definition. Social
capital "should explain how access to social resources can be mobilized for gains - the
process of activation" (Lin 200 l: 29). With regard to empirical evidence of network
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predictors of the concept, however, empirical findings are largely inconclusive. For instance,
whereas a number of studies support Granovetter's (1973) weak tie argument (for a review,
see Granovetter 1982), Krackhardt and Stem (Krackhardt 1992; Krackhardt and Stem 1988)
posited and illustrated empirically that the pattern of strong friendship ties within a firm is
critical to an organization's ability to deal with crises and radical challenges. Findings from a
large electronics company have furthermore revealed that weak inter-unit ties helped project
teams to search for useful knowledge in other subunits, but impeded the transfer of complex
knowledge, which tended to require a strong tie between the two parties to a transfer (Hansen
1999).
A number of studies have also indicated support for Burt's (1992a) structural holes argument
(for a review, see Burt 2000), whereas other contributions have showed opposite results
(Ahuja 2000a; Hansen 1999). Ahuja (2000a) found that spanning of structural holes from
strategic alliances among firms in the chemical industry depressed innovative output in terms
of patents issued, while a similar inter-unit network pattern increased project completion time
at the unit level in an electronic company (Hansen 1999). These latter findings are
accordingly in line with Coleman' s (1988; 1990) "closure" argument rather than Burt' s
"structural holes" theory.
Numerous studies seem to support arguments of the benefits from possessing a central
network position (Ahuja 2000a; Baum, Calabrese and Silverman 2000; e.g. Baum and Oliver
1991; Choonwoo, Lee and Pennings 2001; Shan, Walker and Kogut 1994; Smith-Doerr,
Owen-Smith and Powell 1999; Stuart 2000; Stuart, Hoang and Hybels 1999). Greve,
Golombek et al. (200 I), however, revealed a curvilinear relationship with the shape of
positive 2nd degree polynomials between pulp and paper mills' centrality in the field and
pollution levels. The same study also showed that the interaction effect between education
level and centrality depressed pollution level, and other contributions have also revealed
interaction effects on the outcome between inter-firm links and organizational characteristics
such as age, technological capabilities, and financial resources (Baum and Oliver 1991;
Choonwoo, Lee and Pennings 2001; Smith-Doerr, Owen-Smith and Powell 1999; Stuart
2000; Stuart, Hoang and Hybels 1999).
Altogether, the review suggests that both weak and strong ties may induce positive outcomes;
the spanning of structural holes seems to be beneficial in some circumstances and negative in
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others, network centrality can predict linear and non-linear effects on outcome and moreover
seems to be contingent upon firm characteristics. The divergences of the findings thus
indicate that contextual issues appear to be involved in explaining outcomes and accordingly
must be taken into consideration in social capital studies.
Lin's (2001: 25) definition of social capital portrayed the term as "resources embedded in
social networks ... ", and in my empirical context this implies the start-up's network position
in the emerging field through his external ties and characteristics of the ecological niche into
which he is embedded (i.e. relational characteristics for collectives). I did not explicitly
conduct research on Granovetter's (1973) "weak tie" theory or Burt's (1992a) "structural
hole" approach, yet access to non-redundant information is a part of the development of two
hypotheses. Moreover, I hold that redundancy issues are contextually dependent on niche
characteristics, so I intend to show how both dense network ties (Coleman 1988; 1990) within
niches and contacts to disparate parts of the system (Burt l992a; Freeman 1979; Granovetter
1973) share in expanding our understanding of the concept of social capital.
In order to conduct such tasks, I present below two approaches to social capital, namely focal
actor's external ties and relational characteristics for collectives. Moreover, I intend to
illustrate how these perspectives represent metaphors of different levels of analysis in the
study of the concept.
Actor's External Relations, Relational Characteristics for
Collectives, and Levellssues
Two Different Approaches to Social Capital
Most studies that explicitly or implicitly address the concept of social capital either emphasize
the focal actor's external relations or examine relational characteristics for collectivities
(Adler and Kwon 2000; Gittel and Vidal 1998; Putnam 2000). These different approaches to
social capital can best be explained, I argue, through the illustration of a simplistic and
hypothetical network as shown in Figure 2.1.
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Bl B2
Al A2
Cl C2
Figure 2.1 Social network structure of a hypothetical organizational field.
Here I portray a structural network or an organizational field consisting of six actors, Al, Bl,
Cl, A2, B2, and C2. The lines illustrate symmetric and dichotomous network ties between
pairs of actors. Intuitively we observe two subsets of actors, namely the "ones" and the
"twos". A block-modeling technique such as Concor (Convergence of iterated correlations)
(Breiger, Boorman and Arabie 1975; White 1983; White, Boorman and Breiger 1976) also
makes a similar split, so these subsets can be identified as two distinct ecological niches. For
curiosity's sake, we furthermore observe the niches are cohesive with maximum contact or
density within them, whereas the tie between A 1 and A2 is the only contact between the
niches in the field.
Ifwe denied the existence ofniches and merely hypothesized that each actor's external
relations would be reflected in outcome, we would be likely to expect identical results for A l
and A2, B l and B2, C 1 and C2, due to their equal network positions in the field. For instance,
A l and A2 are able to reach each actor to whom they are not directly connected in fewer steps
than the other nodes; whereas A 1 only has to pass through A2 in order to reach B2, Bl has to
pass through both A 1 and A2 in order to reach the same node. Thus, for B l the distance is
twice as long as it is for A 1. A 1 also has two indirect contacts (B2 and C2) whereas Bl has
only one indirect contact (A2). We furthermore observe that Al and A2 have direct contact
with three nodes, whereas the other actors are directly connected to only two nodes. Summed
up, this approach is congruent with the approach to social capital that studies the focal actor's
external relations, which intends to explain the differential success (or failure) of individuals
and firms by their configuration of direct and indirect links to other nodes (Adler and Kwon
2000; Gittel and Vidal 1998; Putnam 2000).
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A great number of contributions - that either implicitly or explicitly address the concept of
social capital, and where the dependent variable is attainment of gains for the focal actor -
comprise the focal actor's external relations. Studies have discovered that organization
configurations of direct and indirect inter-firm links predict performance on a variety of
parameters such as chance ofsurvival, patenting activity, revenues, time to IPO, stock-market
value at IPO, etc. (Ahuja 2000a; Baum, Calabrese and Silverman 2000; e.g. Baum and Oliver
1991; Choonwoo, Lee and Pennings 2001; Shan, Walker and Kogut 1994; Smith-Doerr,
Owen-Smith and Powell 1999; Stuart, Hoang and Hybels 1999).
Burt's (1992a) structural hole theory also belongs to the same camp. (fwe again look at
Figure 2.1, we observe that A 1 and A2 are the only nodes having direct access to information
from both niches. These actors can, according to Burt's argument, gain access to information
from disparate parts of the system through their external relations, and play the role of
gatekeeper to other actors within their respective niche.
Concerning the investigation of relational characteristics for collectives, the conceptual
content is somewhat ambiguous in my opinion. The major issue is the lack of a clear precision
ofwhat constitutes a set of collective actors, and the best way to illustrate this is to present a
number of definitions that capture this approach to the concept of social capital. In Table 2.1,
we see a variety of descriptions such as "citizens" (Brehm and Rahn), "social structure"
(Coleman), "groups and organizations ", "members of a group" (Fukuyama), "a culture"
(lnglehart), "social organization" (Putnam), and "civil society" (Thomas). In this regard, it is
essential to bear in mind that a definition is neither right nor wrong, only more or less useful
(Grønhaug and Kaufmann 1988). Depending on the research question and purpose of study,
such a variety of what constitutes a "collective" is accordingly defendable. Yet at the same
time, focus can be lost in order to uncover underlying processes that one way or another are
expected to produce some kind of (hopefully) positive outcome for members of an identified
collective,"
6 Other relevant approaches to study collective forms of social capital are to conduct comparisons between
identified collectives or comparisons between actors inside or outside a given collective. For an excellent
discussion ofhow to compare relationships between structurally equivalent niches, see Wasserman and Faust
(1994: 417-423).
38
Brehm and Rahn (1997:
999)
Coleman (1990: 302)
Fukuyama (1995: 10)
Fukuyama (1997)
Inglehart (1997: 188)
Portes and Sensenbrenner
(1993: 1323)
Putnam (1995: 67)
Thomas (1996: 11)
"the web of cooperative relationships between citizens that
facilitates resolution of collective action problems."
"Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity,
but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in
common: They all consist of some aspect of social structure,
and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within
the structure."
"the ability ofpeople to work together for common purposes in
groups and organizations."
"Social capital can be defined simply as the existence of certain
sets of informal values or norms shared among members of a
group that permit cooperation among them."
"a culture of trust and tolerance, in which extensive networks of
voluntary associations emerge."
"those expectations for action within a collectivity that affect
the economic goals and goal-seeking behavior of its members,
even ifthese expectations are not oriented toward the economic
sphere."
"features of social organization such as networks, norms, and
social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for
mutual benefit."
"those voluntary means and processes developed within civil
society which promote the collective whole."
Table 2.1 Definitions of vcollective" forms ofsocial capital. Adapted from Adler and Kwon (2002: 20).
Previously, I have argued that a preferable way to partition an organizational field into subsets
of actors is to apply block-modeling techniques in order to identify ecological niches. This
also represents a consistent approach to capturing different collectives within a larger network
structure. Among the few studies I have found that apply such an approach is Walker, Kogut
et al.' s (1997) study of the formation of an industry network among young biotech firms.
They discovered that structurally equivalent actors had a larger propensity to establish ties
within their own niche than with organizations on the outside. Unfortunately, the authors did
not measure how the emerging structure affected performance, but in a study on pulp and
paper mills in Norway, Greve, Golombek et al. (2001) discovered that mills structurally
equivalent with universities and research institutions had lower pollution levels compared to
mills outside these niches. Thus, this latter contribution indicates that certain relational
characteristics for collectives seem to have explanatory power in portraying whether social
capital is present or not.
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If we apply the collective approach of social capital to Figure 2.1, this perspective does not
emphasize the network configuration of each actor's external relations, but rather examines
differences in organizational outcome as an effect ofbelonging to either the niche of"ones"
or "twos". In order to do this, we have to dig a little deeper than merely examine issues such
as the node's position in the field.
To my knowledge, there are no empirical studies where the focal actor's external ties and
relational characteristics for collectives have been simultaneously examined. Nor have I
observed contributions examining possible interaction effects between these two approaches.
Later I argue the importance of conducting such research, yet since this approach implies a
cross-level and multi-determinant line of attack, I elaborate in general what these level issues
imply first.
Cross-Level and Mixed-Determinant Models
Cross-level models "describe the relationship between independent and dependent variables
at different levels" (Rousseau 1985: 20). If, for instance, a model predicts that individual
group members respond to a characteristic of the group in a comparably homogenous fashion,
this cross-level model predicts within group homogeneity. That is, it predicts that both the
group characteristic (the independent variable at a higher level aggregate) and individual
behavior or outcome (the dependent variable at a lower level aggregate) is homogenous
within groups. Instead, some cross-level models predict, implicitly or explicitly, that
individual group members respond to a group-level characteristic in a disparate, rather than
homogenous fashion. Here, the model' s independent variable is homogenous within groups,
but the dependent variable is not; it varies both within and between groups (Klein, Danserau
and Hall 1994).7A theorist might furthermore posit that the independent characteristic of
group members moderates the relationship of the group characteristic to individual behavior
7 It can also imply that the independent variable is heterogeneous, i.e. the model focuses on individual attributes
relative to the group average for this attribute. This has been described as "frog pond effects" (Firebaugh 1980),
"within-group effects" (Glick and Roberts 1984), or "parts effects" (Danserau, Alutto and Yammarino 1984).
Within one context or higher level aggregate (e.g. group), a given value at a lower level aggregate (e.g.
individual characteristic or outcome) may be relatively large. Within a second context, the same value at a lower
level aggregate may be relatively small. In this dissertation, however, I do not discuss this issue any further, but
for more details and examples, see Klein, Danserau et al. (1994).
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or outcome. Group members for whom the moderator is high, respond to the group
characteristic in one way, whereas group members for whom the moderator is low, respond in
a different fashion (Bedeian, Kermery and Mossholder 1989; Bryk and Raudenbush 1992;
Danserau, Alutto and Yammarino 1984; Tate 1985). Thus, the interaction term expressing the
combined effects of the homogenous group characteristic and the independent individual
characteristic varies both within and between groups (Klein, Danserau and Hall 1994).
Mixed-determinant models suggest that predictors at a variety of levels may influence a
criterion ofinterest. For instance, market characteristics (e.g. the availability of jobs), group
characteristics (e.g. diversity within the group), and individual characteristics (e.g. job
satisfaction) have all been hypothesized to influence employee turnover (Hulin, Roznowski
and Hachiya 1985). Thus, whereas the interaction term in cross-level models produces
combined effects on individual behavior or outcome from the homogenous group
characteristic and the independent individual characteristic, mixed determinant models
generate additive effects from the same (or other) levels.
Individual
characteristics
Individual
outcome
Group
characteristics
Figure 2.2 A cross-level and mixed-determinant model.
Figure 2.2 illustrates a cross-level and mixed-determinant model. Individualoutcome in this
stylistic example can be work satisfaction, which varies among employees both within and
between groups, for instance. The independent variable at a lower level aggregate - individual
characteristic - can be the employee's educationallevel, which is also likely vary both within
and between groups. And finally, independent variable at a higher level aggregate - group
characteristic in our example - can be high or low level of pressure to group conformity.
Thus, this simple model illustrates cross-level effects by exemplifying interaction effects
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between educationallevel and level ofpressure to group conformity on work satisfaction. We
can, for instance, assume that for highly educated employees, pressure to group conformity
will have a stronger negative impact on work satisfaction than for less educated employees.
Moreover, the arrows illustrate that the same independent variables have an additional effect
on work satisfaction, and this shows that we also have a mixed-determinant model. Thus,
even after controlling for interaction effects (and level ofpressure to group conformity), a
researcher might discover that highly educated employees report overall higher work
satisfaction than less trained members of staff. At the same time - after controlling for both
interaction effects and education level - pressure to group conformity can have a negative
effect on the dependent variable.
The suggested cross-level and mixed-determinant effects on job satisfaction can be illustrated
in Figure 2.3. In Figure 2.3a, we see that high pressure for group conformity depresses
reported job satisfaction. Yet, we also observe that for employees within the group of high
pressure to conform, educational level still positively predicts the dependent variable, but at a
lower degree compared to the other group. Thus, we have both an interaction effect and
additional effects for both independent variables at different level aggregates. Altogether, this
implies that we are dealing with a model that is both cross-level and mixed-determinant. For
curiosity, I have also included Models band c. In Model b, we only observe additional effects
from the independent variables at different levels on the dependent variable (but no
interaction effects), indicating a purely mixed-determinant model. In Model c, on the other
hand, we find cross-level effects, but no additional effects.
Low Low Low
.:
group group group
Job conf. / conf. X conf.satisfaction High High High
group / group groupconf. conf. conf.
a) Educational
level
b) Educational
level
c) Educational
level
Figure 2.3 Examples of prediction effects from cross-level and mixed-determinant models.
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This simple illustration accordingly shows that a careful examination of predictors at different
levels of analysis can enhance researchers' understanding of social phenomena. Given that
Model 2.3a is the correct one, ifwe had only studied the relationship between educational
level and job satisfaction, knowledge of interaction effects with group characteristics, such as
pressure to conformity, would have been foregone. Furthermore, we would have missed the
insight that educational level still predicted the dependent variable, even after controlling for
both group level characteristics and interaction effects. Moreover, we would fail to notice that
pressure to group conformity not only interacts with educational level, but also has a unique
(negative, I assume) effect onjob satisfaction, even after controlling for the independent
variable at a lower level aggregate. In the worst case, researchers who did not address level
issues such as those in our example would have observed merely insignificant effects in their
regression analyses by not taking into account that what influences job satisfaction (possibly)
implies multi-level determinants. This would be case if Model 2.3c appeared to be the "true"
one.
Level Issues in Network Research. Ifwe turn back to the hypothetical network shown in
Figure 2.1, I would like to now describe how level issues may have impact on the focal actor
in the field. Previously I have explained how each actor's external relations capture individual
network characteristics and to quantify each node's position within the system, a number of
measures have been developed, such as network centralities (e.g. Freeman 1979) or
constraints (Burt 1992a). In turn, these measures can be applied to uncover how they affect
individual behaviour or outcome. In the methodological chapter, I describe these issues in
detail, but for the time being, I maintain that each actor' s network position in the field through
his external relations is analogue to individual characteristics, i.e. lower level aggregate.
Let us now assume that prior research has taught us that within niche "one" in Figure 2.1
there is a high level ofpressure for group conformity, whereas in niche "two" such pressure is
low or absent. This is exactly the same higher-level aggregate variable as described above.
Let us furthermore assume that each actor or node has been assigned individual tasks that can
be characterized as complex and novel. In order to highlight the importance of high or low
pressure to group conformity, the outcome for each node would have to benefit the niche as a
whole. Thus, each actor has an incentive to achieve the highest possible outcome for him, as
43
well as for the rest of the niche. Actors can exchange information on pairs of relations as
illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Ifwe only considered each node's network position through his external relations - i.e.
analogue with lower level aggregate - it would be likely to expect that A I and A2 would be in
equally advantageous positions, compared to the other nodes. They have more direct and
indirect access to information, and receive non-redundant feedback from disparate parts of the
system. We would accordingly expect similar results for A I and A2, and the rest of the nodes
(B l, C l, B2, C2), respectively, in terms of individualoutcome. Yet, contextual features may
complicate such a pattern. A high level of pressure for group conformity in niche "one" would
most likely suppress open discussion, which in turn would depress the accumulation of novel
ideas, considered essential in solving complex tasks. Thus, each node in niche "one" is likely
to suffer from this attitude, which would probably lead to lower individualoutcome (and for
the niche as a whole). In niche "two", the situation would probably be the other way around,
since open discussion encouraging a high degree of diversity of inputs would play a part in
solving complex and novel tasks.
Altogether, Iexpect that the node's network position in the field and niche characteristics
matters in solving novel and complex tasks, but we do not know how the different level
aggregates work together. Nevertheless, Iexpect that we would achieve results similar to
either models a) or b) in Figure 2.4, implying a combined cross-level and mixed-determinant
model (a), or a pure mixed-determinant model (b). Thus, being a central actor helps, but niche
characteristics (such as level ofpressure to group conformity) have a unique negative effect, I
argue (models a & b), and possibly depress the advantages ofbeing a central actor (model a)."
8 Depending on type of task, we could also assume that the situation would be the other way around. If, for
instance, the actors were assigned routine tasks with low level of complexity and novelty, a high degree of
pressure to group conformity could help to focus on the task at hand and speed up the process.
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Figure 2.4 Revised examples ofprediction effects from cross-level and mixed-determinant models.
Two Illustrations of Level Issues in Network Analysis
Illustration One. A slightly modified network in Figure 2.5 illustrates more comprehensively
how the understanding of causal mechanisms in network studies can be lost ifwe do not
carefully consider level issues." Here one actor, O l and D2, respectively has been added to
each niche. As before, the network structure is symmetric, dichotomous, and the "ones" and
"twos" possess equal individual positions through their external relations. From the figure, we
furthermore observe that A l&2, Bl &2, and C l&2 represent core players of each niche,
whereas O l&2 are distant actors. A l&2 are still the most central actors in the field, bridging
the two niches. C l&2 are the second most central actors through their connection to Dl &2.
Bl &2 are the third most central actors, and finally Dl &2 are the least central players.
9 I acknowledge DiMaggio (1986: 339-340) for the idea of this illustration.
45
Bl B2
Al A2
C2Cl
Dl 02
Figure 2.5 A modified network.
Let us furthermore suppose that the propensity for each actor to comply with the pressure of
group conformity is contingent upon how close he is to the core-players in niche "one". We
see that 02 is the most distant actor from the niche (he has to pass through C2 and A2 before
reaching Al), B2 and C2 the second most distant actors (they have to pass through A2 before
reaching A l), and A2 and Ol the third most distant actors (they have direct contact with core-
players in niche one, A2 with AI, and Dl with Cl, respectively). Thus, 02 will be negatively
affected by conformity pressure to a very low degree, but at the same time, he possesses a
distant position, constraining him to reduced input from the other parts of the network in
solving novel and complex tasks. A l is in the opposite situation. Belonging to a niche where
conformity pressure constrains output, at the same time, he holds a central position in the
network.
If a researcher overlooked how niche characteristics (Le. higher level aggregate) interacted
with the players' network position through their external ties, he could merely have obtained
insignificant results ifhe conducted analyses on actors in this field, and the following
illustration exemplifies this issue. For simplicity, I have granted the nodes in the network with
the following centrality scores: A l&2 = 3, Cl&2 = 2, Bl &2 = l, and Dl &2 = O. I moreover
gave the actors following distance scores from the core-players in Niche l: 02 = 3, C2&B2 =
2, and A2&01 = 1. Since AI, Bl, and Cl make up the core in Niche one, I gave them
distance score O. The individual task at hand is as complex and novel as before, with equal
sharing of outcome within each niche.
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Altogether, individualoutcome is a function ofnetwork position and the distance from core-
actors in Niche one. More formally:
F(network position, distance from the core in niche one) = Individualoutcome (l)
We know that, with everything else being equal, possessing a central position is positive for
individualoutcome and distance from core-players in Niche one is also positive, and the
equation below suggests such a relationship:
Individualoutcome = network position + (distance from the core in Niche one) 2 (2)
Ifwe apply the centrality scores and the distance scores to the core players in niche "one",
and furthermore assume Equation 2 to be the "true" one, individualoutcome will be as
follows: Al = 3, Bl = l, Cl = 2, Dl = l, A2 = 4, B2 = 5, C2 = 6, and 02 = 9. Let us
furthermore suppose that a researcher - lacking any prior knowledge of our "true" model
(Equation 2) - intends to uncover the underlying mechanisms behind the observed results.
a) b)
Outcome 3.875
Centrality 1.500
Outcome Modell Model2 Model3 Model4
Intercept 4.400 3.875 4.400 4.400
(2.535) (6.560) (4.221) (7.012)
Centrality -.350 -.350 -.350
(-.377) (-.628) (-1.043)
Nichel -2.125* -2.125* -2.125**
(-3.597) (-3.411) (-5.667)
Centr*Nichel 1.050*
(-3.13)
R2 .023 .683* .706* .915*
R2Adi .140 .630* .589* .851*
Mean Std Dev
-.152
2.748
1.195
Outcome .884
Central i O
.277
-1.456
Dep. var: Outcome; n =8; § p<.IO; *p <.05; **p <.01 (two tailed tests)
Skewness Kurtosis
Table 2.2 Correlation matrix and regression analyses.
The correlation matrix (Table 2.2a) indicates an insignificant effect between actor centrality
and the dependent variable, and ordinary least square regression analyses in Table 2.2b (t-
values in parentheses) reveals a similar picture in all models. Thus, if a researcher only
47
emphasized the actor's external relations he would (wrongly) conclude that individual
network position does not matter. Model 2, on the other hand, reveals that the dummy
variable for niche significantly predicts the outcome, indicating that relational characteristics
for collectives have causal power. As expected, actors in Niche I - allowing apen discussion
in solving novel and complex tasks - are likely to outperform their colleagues in Niche 2. The
parameter moreover remains stable in Model 3, which investigates possible mixed-
determinant effects (i.e. combined effects from the focal actor's network position and niche
effects). Yet ifwe now look at the interaction term between actor centrality and niche effects
in Model 4, we observe that individual network position does matter, but is contingent upon
to which niche the actor belongs. The adjusted R-square is also considerably higher here
compared with the previous models.
Altogether, from this particular case we can conclude that social capital appears to be a
mixed-determinant and cross-level phenomenon, where both the focal actor's network
position along with the relational characteristics for collectives are predictors of outcome. The
above outline can also be shown in Figure 2.6 (adapted from Model4 in Table 2.2b), which
illustrates interaction effects between niche characteristics and network centrality. In Niche 2,
being a central actor is negative, whereas the opposite is the case in Niche 1. Ifthe lines had
crossed each other as they do in Figures 2.3c and 2Ac, we would have a purely cross-level
model. Thus, broadly spoken we can say that our model "approaches" such a model.
10 _
Outcome
7,5 _ .....-.......
5 - N 2..... _ ...
2,5 - N 1
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I
O
I
1
[
2
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3
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Figure 2.6 Mixed determinant and cross-level effects. Adapted from Model 4, Table 2.2b.
Even after conducting interaction effects between the actor's network positions in the field
and dummy for which niche he belongs to, the researcher would still lack complete
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information about our "true" model. Yet, by also including Model 4 in the analyses, I argue
that he is now in a much better position to start unearthing better and more comprehensive
network predictors of actor outcome.
Illustration Two. Nevertheless, the above illustration of a cross-level and mixed-determinant
model is admittedly utterly artificial. It is therefore defendable to include another illustration,
this time with real data, compiled by Padgett (1987) and based on Kent' s (1978) history of
families in 15th Century Florence, Italy. The original dataset includes both marriage and
business ties for 116 leading Florentine families ofthis period, but in this illustration, I chose
marital ties for a collection of 15 families because of their historical prominence.l" The
family was an important economic and political unit at this time (Breiger and Pattison 1986),
and in the early 1430s a political battle was waged in Florence for control of the government,
primarily between the Medici and the Strozzi families (Padgett 1987). A marital tie exists
between a pair of families ifa member of one family marries a member of the other. Figure
2.7 illustrates the structural network on these relationships and the numbers in parentheses
portray the families' net wealth in 1427, as taken from government records. The wealth
variable thus depicts autonomous characteristics (Wasserman and Faust 1994) .
.-Pazzi (48)
.-Acciaiouli (10)
~Barbadori (55)
Figure 2.7 Marital ties between 15 Florentine families.
10 The reduced dataset - presented in both Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Borgatti, Everett et al (2002)-
contained 16 families, but since one ofthem is an isolate I deleted this node from the analyses.
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Concor (Breiger, Boorman and Arabie 1975; White 1983; White, Boorman and Breiger 1976)
identifies four ecological niches as shown in Table 2.3, whereas Table 2.4 illustrates densities
within and between each block (all network analyses are calculated in Ucinet 6.12, Borgatti,
Everett and Freeman 2002). An important issue to consider when using Concor is to decide
how fine the partition should be. Wasserman and Faust (1994: 378) held that "[tjheory and
interpretability of the solution are the primary considerations in deciding how many ...
[partitions} to produce." They furthermore argued that making too many splits can lead to
unstable correlations, due to the small number of elements. I have therefore used Concor to
divide the network into 4 niches, Le. I conducted two splits, and this is also interpretable.
Moreover, in unreported analyses I changed the number of splits, but the change in R-square
indicates no other specific saturation point.
Network density is a measure ofhow many relations (I) among (n) actors (in this case marital
ties among Florentine families) exist compared to the maximum possible number of relations,
1/[ n(n-l )/2]. The overall density (block alpha) in this network is .191. Density levels larger
than the block alpha (presented in bold) are considered to be large, portraying niches that are
either densely connected within themselves and/or with other niches. Thus, the matrix in
Table 2.4 reveals how members are connected within and between niches.
Niche 1 Niche 2 Niche 3 Niche 4
Acciaiouli (10)
Albizzi (36)
Barbadori (55)
Ridolfi (27)
Salviati (10)
Tornabuoni (48)
Pazzi (48)
Ginori (32)
Medici (103)
Bischeri (44)
Peruzzi (49)
Castellani (20)
Strozzi (146)
Guadagni (8)
Lamberteschi (42)
Table 2.3 A block model of structurally equivalent actors.
Niche 1 Niche 2
Niche 1 .067
Niche 2 .444 .000
Niche 3 .083 .000
Niche 4 .167 .000
Niche 3 Niche 4
.833
.125 1.000
Table 2.4 Density matrix. Block alpha = .191
Figure 2.8 displays graphically the density structures in the field within and between niches
and sums up what Table 2.4 tells us. We observe low density (indicated by the dotted arrow)
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within Niche l, high density between Niches l and 2 (indicated by the lined arrow), absent
density within Niche 2 (absent arrow), low density between Niches l and 4, low densities
between Niches l and 3, and finally low density between Niches 3 and 4. The density is high
within both Niches 3 and 4. Finally, there is no direct contact between Niches 2 and 3, and 2
and 4, respectively.
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Figure 2.8 Graphical display of densities in relations within and between niches.
Table 2.5 introduces the measure of information centrality, derived from information theory
and developed by Stephenson and Zelen (1989). It indicates the amount of information at each
node in the network, calculated from the flow of communications through all paths of a
network from all other nodes. Long paths contain less information than short ones due to the
loss of information at each node. Thus, this measure of centrality uses all paths in a network,
but gives them relative weighting as a function of the information they contain (for further
details, see Stephenson and Zelen 1989). The correlation matrix (Table 2.5a) indicates a
positive but insignificant relationship between this centrality measure and family wealth (I
used the naturallogarithm ofwealth, WealthLn, due to kurtosis), and Models l and 3 in Table
2.5b show a similar picture (t-values in parentheses). Models 2 and 3 furthermore suggest that
the niche the families belong to has no relationship with wealth.11 Thus, given that a
II In JMP (2003), the nominal variables were expanded to all levels implying that the estimate for Niche 4 is the
negative mean for the estimates of the other niches. In this way it is illustrated how each nominal factor deviates
from the average of the other factors. In this particular case, it measures to what extent families in a given niche
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researcher conducted no further analyses, he would accordingly (wrongly) have rejected any
relationships between the described network parameters and family wealth.
a) b)
Mean Std Dev WealthLn Modell Model2 Model3 Model4
WealthLn 3.520 .824 Intercept 2.664 3.510 2.562 .249
InfoCentr .747 .193 0.269 (3.038) (15.800) (2.936) (.171)
InfoCentr (1C) 1.147 1.290 3.996§
(1.007) (1.123) (2.232)
Nichel -.283 -.312 -.052
(-.886) (-.987) (-.215)
Niche 2 .481 .594 .903*
(1.222) (1.479) (3.084)
Niche 3 .404 .293 -.393
(1.127) (.797) (-.896)
Niche 4 -.601 -.575 -.457
(-1.321) (-1.275) (-1.414)
Nichel *IC .132
(.063)
Niche2*IC -2.544
(-1.322)
Niche3*IC 10.489§
(2.073)
Niche4*IC -8.077**
(-3.687)
R2 .072 .268 .350 .806*
R2Adj .001 .068 .090 .612*
Skewness Kurtosis Dep. var: WealthLn; n =15; § p<.IO; * p<.05; ** p<.OI (two tailed tests)
Wealth 1.777 3.598
WealthLn -.290 -.180
InfoCentr -.433 -.775
Table 2.5 Correlation matrix and regression analyses.
Model 3 is purely mixed-determinant, omitting possible cross-level effects between actor
centrality and the niche parameter, while Model4 includes interaction terms between them.
With other words, in Model 4 we also allow for possible cross-level effects and the analyses
definitely show a different picture. First, explained variance has increased dramatically - the
(e.g. Niche 1) are different in wealth as compared to the totality of families in the other niches (e.g. Niches 2,3
and 4). Despite insignificant results in Models 2 and 3, contrast effects in JMP (2003) showed that the combined
wealth for Niche 2 and 3 was significantly higher than the combined effect for Niches I and 4. In Model 2, t-
value = 1.99 (p<.1O) and in Model 3 t-value = 2.02 (p<.1 O).
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adjusted R-square jumps from 9.0% in Model 3 to 61.2% in Model 4 - and is now also
significant. We furthermore see that information centrality significantly predicts wealth
(p<.IO), and that Niche 2 is significantly wealthier than the other niches.l ' This piece of
empirical evidence thus indicates that cross-level models can increase our understanding of
social phenomena in general and network predictors at different level aggregates in particular.
The Medici's' wealth was possibly a result ofpossessing an overall central position in the
network, both indicated by the highest centrality score (Table 2.6) and the "star" position in
Figure 2.7. The family's success can partly be explained by not being connected at all within
its own niche but strongly connected to Niche l - which is loosely tied within itself and to the
other blocks in the field. In this case, it seems that wealth (intentionally or unintentionally)
was created through mechanisms at different level aggregates, indicating that mixed-
determinant mechanisms were also present.
It is beyond the scope ofthis dissertation to discuss in detail the possible driving forces
behind the observed pattern, yet plausible explanations might be that Burt' s (1992a) structural
hole theory or Granovetter's (1973) weak tie argument could be manifest at different levels of
analyses. The first explains how access to valuable non-redundant information can be
achieved by connections with disconnected others throughout the field, whereas the latter
predicts that such resources can be achieved by being weakly connected to distinct social
circles (which is the case when densities within and between niches are low).
12 Despite low sample size and relatively many parameters, the lack offit function in JMP (2003) gave no
warning about loss in degrees of freedom. Furthermore, visual inspection of the data plots in the statistical
program did not indicate multicollinearity problem.
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Family Inf. Centr.
Pazzi (48)
Ginori (32)
Lamberteschi (42)
Acciaiouli (10)
Salviati (10)
Barbadori (55)
Peruzzi (49)
Castellani (20)
Albizzi (36)
Bischeri (44)
Strozzi (146)
Ridolfi (27)
Tomabuoni (48)
Guadagni (8)
Medici (103)
.394
.483
.511
.554
.598
.763
.779
.794
.830
.832
.878
.901
.902
.917
1.064
Table 2.6 Information centralities for the Florentine families.
For the Strozzi family in Niche 3, the picture is somewhat different. They are not so central in
the overall network - actually there are four other actors that are more central (Table 2.6)-
yet they remained the wealthiest family in Renaissance Florence. Why is this? I believe the
interaction effects we observe in Model 4 (Table 2.5b) partly provide the answer. We find a
positive and significant interaction effect (p<.l O)on family wealth from information
centrality and belonging to Niche 3. Table 2.4 and Figure 2.8 demonstrate that within this
subset there is a high density among the families (in addition to being loosely connected to
Niches 1 and 4), and it seems that access to information and resources from disparate parts of
the systems is particularly beneficial in such a context. Altogether, belonging to a densely
connected niche does not seem to provide benefits per se, but is rather contingent upon each
actor's position in the field. I will not elaborate this issue in length now, but ( will return to
the topic in the following chapters.
Finally, we observe a significant negative effect from information centrality on wealth for the
families belonging to Niche 4, but ifwe go back to Table 2.3, we observe that there are only
two nodes in this niche. Accordingly, I will not pay too much attention to this finding. Table
2.6 shows that the relatively wealthy Lamberteschi family is not so central in the marital
network whereas the position is the opposite for the relatively poor Guadagni family.
To sum up, the analyses show that by including interaction terms between the identified
niches and actors' individual network positions, explained variance was greatly increased and
we also observed a number of significant parameters. This indicates that both cross-level and
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mixed-determinant mechanisms were at work, and furthermore highlights the importance of
conducting empirical analyses that simultaneously examine both the focal actor's external ties
and relational characteristics for collectives. Thus, rather than serving as exhaustive proof of
the interplay between different levels of analyses, the above illustration teaches us that there
might be "something more" to the concept of social capital than empirical research has so far
uncovered. Furthermore, this is in line with Gabbay and Leenders (1999: 5) who argued that
the very nature of social capital runs through various levels of analysis and a "full study of
social capital should thus incorporate structure ... at multiple levels of analysis."
I fully acknowledge that the Florentine case does not account for alternative explanations of
causality between dependent and independent variables, but nevertheless I argue that the
illustration discloses an avenue for further research that I believe will provide fuller and richer
insights to our understanding of concept of social capital.
Conclusion and Research Question
Conceptual Clarifications and Limitations of the Scope of the Study
So far in this chapter, I have emphasized that the focal actor's external relations and relational
characteristics for collectives represent different levels of analyses in the study of social
capital. I have also intended to demonstrate that by using a cross-level and mixed determinant
study, researchers may gain a fuller insight of the concept than by merely focusing at one
single level. Before ending this chapter, however, I find it legitimate to clarify further a few
conceptual issues regarding these different approaches to social capital. First I focus on the
focal actor's external relations, and next I emphasize relational characteristics for collectives.
Accordingly, the aim with this section is to give these concepts a more explicit description
and clarify those limitations I have chosen to conduct in the remaining chapters of the
dissertation.
Focal Actor's External Relations. As previously described, the focal actor's external relations
can be conceptually interpreted as his configuration of direct or indirect ties. An actor is
centrallocally ifhe has a large number of connections with other nodes in the immediate
environment; i.e. if he has a neighborhood of many direct contacts (Freeman 1979). Thus,
local centrality is concerned with the relative prominence of a focal point in the neighborhood
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(Scott 2000). Freeman (1979) conceptualized it as a measure of activity and involvement in
the network. Brass and Burkhardt (1992) argued moreover that local central ity represents the
number of alternatives available to an actor, in addition to the avoidance of relying on
mediating positions for direct to access to vital information.
A different approach in the study of the focal actor's external relations is to focus on indirect
ties or his overall strategic significance in the relevant network structure. For instance, ifhe
has established external relationships to other actors that in turn are connected to many others,
he will possess many indirect ties. The easiest way to operationalize this measure is to simply
count the number of indirect ties (Ahuja 2000a). Many indirect ties can indicate that the focal
actor has established external relations to other central actors, which in turn may enable him
to access more resources and better information than just being connected to alters possessing
few ties.
A similar (though not identical) concept is the focal actor whose configuration of external ties
enables him to reach each node in the network structure in relatively few steps. This network
approach has been denominated closeness centrality. Freeman (1979) argued that actor
closeness should be measured as a function of geodesic distance, i.e. the shortest number of
steps between a given actor to all other actors in the network. As geodesic distance increases
in length, the actor's closeness centrality decreases along with his strategic significance in the
overall network structure (Scott 2000).
External relations providing focal actor access to non-redundant resources and information
can be defined as a positive function of the level ofnonadjacent relational ties (Freeman
1979). This statement grows out of the idea that actors in a network are somehow central to
the degree they stand between others on the paths of interaction (Anthonisse 1971; Bavelas
1948; Cohn and Marriott 1958; Freeman 1977; Friedkin 1991; Shaw 1954; Shimbel 1953).
Among other things, such actors have access to parts of the network that are not strongly
connected to each other, allowing richer and more differentiated information to reach them
(Krackhardt 1990). Freeman (1977; 1979) has operationalized the concept of actor
betweenness centrality as the number of geodesics (i.e. shortest paths) between each pair of
nodes in a network that passes through the given actor. In a later contribution, Freeman and
colleagues (Freeman, Borgatti and White 1991) further developed the measure to include not
only the geodesic paths, but all independent paths between pairs of points in the network.
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They argued, "the flow [of information and other resources} between two points is a global
phenomenon; it depends, not just on the capacity of the channel linking the points directly,
but on the capacities of all the channels on all paths - both direct and indirect - that connect
the two" (Freeman, Borgatti and White 1991: 146). The refined measure is called actor flow
betweenness. The idea behind the notion is somewhat similar to Burt's (1992a) structural hole
theory. However, whereas Freeman and colleagues emphasized the entire graph, Burt focused
on the egocentric network structure in measuring the spanning of structural holes, i.e. to what
degree the focal actor's external relations are connected or disconnected to each other.
There are, however, a number of other approaches to study the focal actor's external relations
that go beyond the scope ofthis dissertation. For instance, an actor may report many advice
ties to other players, but few others report seeking advice from him. This shows a high level
of out-degree centrality, but a low level of in-degree centrality. This may furthermore affect
how we model and interpret the other centrality measures that I have described above. Yet
since this contribution focuses on symmetric network ties, i.e. we do not emphasize eventual
directionality of contacts between nodes, I do not elaborate on this issue (for details, see for
instance Freeman, Borgatti and White 1991; Freeman 1979; Scott 2000; Wasserman and
Faust 1994).
Studying a focal actor's external relations can also imply a careful investigation of different
kinds of network ties. A node can, for instance, have a number of advice ties to other nodes
with whom he also shares friendship ties. However, these relations do not necessarily overlap,
and for the same actors it is possible to uncover layers of different network structures,
dependent upon characteristics of the ties. Krackhardt (1992) claimed that in a study from a
high-tech company, friendship ties could better explain how the firm was prevented from
being unionized, than advice ties (and formal organizational structure).
l have mentioned Granovetter's (1973) weak tie theory; this is somewhat similar to the
argument behind the advantage of accessing non-redundant information, however the causal
agent is different. The previous review has also indicated how strong ties may be beneficial in
a number of occasions, indicating that the benefits from tie strength are context dependent
(Hansen 1999; Krackhardt 1992; Krackhardt and Stem 1988). Research has also undertaken
the task of investigating characteristics of the focal actor' s partners as opposed to merely
studying tie characteristics. For instance, ego may draw benefits from a resourceful alter by
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means of status, or through the information the alter may offer (e.g. De Graaf and Flap 1988;
Lin, Ensel and Vaughn 1981a; Lin, Ensel and Vaughn 1981b; Marsden and Hulbert 1988). In
a study of venture-capital-backed biotechnology firms, Stuart, Hoang et. al (1999) found that
privately held biotech firms with prominent strategic alliance partners and organizational
equity investors went to IPQ faster and earned greater valuations at IPQ than firms lacking
such connections. Another study showed that biotech organizations with large and innovative
alliance partners performed better than otherwise comparable firms that lacked such
partnerships (Stuart 2000).
All the above illustrations show how a focus on the focal actor's external relations can be
undertaken. The research question and purpose of the study must, of course, serve as primary
guidelines when deciding which concepts to include or exclude. The three concepts, local
centrality, strategic significance in the overall network structure, and the level of nonadjacent
relational ties - all described above - constitute the focal actor's external relations that are
included as variables in this study. Whereas the two latter parameters play the role as
independent variables, local centrality is merely included as a control variable in a number of
models. Moreover, the study focuses on symmetric network ties, rather than (eventually)
directional ties. Finally, the study emphasizes the very structure ofnetwork ties, rather then
elaborating on the content ofthese relationships. As described, this is in accord with Hinde
(1976: 8), who referred to the term structure Hasa patterning of relationships that is
independent of the particular individuals concerned. "He further stated that H[i}nmoving to
this more abstract level wefocus on aspects of the content ... that show regularities across
individuals and across societies ... "
Relational Characteristics for Collectives. The dissertation has so far illustrated that a
researcher has a number of options at hand when choosing how to identify groups of actors in
a field, varying from partition based upon the naturalistic approach, classification of
attributes, structural cohesion, and structural equivalence (DiMaggio 1986). I have finally
argued why partition based on structural equivalence is perceived to constitute a better
decision (Arabie, Boorman and Levitt 1978; Burt 1982; Carley 1986; DiMaggio 1986;
Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991; Greve and Salaff 200 l; Meyer 1979; White 1983). Ifa
researcher wants to examine relational characteristics for collectives - e.g. niches of
structurally equivalent corporate actors (Burt and Talmud 1993) - he has a number of
alternatives at hand. However, as emphasized, research question and purpose of the study
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must always serve as primary guidelines in how to undertake such a task, yet for niches (or
other types of identified collectives) examining the density of contacts is at least one such
viable option.
Regarding the density approach, the Florentine case, presented in this chapter, can illustrate
how such a task can be conducted. We remember that the density table (Table 2.4) shows the
density of marital ties for niches of structurally equivalent families. Earlier in this chapter, I
have stated that Coleman (1988; 1990) developed a general wide-scale theory of social capital
in relation to the study of actors who are pursuing interest-driven goals by describing how
"closed" and dense networks may create normative sanctioning mechanisms, fine grained
information sharing, higher levels of trust, and consequently decreased fear of opportunism. If
we again tum to Table 2.4, we observe a high density ofmarital ties within Niche 3 (block
alpha = .833).13This implies that "almost" all the four families in this niche are connected to
each other through marriage. Everything else being equal, the higher the density of relational
ties in collectives, the more closed the network is as well. According to Coleman's theory,
this should thus create an atmosphere of fine-grained information sharing, trust and low fear
of opportunistic behavior for the involved nodes.
However, this line ofthinking has not been without criticism. A counterargument to the above
argument could be that densely embedded niches, despite fine-grained information sharing
and low risks of opportunistic behavior, face the risk of encountering a "redundancy trap" as a
result of looking inward and ignoring novel and perhaps better solutions that are being
developed in different parts of the system. This is in accordance with both Burt' s (l992a)
structural hole theory and Granovetter's (1973) weak tie argument, emphasizing the
importance of avoiding connections to other, similar nodes. Nonetheless, in the next chapter I
argue that these seemingly opposite arguments are complementary rather than contradictive,
and convey different levels of analysis.
It is also worth noting that densities of contacts can be studied across different niches of
structurally equivalent actors. Thus, such an approach not only gives us a clue ofwhat is
I3 Table 2.4 shows that Niche 4 has a density of l, but this niche only consists of one pair of nodes. The very
presence of a martial tie between these two families will consequently produce maximum density, and absence
ofa tie, minimum density.
59
going on within niches, but also between niches in the field. Among other things, we can
discern patron-client patterns, and elucidate agency structures (White 1983). Density patterns
between niches can also investigate the directionality ofnetwork ties (e.g. niches offirms that
control other niches of firms through ownership). Furthermore, we could study structural
equivalence for all kinds of relations, single or multiple relations, dichotomous or valued
relations. It is, however, beyond the scope of the dissertation to debate this issue, but for an
excellent discussion of different patterns of network ties within and between collectives, and
how they can be interpreted, see Wasserman and Faust (1994).
Moreover, regarding the study of characteristics within (and between) niches, a whole variety
of variables developed at the group level could be applied, and practically only fantasy limits
the researcher. The level of pressure to group conformity, described earlier in this chapter, is
one such example.
Brief Summary and Limitations of the Scope of the Study. Summed up, with regard to the
focal actor' s external relations, this dissertation emphasizes three concepts: local network
centrality, strategic significance in the whole network structure, and level of nonadjacent ties.
Relational characteristics for collectives imply densities of reported contacts within the
respective niches of structurally equivalent actors. The network structure that I have analyzed
is non-directional, non-valued, and excludes possible multilayer characteristics. Further
details ofhow I have modeled and measured network variables are described in Chapter 4.
Research Question
In this chapter, I first elaborated the concept of organizational fields (DiMaggio 1991) within
the social network perspective. I argued that perhaps the best way to study subsets of
organizational actors in a field is to conduct block-modeling techniques in order to distinguish
structurally equivalent actors, defined as ecological niches (Burt and Talmud 1993). Next, I
presented a brief overview of the very concept of social capital and described how a focus on
the focal actor's external relations and relational characteristics for collectives, entails
different forms of the term. In the third section, I illustrated how cross-level and mixed-
determinant models, possessing these forms of the concept, represent metaphors of the focal
actor's network position in the field and niche characteristics. For illustrative purposes, the
chapter also addressed level issues by analyzing two different networks - one artificial and
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the second adapted from Padgett' s (1987) study on marital ties between 15 prominent
Florentine families. This latter section was intended to clarify a few conceptual issues and
limits the scope of the network variables that will be applied in the following chapters.
To sum up, I argue that both theoretical issues as well as empirical illustrations presented
throughout the chapter indicate that level issues seem to play an important role in the study of
social capital. In particular, it seems that cross-level and mixed-determinant models may
enhance a researcher' s understanding of both the focal actor' s external relations and relational
characteristics for collectives, as well as portray effects on focal actor outcome from the
interplay between these forms. This motivates the following research question, which is also
illustrated in Figure 2.9:
Research Question: Do we observe unique effects or interaction effects on focal actor outcome from his
external relations in the field and niche characteristics? Thus, to what extent do we observe cross-level or mixed-
determinant network predictors of social capital?
Focal actor's
external
relations
Focal actor
outcome
Niche
characteristics
Figure 2.9 A cross-level and mixed-determinant model of social capital.
In the following chapters of the dissertation, I describe in detail how the focal actor's network
position in the field and niche densities may affect the outcome in terms ofventure success.
The next chapter develops a number ofhypotheses that entail both these approaches to social
capital, and in addition suggests possible interaction effects between the forms. The
hypotheses are in tum empirically tested in Chapter 5. The data presented in this study has
been gathered from start-ups in the emerging hydroelectric micro-power field in Western
Norway.
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3. Hypotheses
The major issue in this chapter is to discuss how different network configurations in the
emerging micro-power field may enable an entrepreneur to overcome his "liability of
newness" (Stinchcombe 1965). Hannan and Carroll (1992) maintained that a great challenge
for actors in emerging industries is to establish ties with an environment that neither
understands nor acknowledges their existence; yet once these are in place, l argue that
network connections can play an extremely critical role for the start-ups in the development of
social capital. I elaborate some hypotheses where I apply the focal actor's external relations in
the field and niche characteristics (i.e. relational characteristics for collectives). This implies
both a cross-level and a mixed-determinant approach to the concept.
The final section of the chapter shifts the focus outward from network predictors of social
capital and addresses issues from population ecology theory and institutional theory. Here, I
question whether start-up success/failure ofbeing an early or late adopter in the emerging
field is a possible outcome of population density (Hannan 1986) or mimetic behavior
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991).
Network Configurations and Venture Success
Focal Actor's External Relations in the Field and Venture Success
I believe it can be fruitful to distinguish between the stage of investment and the stage of
operation when discussing how network positions in the field may enable small hydro-
electrical plants to overcome their "liability ofnewness". The first stage focuses on how to
spend the money as wisely as possible during the investment phase, whereas the latter
emphasizes - after invested capital has been "sunk" - how to get the best out of the plant.
Below I discuss the first issue, and start with elaborating a hypothesis where l propose a
curvilinear relationship with the shape of a negative 2nd degree polynomial between the focal
actor's network distance to the center of the field at start-up and electricity production per
capital invested (in real terms). I define the center of the field as a position ofstrategic
significance in the overall network (Scott 2000). Thus, I emphasize the focal actor's external
relations in the field.
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Most ventures are faced with several problems and challenges, and this is especially the case
for start-ups in emerging fields. In his seminal paper Stinchcombe (1965: 148) described these
constraints as the "liability of newness" stating that "[a}s a general rule a higher proportion
of new organizations fail than old. This is particularly true of new organizational forms, so
that if an alternative requires new organization, it has to be much more beneficial then the
old before theflow of benefits compensates from the relative weakness of the newer social
structure. " Thus, entrepreneurs in young fields have to learn new roles without the benefit of
role models in discovering and creating effective routines and competencies (Aldrich 1999;
Barron 1998). In spite ofthat, I review a number of contributions below showing that it is
possible to outdo the "liability of newness" by accessing tangible and intangible resources
from inter-firm links.
In an ecological study of daycare centers and nurseries in Toronto, Baum and Oliver (1991)
discovered that environmentallinkages reduced the mortality rate to a higher degree for
young establishments compared to older ones. In their interpretation of the se findings, they
stated "young organizations that confronted a liability of newness were shown to benefit to a
significantly greater extentfrom institutional linkages than older organizations ... Young
organizations may be capable of obtaining early legitimacy and access to resources through
the formation of institutional attachments, and these stable relations with important
constituents may succeed in sheltering young organizations from the risks of youth and
inexperience" (Baum and Oliver 1991: 214). A similar study has shown that young biotech
firms benefited more from strategic alliances in terms of growth than did old organizations
(Stuart 2000).
Shan, Walker et al. 's (1994) examination of the association between inter-firm cooperation
and innovative output is another example from the young biotech industry. Arguing that these
organizations lacked financial, marketing and distribution resources on their own, they
hypothesized and showed empirically that an entrepreneurial firm's number of cooperative
relationships had a positive effect on the number ofpatents issued. More recently, Stuart and
colleagues (Stuart 2000; Stuart, Hoang and Hybels 1999) found that technology start-ups with
prominent alliance or exchange partners performed better than comparable ventures without
endorsements. Endorsement by well-regarded affiliates increased sales growth rates among
U.S. semiconductor start-ups, and resulted in faster initial public offerings (IPO) - at higher
valuations - among U.S. biotechnology start-ups. Baum, Calabrese et al. (2000) discovered
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that the more partnerships the Canadian biotech firms had from founding with pharmaceutical
companies, universities and marketing companies, the higher the revenues were in following
years. Alliances with pharmaceutical companies, universities and government labs predicted a
significant relationship with the number of patents issued. Moreover, the higher the biotech
partners' relative scope and innovativeness, the higher the number ofpatents issued. The
interaction effect from partners' relative scope and innovativeness was also positive for both
revenues and number ofpatents issued. Finally, Choonwoo, Lee et al. (2001) have shown that
linkages to venture capital companies positively predicted performance for South Korean
technological start-ups.
All these findings accordingly indicate certain relationships between ventures' possession of
inter-firm links and outcome. It is therefore reasonable to assume that critical resources may
span the firm's boundaries within inter-organizational processes and activities (Dyer and
Singh 1998). Nevertheless, the studies reviewed above do not explicitly emphasize the focal
actor's inter-firm position in the field. Hannan and Carroll (1992: 32) maintained that even if
a venture succeeds at creating structures and routines for adapting successfully to the inferior
regions of the "resource space", in the course of doing so it may commit itselfto persisting at
the margins. The specialized learning, the collective experience, and connections with the
environment all become specialized to exploiting the areas of lower value. Attempting to shift
toward the richer center, on the other hand, entails a high risk offailure during periods of
protracted reorganization. If the organization should succeed, it would bring itself into
competition with others more experienced in exploiting the center, and in either case, the firm
will have a higher than average risk of failure.
In my opinion, the description of the "resource space" above is analogous with what
DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 64-65) conceptualized as an organizational field; "those
organizations [or corporate actors} that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of
institutional life ... "Drawing upon Hannan and Carroll's (1992) arguments it is thus likely to
expect that nascent entrepreneurs - positioning themselves at the margins of the field, or
striving towards the center during the investment period - will reap an inferior return from
their investments. At the margins, both vendors and advisors, in addition to other already
established hydroelectric plants, most likely have inferior abilities in how to achieve optimal
output from investments in micro-power systems. They probably possess some knowledge,
but only the less experienced reach these inferior sections of the field. Thus, if an entrepreneur
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places himself at these margins of the "resource space", this will result in inferior and sub-
optimal investment solutions.
On the other hand, the candidate who - intentionally or unintentionally - strives towards the
center of the "resource space" during the investment stage will most likely encounter vendors
and providers with better-developed skills and knowledge than he has. In tum, a high degree
of asymmetric knowledge will place the entrepreneur in a disadvantageous bargaining
position regarding investments. I argue that this is analogous to a state of asymmetric power
relations. According to Emerson (1962: 32), one's power resides implicitly in another's
dependency. The dependence of actor A on B is therefore "directly proportional to A 's
motivational investment in goals mediated by B, and inversely proportional to the availability
a/those goals to A outside a/the A-B relation". The dependence of A on B thus provides the
basis for B's power over A, as B is in control of, or otherwise has influence over goods and
services that A desires.
Hence, let us now assume that A (e.g. a start-up plant) desires to choose B (e.g. a vendor or
consultant ofhydroelectric micro-power systems) as his major provider due to his assumption
that B is an expert with maximum knowledge in the emerging field. A might have gained
such information by communication with other start-ups that have approached B (or other
central actors in the field) out of similar motives. He is moreover convinced that he has to
choose this provider (or other central actors in the field) rather than marginal actors, believing
that central actors will support him with the best and latest technology developed in the field.
This, in turn, places A in a disadvantageous bargaining position due to the asymmetric
knowledge and power.
It is unlikely to expect any competition for the electricity that will be produced from the start-
ups once in place, due to the marginal contribution at each plant and the homogeneity of
product. Even though experienced professional providers and consultants should have
interests in the electricity market, they would have no incentives in preventing the highest
possible production for their clients. Nevertheless, they do desire to reap the highest possible
returns for the products and services they provide, and hence have incentives towards
encouraging their clients to overinvest, either by selling a plant that is more expensive than
the optimal model, or by charging a premium price.
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It is also likely to expect that the tendency for overinvestment for start-ups approaching the
center of the field would be dampened by cooperation with other micro-power plants that
neither sell equipment nor charge anything for sharing experiences and advice with
newcomers. Yet, ifthese plants are also close to the center of the field, they might possibly be
unaware ofmore economical options at hand. Consequently, information and advice will be in
accordance with what has been shared from established professional vendors and consultants
in the field.
Altogether the review above, illustrating the possibility to overcome the "liability of newness"
through access to tangible and intangible resources from inter-actor links, definitely indicates
that there are benefits from cooperating with other actors. Yet, my discussion emphasizes that
it is important to examine who you choose to collaborate with in the field, or where you place
yourself in the "resource space". If the plant establishes itself too distant or close to the center
of the field, low performance is the most likely outcome. Actors who place themselves in
intermediate positions, on the other hand, escape from the disadvantages described. They are
likely to achieve certain knowledge in how to build the plant since they have not placed
themselves at the margins with low competence, nor have they been squeezed at the center
due to an inferior bargaining position or disadvantaged by asymmetric information.
I have found no study that directly investigates the issues I have described above, yet it is
worth noting - as previously briefly stated - that Greve, Golombek et al. (2001) discovered a
curvilinear relationship between pollution levels and network centrality in the Norwegian pulp
and paper industry. Actors in central and marginal positions had high pollution levels,
whereas actors in intermediate positions polluted less. They described the findings as a cry for
help from actors with high pollution levels (and also financial problems), but an alternative or
complementary explanation could be that actors who strive towards the center in hope of
optimal solutions place themselves in an inferior position due to asymmetric information and
lack of bargaining power. They therefore become vulnerable to either overinvest or choose
suboptimal solutions, so I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: There is a curvilinear relationship with the shape of a negative 2nd degree polynomial between
the focal actor's network distance to the center of the field at start-up and electricity production per financial
capital invested. Production is low for plants at the margins and in the center of the field, whereas it is high for
plants in intermediate positions.
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Niche Characteristics and Venture Success
So far, I have only emphasized the focal actor's external relations in the field, but in this
section, I additionally highlight how niche characteristics may enable start-ups to overcome
their "liability ofnewness". This means that I have expanded the focus to involve relational
characteristics for collectives implying both cross-level and mixed-determinant approaches to
the concept of social capital. I begin with developing a hypothesis that argues that start-ups
embedded in densely connected niches are likely to outperform their colleagues in sparsely
connected niches. Next, I propose that access to non-redundant information is more beneficial
in densely connected niches than in sparsely connected niches.
Although network ties are essentially dyadic exchanges, the key precursors, processes, and
outcomes associated with them can be influenced by the characteristics of the niche into
which actors are embedded. Niche characteristics of the Florentine families in Table 2.4 and
Figure 2.8 illustrate density levels of contacts (marital ties) between and within the identified
subsets, and I emphasize the latter issue below. Previously I have defined niche density as the
number of relations (I) among (n) actors that exist compared to the maximum possible number
of relations, 1/[ n(n-l )/2], within the subset.
Ahuja (2000a) argued that resource-sharing benefits of collaboration arise from actors
combining their skills and imparting their knowledge and experience. This is in accordance
with a number of other scholars who argued that dense and extensive relations between nodes
may foster the development of shared norms of behavior and explicit inter-firm knowledge-
sharing routines (e.g. Dyer and Noboeka 2000; Uzzi 1997; Walker, Kogut and Shan 1997).
The social constraints associated with dense, embedded networks can facilitate large
relationship-specific investments that can help maximize the benefits from collaboration
where common partners can serve as referral agents to encourage cooperation and sharing
(Gulati 1995; Shan, Walker and Kogut 1994; Uzzi 1997). Deeply embedded networks can
also foster fine-grained information transfer and joint problem solving, two essential
components of successful resource-sharing (Ahuja 2000a; Uzzi 1997).
Dense ties are furthermore likely to help curb tendencies of opportunistic and genuinely self-
seeking behavior (Coleman 1988; 1990; Walker, Kogut and Shan 1997). This is the case
when, for instance, consultants and providers are inclined to encourage start-ups to over-
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invest. Due to close contact between alters, information diffuses rapidly to relevant actors,
imposing sanctions on deviant behavior as well as preventing its occurrences.
As described, Ahuja (2000a) discovered that closed egocentric networks of strategic alliances
among firms in the chemical industry resulted in higher innovative outputs in terms of patents
issued. Similar results have moreover been reported by Hansen (1999), and these findings are
in accordance with Coleman (1988; 1990) arguing for the benefits of possessing dense and
closed network ties.
Structural-equation approaches can indicate roles distributed among actors according to
similarity in communication structures (Greve and Salaff2001), and in addition identify
groups ofactors with shared cognitions (Carley 1986; Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991).
Accordingly, I find it likely to expect hydroelectric start-ups to perform better in densely
connected niches compared to their colleagues in sparsely connected subsets. Considerable
sharing of experiences and skills will most likely take place here as a result of the high degree
of contacts between actors. This is particularly important in a field where well-developed
templates or schemata are to be established from a less extended and more fragmented
knowledge base (Aldrich 1999; Spender 1989). Fine-grained information transfer and joint
problem solving will accordingly place actors in highly connected niches in a superior
position with regard to getting as much as possible out oftheir investments in micro-power
systems. Finally, transparency within the niche - as a result of rich flows of communication
and resource-sharing - will curb tendencies of opportunistic- and genuinely self-seeking
behavior among professional consultants and vendors. Altogether, this suggests following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Actors in densely connected niches have higher electricity production per financial capital
invested than actors in sparsely connected niches.
A counterargument to my above statements is that densely embedded niches, despite fine-
grained information sharing and low risks of opportunistic behavior, face the risk of
encountering a "redundancy trap" as a result of looking inward and perhaps ignoring novel
and better solutions developed in different parts of the system. This is in accordance with both
Burt's (1992a) structural hole theory and Granovetter's (1973) weak tie argument, which both
emphasize the importance of accessing non-redundant information. As stated before, the
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hydroelectric micro-power field is still in its infancy and the established knowledge base is
therefore fragmented. An alternative hypothesis could therefore be that start-ups in sparsely
connected niches are expected to outperform their colleagues in densely connected niches.
I argue, however, that there is not necessarily a contradiction between being established in a
highly embedded or dense niche and at the same time accessing non-redundant information
from disparate parts of the system. Embeddedness has both a relational and a structural
aspect, and Granovetter (1992: 33) emphasized that ignoring the social structure only gives a
partial picture, warning that one can easily slip into "dyadic atomization", a type of
reductionism. Drawing upon the embeddedness perspective (Granovetter 1985; 1992) I thus
examine ifthe intensity of contacts within niches moderates the value of accessing
information from disparate sources. Accordingly, what I emphasize is how the structure of
relationships in these subsets is expected to influence outcomes from the focal actor's
relational ties with nodes that to some extent are considered to provide non-redundant
information.
The above discussion highlights the importance of examining the density structure within
niches, and Figure 3.1 portrays a two-dimensional matrix where start-ups belong either to a
densely or sparsely connected niche, and either have access to non-redundant information or
not. I define non-redundant information to be a positive function of the level of nonadjacent
relational ties (Freeman 1979).
Niche density
Low High
Access to non- High
redundant
information Low Lowoutcome Medium outcome
Medium outcome High outcome
Figure 3. t A two-dimensional matrix of network predictors of social capital.
I have already argued that highly embedded subsets of actors provide transparency, curb
tendencies of opportunistic behavior, and make available fine-grained information transfer
and joint problem solving. Yet I believe that such a condition furthermore establishes a
potential of what Cohen and Levinthal (1990: 128) described as "absorptive capacity",
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conferring an ability to evaluate and utilize outside knowledge as a function of the level of
prior related knowledge, basic skills, and shared language. Thus, I find it reasonable to
assume that the benefits achieved in densely connected niches additionally grant the focal
actor a "capacity" - but not necessarily an advantage per se - to further develop his skills in
building an efficient power plant. I elaborate this argument below.
An entrepreneur accessing information about a novel solution from one or more nodes might
succeed in exploiting this opportunity as a result of being part of an embedded structure where
he can share and discuss innovative ideas with others. Ifhe opts for the novel solution, a high
degree of mutual interaction could furthermore grant him complementary skills and
experience, assisting him to gain maximum outcome from his decision. A high level of
internal discussion and communication could also provide him with advantages if he accesses
information about two (or more) alternative investment opportunities. He could now discuss
and share his thoughts and questions and receive feedback from a collective where the stream
of ideas and suggestions flow relatively extensively. From this exchange of information -
where both the knowledge level is relatively developed and where mutual trust exists - he
would now be in a fairly good position to make the right decision. I therefore expect a
positive interaction effect on electricity production from access to non-redundant information
and being part of a niche where the network structure is dense. This is illustrated as "high
outcome" in the upper right quadrant in Figure 3.1.
On the other hand, ifthe entrepreneur accesses the same kind ofnovel information, but
belongs to a niche with low density, he would not gain the same advantages. The same set of
opportunities to discuss novel ideas within his own subset would not be established, and he
could accordingly decide upon solutions that are better known to him. As a result of being
unfamiliar with the high level offine-grained information sharing where actors constantly
exchange innovative ideas, this condition could even influence his attitude toward novelty. In
tum, this could constrain him from considering seemingly better options as beneficial at all. It
would also be likely to expect that the start-up would have a lesser ability to exploit novel
ideas to their full potential since there would not be as much mutual exchange of "how to do
things" within his niche. Altogether, this implies that despite access to novel and innovative
ideas, there would not have been established any platform ofmutual interaction where this
increased knowledge could reach its full potential. To paraphrase Cohen and Levinthal (1990)
we can say that there is low capacity within the niche to absorb and apply to commercial ends
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the new information that has been made available. On the other hand, in accordance with
Burt's (I992a) structural hole theory and Granovetter's (1973) weak tie argument, I expect
that non-redundant information possesses some genuine advantage. As illustrated in the upper
left quadrant in Figure 3.1, I therefore propose that start-ups in weakly connected niches, but
with access to non-redundant information, will be "medium" in performance.
If we now tum to the lower right quadrant of Figure 3.1, Ihypothesize that actors in highly
embedded niches who lack access to non-redundant information, will also gain "medium
outcome". Previous discussion has explained that niche density per se is expected to be
positive for the focal actor, and the absorptive capacity of exploiting novel ideas should also
be in place. However, by lacking access to non-redundant information, the start-up misses the
opportunity to further improve his plant through innovative and novel ideas, despite that
mutual trust and fine grained-information sharing are already in place in his niche.
An implication of the above discussion is that start-ups in the lower left quadrant in Figure 3.1
become low performers. They gain neither benefits from non-redundant information, nor do
they possess advantages from fine-grained information sharing and mutual trust, which is the
case in densely connected niches.
Ihave found no contributions that explicitly investigate the issues that Ihave described above,
but as previously mentioned, investigations of Burt's (1992a) structural hole argument have
been inconclusive. Thus, while a number of studies supported the theory (for a review, see
Burt 2000), others showed opposite results (Ahuja 2000a; Hansen 1999). Apparently - both
for arguments and empirical evidence - there still seems to be certain tensions between the
camp that favors Burt's theory and the one that favors Coleman's (1988; 1990) closure
argument. Ibelieve, however, that my illustration above may provide a meeting point for the
diverging positions. Burt (2000) also addressed a similar solution to the controversy by
arguing that the spanning of structural holes does not necessarily benefit actors per se, but is
contingent upon whether there is some kind of internal constraint within a group. Only when
both conditions are present, he argued, would the players achieve their maximum potential.
Reagan's and Zuckerman's (1999) study ofperformance in corporate R&D units, adds
another bit of empirical support to my line ofthinking. They reported high performance in
units in which scientists where drawn from diverse employee cohorts (implying that their
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networks reached diverse perspectives, skills and resources outside the team), and where it at
the same time were dense communication networks within the section. Greif (1989) moreover
argued that network closure was critical to the success of the medieval Maghribi traders in
North Africa. Each trader ran a local business in his own city that depended on sales to distant
cities. Network closure among the traders allowed them to coordinate so as to trust one
another, and profitably trade the products oftheir disparate business activities. The traders
individually had networks rich in brokerage opportunities, but they needed closure with one
another to take advantage of the opportunities (Greif 1989).
Controversies regarding outcomes from spanning structural holes or closures (Ahuja 2000a;
Burt 1992a; Coleman 1988; Hansen 1999), along with findings from Reagan's, Zuckerman's
(1999) and Greif's (1989) studies on corporate R&D units and medieval traders in North
Africa, grant pieces of empirical indications that there might exist interaction effects between
niche density and access to non-redundant information. Previous discussion also maintains
that non-redundant information per se is expected to be positive for the focal actor, and these
issues are summarized in the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between the focal actor's access to non-redundant information at
start-up and electricity production per financial capital invested.
Hypothesis 4: There is an interaction effect between niche density and focal actor's access to non-redundant
information at start-up on electricity production per financial capital invested:
a) Production is high at plants in densely connected niches where focal actor has high degree of access to
non-redundant information.
b) Production is medium at plants in sparsely connected niches where focal actor has high degree ofaccess
to non-redundant information.
c) Production is medium at plants in densely connected niches where focal actor has low degree ofaccess
to non-redundant information.
d) Production is low at plants in sparsely connected niches where focal actor has low access to non-
redundant information.
Population Density and Mimetic Behavior
In this section, I turn the focus outward from possible network predictors of social capital and
question whether being an early or late adopter in the emerging field influences the ability of
the focal plant to overcome its liability ofnewness. This implies that I address issues from
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population ecology theory and institutional theory, and question whether start-up
success/failure ofbeing an early or late adopter in an emerging field is a possible outcome of
population density (Hannan 1986) or mimetic behavior (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).
Drawing upon these different frameworks, I develop two alternative hypotheses. One suggests
that it is negative to be an early adopter (compared to being a late adopter), whereas the other
proposes the opposite outcome.
Population Density and Venture Success
A central aspect of the ecology approach is that the density of an organizational form - i.e. the
number of organizations of a given type sharing a "common fate with respect to
environmental variation" (Hannan and Freeman 1977: 929) - can be interpreted as a measure
of the legitimacy of that particular population (Hannan and Carroll 1992).14Carroll and
Hannan (1989: 525) argued that organizational density serves as an indicator of the status of
the form, the extent to which it is taken for granted, and the extent to which "relevant actors
regard it as the 'natural' way to organize for some purpose. " An implication of this argument
is that increased density - i.e. increased legitimacy - will increase the founding rate" by
facilitating the establishment of similar organizations. Hannan (1986) developed a density
dependence model which states that the size of a population of similar organizations reflects
two underlying processes: legitimacy and competition. Increasing organizational density at
the beginning of a new organizational form increases legitimacy, facilitating an increase in
start-ups. Later, at high levels of density, factors inhibiting start-ups become dominant, such
as heightened competition for resources. Considered jointly, increased density predicts a start-
up rate with the shape of a negative 2nd degree polynomial.
According to Hannan (1986), increased density has the opposite effect on the disbanding
rate". At low-density level, the level of competition with other organizations is modest.
14 Note that the definition ofpopulation differs from the definition offield. Whereas the latter emphasizes an
aggregate of institutional life, including key suppliers and regulatory agencies (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 61),
the population approach only emphasizes organizations that are similar in their dependence on the environment.
15 Defined as the number of organizations added to a population during a specified unit of time, relative to the
number already in the population (Aldrich 1999: 266).
16 The number of organizations that disband in a population during a specified unit of time, relative to the
number already in the population (Aldrich 1999: 266).
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Disbandings are, however, high due to low level of legitimacy. An increase in density in this
case predicts a decrease in the disbanding rate, shaped as a positive 2nd degree polynomial.
The reason why the disbanding rate is not linearly negative is that increased density is also
expected to spur competition of limited resources throughout the population. A number of
empirical studies give support to Hannan' s (1986) density dependence model (for a review,
see Baum 1996).
For now, I will not so much emphasize what triggers the start-up rate, but rather draw upon
Hannan' s (1986) argument of a decreased disbanding rate in the early life of a population as a
result of increased density, spurring legitimacy of the new form. The concept of
organizational legitimacy is rather broad, but here I focus on cognitive legitimacy and
learning.
Cognitive legitimacy refers to the acceptance of a new kind of a venture as a taken-for-
granted feature of the environment (Jeppersen 1991). The highest form of this kind of
legitimacy is when a new product, process, or service is accepted as a part of the sociocultural
and organizationallandscape. From a producer's point of view, cognitive legitimacy means
that newentrants to an industry are likely to copy an existing form, rather than experiment
with a new one. From a consumer's point of view, cognitive legitimacy means that people are
committed users of the product or the service (Aldrich 1999).
As described, learning means that entrepreneurs develop their own organized knowledge
structures through experience, and use those structures as templates (schemata) to give
information form and meaning (Walsh 1995). Entrepreneurs in established populations can
benefit from templates that already exist and adopt the most preferable (Spender 1989).
However, in young populations, well-developed templates are scarce, and pioneering
entrepreneurs must learn new schemata from a fragmented knowledge base.
Ifwe apply these arguments to the emerging hydroelectric industry in Western Norway, the
likely expectation is that late adopters will be better prepared to face the challenges of the
"liability of newness" (Stinchcombe 1965) than the first pioneers in the field. Rather than
experimenting with solutions where both the level of investments and outcomes are unknown,
late adopters can draw upon skills and experiences that have already been developed in the
field. They can accordingly draw upon a better developed and less fragmented knowledge
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base than their precursors. From an ecological perspective, this implies that late adopters have
a lower possibility of failure than early adopters in the field.
Personally, I believe that the disbanding rate in the field under most circumstances will be
extremely low, independent of density and legitimacy level. The reason is that most of the
costs in the micro-power sector are attached to the investment phase, whereas variable
maintenance costs approach zero. Conventional financial theory teaches us that if invested
capital is "sunk" - i.e. has low or no alternative value - and the variables costs are low, the
plants will continue to operate even ifthey are totally unprofitable regarding their total
investments. However, I believe that densityand legitimacy issues are likely to predict
venture success in terms of electricity production per capital invested. According to this
argument, early adopters will be inferior performers (but unlikely to disband due to "sunk"
investments and low variable costs), whereas increased density and legitimacy will provide
competence to late adopters, enabling them to become successful entrepreneurs.l '
Altogether, I hold that there is a positive linear relationship between being an early or late
adopter and electricity production per invested capital, due to accumulation of learning and
competence throughout the field. Thus I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5: Early adopters in the hydroelectric micro-power field have low electricity production per
financial capital invested, whereas late adopters have high production.
Mimetic Behavior and Venture Success
The term mimetic behavior is based upon central elements from institutional theory, and this
typology emphasizes "isomorphism" as an important causal mechanism to understand certain
organizational phenomena. According to this theory, organizations change over time to
17 The second issue in Hannan's (1986) density dependence model regarding disbanding rates is that the curve
will become positive at a certain level, due to increased competition of limited resources. Regarding the
emerging hydroelectric micro-power industry, however, I do not find it reasonable that this will induce a non-
linear pattern in outcome between early and late adopters. The reason for this is that the production from the
micro-power industry is marginal compared to total electricity production in Norway, so their appearance will
have practically no effect at all on competition and price settings in the markets. Even if it should affect the
electricity price, this would depress the founding rate rather than the disbanding rate due to low variable costs.
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become more similar to other organizations in their environment (DiMaggio and Powell
1991). When faced with uncertainty, organizations economize on search costs and imitate the
actions of other seemingly successful organizations, substituting institutional rules for
technical rules (Cyert and March 1963; Meyer, Scott and Deal 1983). Mimetic behavior can
thus be portrayed as a consequence from the actors' efficient responses to uncertainty
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Yet the process can also be driven by a kind of social-
constructionist role inducing what has been described as "obligatory action" (March 1981).
According to this model, once enough social actors do things in a certain way, then that
particular course of action becomes taken for granted or institutionalized, and thereafter other
social actors will undertake that course of action without thinking. If enough of one type of
social actors adopts a certain course of action, then other similar social actors will imitate
them. Thus, "bureaucratization and forms of organizational change occur as the result of
processes that make organizations more similar without necessarily making them more
efficient" (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 64).
Early adopters of organizational innovations are commonly driven by a desire to improve
performance (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). However, new practices can become "infused
with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand" (Selznick 1957: 17). As an
innovation spreads for instance, a threshold is reached beyond which adoption provides
legitimacy rather than improves performance (Meyer, Scott and Deal 1983). Strategies that
are rational for individual organizations may not be rational if adopted by large numbers. Yet
the very fact that they are normatively sanctioned increases the likelihood oftheir adoption
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991).
A number of studies have shown evidence ofmimetic behavior (e.g. Greve 1995; Gulati
1995; Knoke 1982; Starr 1982; Venkatraman, Koh and Loh 1994), and a contribution that
nicely illustrates the above arguments is Tolbert's and Zucker's (1983) work on the adoption
of civil service reform in the United States. Early adoption was related to internal
governmental needs and strongly predicted by city characteristics such as the size of
immigrant population, political reform movements, socioeconomic composition and city size.
Later adoption, on the other hand, was not predicted by city characteristics, but related to
institutional definitions of the legitimate structural form ofmunicipal administration.
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The arguments so far, however, emphasize adoption of new practices among already existing
organizations as a result of mimetic isomorphism. Yet I find it reasonable to also apply this
line ofthinking to the decision to establishing a new venture (or not). In the early life of the
emerging field, candidates are most likely driven by a desire to reap potential economic
benefits from access to a natural resource (e.g. waterfall) when deciding to build a micro-
power plant. These actors are probably highly motivated and would strive accordingly to gain
the technical necessary skills to accomplish the task at hand.
Later, however, word of mouth might inspire other potential candidates but who lack the same
motivational skills. Furthermore, since they might not have considered all the economic and
labor effort that it takes to complete the project, these late adopters are prone to catch the
wave ofthis "new thing" without possessing the necessary capabilities. They might also feel
certain pressure from vendors, consultants and even family- or local community members
who (possibly) encourage them to develop a natural resource in an environmental friendly
manner that will benefit "everybody".
Summed up, early adopters will manage to build efficient plants out of genuine interest as
well as careful considerations of what it takes to establish a plant. On the other hand, late
adopters will establish to a larger extent plants as a result of "moments of inspiration" or some
kind ofpressure from the environment. At the same time, they will also probably lack the
same motivation to learn the new technology, and finally fail to sincerely calculate costs and
benefits. Thus, the alternative hypothesis suggests:
Hypothesis 5 alt: Early adopters in the hydroelectric micro-power field have high electricity production per
financial capital invested, whereas late adopters have low production.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I first elaborated a number ofhypotheses where I applied the focal actor's
external relations and niche characteristics (i.e. characteristics for collectives) as independent
variables. This implies both a cross-level and mixed-determinant approach to the concept of
social capital.
77
Next, I turned the focus outward from network predictors of social capital and addressed
issues from population ecology theory and institutional theory, questioning whether start-up
success or failure from being an early or late adopter is a possible outcome ofpopulation
density (Hannan 1986) or mimetic behavior (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). The hypotheses are
summed up in Table 3.1.
In Chapter S, I test the hypotheses. Data for the empirical analyses were gathered from actors
in the emerging hydroelectric micro-power field in Western Norway, and in the next chapter,
l describe how I modeled the variables for this study.
Form(s) of social Hypo- Simplified text Predicted
capital thesis outcome
Focal actor's I Production is low for plants at the margins and in n
external relations the center of the field at start-up, whereas it is
high for R_lantsin intermediate positions.
Characteristics for 2 Actors in densely connected niches have higher +
collectives production than actors in sparsely connected
niches
Focal actor's 3 There is a positive relationship between actor' s +
external relations access to non-redundant information at start-up
and production.
Both 4a Production is high at plants in densely High
connected niches where actor has high degree
of access to non-redundant information at start-
up.
Both 4b Production is medium at plants in sparsely Medium
connected niches where actor has high degree
of access to non-redundant information at start-
up.
Both 4c Production is medium at plants in densely Medium
connected niches where actor has low degree of
access to non-redundant information at start-up.
Both 4d Production is low at plants in sparsely Low
connected niches where actor has low access to
non-redundant information at start-up.
5 Early adopters have low production whereas +
late adopters have high R_roduction.
Salt Early adopters have high production whereas -
late adopters have low production.
Table 3.1 Summary of the hypotheses.
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4. Research Methodology
A scientific method can be defined as Ha system of explicit rules and procedures upon which
research is based and against which claimsfor knowledge are evaluated" (Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias 1996: 13). As the definition maintains, a scientific method has to be
explicit enabling the reader to evaluate the validity ofthe study and eventually conduct
similar research in other empirical settings to assess the generality of the findings from a
research project.
This chapter expounds the applied methodology in this dissertation. First, I introduce
sampling strategies in network research with a description of how the relevant respondents for
this study were identified. Next I explain the research instrument for this project; how data
was gathered, and subsequently a description of in what way the independent variables and
the dependent variable were modeled. Finally, I portray a number control variables and how
they were operationalized.
Sampling
Sampling- and Data Collection Strategies in Network Research
Network variables can be measured on one, two, or more modes of data where the term
"mode" refers to a distinct set of entities on which the structural variables are measured
(Arabie, Carroll and DeSarbo 1987; Kroonenberg 1983; Tucker 1963; Tucker 1964; Tucker
1966). Structural variables measured on a single set of actors portray one-mode networks and
this is the most common approach within this framework. However, structural variables can
also be measured on two (or more) sets ofentities. For instance, in an affiliation network, we
first have a set of actors (first mode) and second a set of events or activities (second mode) to
which the actors in the first set attend or belong. The events are often defined on the basis of
memberships in clubs or voluntary organizations (McPherson 1982), social events attendance
(Davis, Gardner and Gardner 1941), sitting on a board of directors, or socializing in a small
group (Bernard and Killworth 1982; Bernard, Killworth and Sailer 1980; Wilson 1982).
In this study, I have applied one-mode network data, and will not elaborate any further on
two-mode perspectives. Examples of one-mode network ties can be individual evaluations
such as friendship, liking and respect, transactions of material resources, strategic alliances
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between otherwise independent firms, and exchange of information and advice, to mention a
few.
I have previously described the phrase "social network" as a set of actors and the ties among
them (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Yet there is no universally agreed upon approach for how
to delimit a network sample and how to develop a data collection strategy that is applicable in
every empirical setting. Scholars in the field have also struggled over these issues for more
than three decades (e.g. Burt and Ronchi 1994; Carley and Palmquist 1992; Frank 1971;
Freeman, Romney and Freeman 1987; Granovetter 1976; KilIworth and Bernard 1976;
KilIworth and Bernard 1979; Krackhardt 1987; Kumbasser, Romney and Batchelder 1994;
Laumann, Marsden and Prensky 1983; Marsden 1990; McPherson 1982; Scott 2000).
A convenient sampling strategy in social science research is to identify a population of
relevant units (e.g. firms operating in a particular industry) and from this collection randomly
draw a sample. In network research, however, this approach is not applicable since analyses
focus explicitly on interdependencies among the units studied.l" The omission ofpertinent
elements or arbitrary delineation of boundaries can lead to misleading or artificial results
(Barnes 1979). For instance, let us assume that the theoretical size of the population being
studied is 1,000 and that the researchers randomly select and gather data on 100 entities from
this population. As long as the researchers collect information on autonomous attributes (for
instance firm size, age, revenues, profits, etc.) and there is no bias in the sample - i.e. it is
representative for the whole population - convenient methodological criteria in social science
research should be met. In network research, on the other hand, this is not the case. [fwe
again assume that the population size is 1,000 and the researchers only gather data from 10%
of the relevant actors, the loss of information about (possible) network ties is dramatic. The
maximum number of directional ties among (n) actors in a given one-mode network is n(n-I).
Thus, by merely gathering data on "our" sample, we are theoretically in danger of losing
information about more than 99% of the possible relational ties, and this will most likely
strongly disturb any applied network measure. It is therefore essential for the researcher to be
very conscious about sampling strategy and boundary specification in network research as
compared to other areas in social science studies.
18 An exception is research on egocentric networks. For details, see, for instance, Wasserman and Faust (1994:
41-43) or Burt (I 992a).
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Laumann, Marsden et al. (1989) described two Iines of attack in regard to boundary
specification in social network studies. The first they referred to as the realist approach and it
focuses on actor set boundaries and membership as perceived by the actors themselves. For
instance, a street-comer gang is acknowledged as a social entity by its members and the
membership of the gang is the collection ofpeople the members acknowledge as belonging to
the gang. The second is what the authors denominated as the nominalist approach, and is
based on the theoretical concern of the researcher. Wasserman and Faust (1994: 32) describe
the following example: "[A} researcher might be interested in studying the flow of computer
messages among researchers in a scientific specialty. In such a study, the list of actors might
be the collection of people whopublished papers on the topic in the previous five years. This
list is constructed for the analytical purposes of the researcher, even though the scientists
themselves might not perceive the list of people as constituting a distinctive social entity. "
The composition of relevant actors to include in a network study thus depends on both
theoretical and practical considerations. Of course, the case is most straightforward when we
have an a priori and a clearly defined set of actors with specified boundaries, such as pupils in
a classroom, employees in firm, inhabitants in a village, or manipulated laboratory groups.
However, in many real world studies the task is not always that simple (admittedly, most
students in classrooms, employees in a firm and inhabitants of a village also have network ties
that go beyond the described boundaries). A recommended technique when we do not have an
a priori identified set of actors is to conduct a procedure referred to as "snowball sampling"
(Erickson 1978; Goodman 1949; Goodman 1961). This could include elements from both the
realist and nominalist approach. By means of archive data (e.g. newspapers, web-searches,
public databases, journals, etc.), a researcher would be able to identify a number of relevant
candidates for a network study (a nominalist approach). He could also contact a core of
assumed "key" actors and ask them who they believe are the relevant actors within the given
sector (a realist approach). As a second step, he could ask these actors to inform him about
network ties to other nodes that he has not been able to discover. These additional actors
constitute the "second-order" zone, and the technique can proceed through several such steps.
To decide when to stop snowball sampling depends on both theoretical and practical
considerations, but the most convenient strategy is to end it when most of the new contacts
have already been cited by the respondents at previous levels (Wasserman and Faust 1994).
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With this procedure, sampling goes on until a certain saturation point is reached (Marsden
1990).
Applied Sampling Strategy in this Study
In Chapter l, I argued that the growth of hydroelectric micro-power plants in Norway has
predominately taken place in the Western region of the country, and this is the major reason
why I have constrained the empirical setting in this study to the counties (in Norwegian:
fylker) Rogaland, Hordaland, Sogn og Fjordane, Møre og Romsdal. This area additionally
represents a relatively homogenous zone for both climatic and geological conditions.
In order to access data from these plants I applied a nominalist, realist, and partlya snowball
sampling strategy. First, I accessed data (an Excel file) from The Norwegian Water Resources
and Energy Directorate (NVE) (2000) which represented an overview of the start-ups in the
country. However, this list only mapped hydroelectric micro-power start-ups that were
established before 2000, and communication with actors in the field taught me that the list had
flaws and was incomplete. I therefore undertook the task to make phone calls to all the local
municipalities (in Norwegian: kommuner) in Western Norway where the NVE (2000) Excel
file stated that one or more micro-power stations had been built. Through this strategy, I was
able to identify 27 hydroelectric micro-power plants." This list excludes two actors where
one - after showing him a list of relevant actors in the field - claimed that he had not
cooperated with any of other listed actors, and the other asserted that he had even built the
generator on his own. In order to study novel entrepreneurs, the list also excludes two plants
that were built by a company that is also professional vendor and consultant of micro-power
systems. In mapping network ties, however, the candidates approached were asked ifthey
were having or had had relationships to this firm (and these plants) implying that they were
included in the network. In order to map unrecognized micro-power entrepreneurs, I
eventually asked every respondent to name other newly established plants in Western
Norway, and this strategy identified two more respondents.
19 One ofthese plants was built as common project between two neighbors as a chain oftwo generators at
different altitude levels. I approached one ofthese actors, but he was one ofthose who failed to return the
questionnaire.
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Altogether, I discovered a number of 29 possible candidates for data-collection. Despite a
number of attempts, I was unable to get in touch with one of them, but the other 28 that were
contacted by telephone were first given brief information about the research project and were
next asked ifthey wanted to participate in the study. Three ofthem informed me that their
plant was built before 1994 and were accordingly deleted from the study. 20 All the 25
remaining candidates responded that they were willing to participate in the study. The oldest
plant in my study was established in 1994 and youngest were established in 2001. I did not
discover any micro-power plants that started electricity production in 2002.
Data Instrument and -Collection
Data Collection Instrument
Before developing an instrument for data collection, I spent considerable time searching the
publicly available information in order to get an overview of the particular sector. I also
conducted an open-ended interview with an actor who was considered an authority in the
field. Additionally, I conducted an open-ended interview with a micro-power start-up to
whom I also presented a draft of the questionnaire. Finally, to gain more insight on the
particular sector and to get further feedback on the draft of the questionnaire, I communicated
with an engineer and expert in small-scale hydroelectricity.
The language that I applied in the questionnaire is "nynorsk" which is the written idiom that is
most commonly used in the rural areas in Norway (compared to "bokmål", which
predominates in urban areas). Linguistically, it is also closest to most of the different dialects
spoken in the region. The instrument consists of five parts. The first section explains the
content of the questionnaire and how to complete it. In the part following, a number of
vendors and consultants of micro-power systems are listed, in addition to Sintef, a Norwegian
technology research institute. These candidates were identified by conducting a web-search in
addition to information provided by a micro-power entrepreneur. I argue that mapping
network ties between start-ups and suppliers - in addition to merely gathering network ties
between the plants - represents a strength in this study. This approach expands the strategy of
only studying the focal population of start-ups to include an aggregate of what constitutes a
20 The participants, however, were asked ifthey had ties to these actors.
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recognized area of institutionallife. It is furthermore consistent with the organizational field
paradigm (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).
In the first column, I presented the suppliers and consultants in alphabetic order. In following
columns the respondents were asked to give information about the content of regular contacts
they have/had with the different providers. Actors may have different kinds of relations with
each other, and some contacts overlap. This is referred to as multiplexity in relationships
(Greve and Salaff2001). In order not to miss the richness in the network structure, I divided
the contents of the relations or contacts into four classes. I discussed and developed the
questions in cooperation with a hydroelectric entrepreneur and an electrical engineer, and the
content of the questions was phrased as follow (translated from Norwegian [nynorsk]):
l. contact regarding legal issues and environmentalism
2. contact regarding choice of product, technological solutions, and hydroelectric
conditions
3. contact regarding installation/building and upstart
4. contact regarding operation and maintenance
The candidates were asked to note whether they have/had one or more of these contacts with
different vendors, consultants, or Sintef. Freeman, Romney et al. (1987) have shown that
people are good at recalling regularly occurring relations as opposed to ad hoc contacts, so in
two other columns, I asked the respondents to identify the year the contacts were established
and eventually terminated. Since this dissertation studies the development of a structural
graph where network constellations at the time of start-up are modeled as independent
variables, it was particularly important to identify the year different contacts were established.
This procedure is also in accordance with scholars' recommendations for gathering
longitudinal and dynamic network relationships (Burt 1992a; Podolny and Baron 1997).
Below the listed actors there was an empty space in which the respondents could add other
vendors and consultants with whom they have/had network ties in the process ofbuilding the
plant.
In the third part of the questionnaire, Ilisted all the hydroelectric micro-power plants and
miniature power plants that I was able to identify in the Western region of Norway. The
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reason for also including miniature plants was that there is no substantial difference in
technical terms between the two classes of hydro turbines, except for the size." By this
strategy, I was able to identify possible network ties to plants that also went beyond what is
strictly defined as hydroelectric micro-power.
In the first column, I placed the name of the plant (in a number of cases the name of the owner
of the plant also). With the aim ofmaking it easier for the respondents to discern the different
plants, in the second column, I placed in alphabetic order the name of the local municipality
(in Norwegian: kommune) where the different actors were located. In following columns, the
respondents were asked exactly the same questions about possible network relationships as in
the previous part of the questionnaire. Again, l left an open space where the respondents could
add network ties to unrecognized candidates. Interestingly, only one respondent mentioned a
network tie to a plant that was not already on the list, and this plant was located in Western
Norway. This indicates that the described region represents a natural boundary regarding
network ties between micro-power plants in the emerging field.
In the fourth part of the questionnaire, I first asked the respondents about autonomous
characteristics of the plant. I requested the month and year electricity production was started,
and since my intention was to model monthly production as the time-window for the
dependent variable, I next asked them about total monthly electricity production in kWh since
start-up. The strategy of gaining information about monthly production partly failed, however.
Due to the smallness ofthese plants, a number ofthem have not been particularly strict about
recording production within a monthly time frame, so I decided instead to register yearly
production (description below). I also asked about the size of the plant in terms of maximum
production in kWh, and other technical terms such as maximum throughput (operating flow),
total head difference, the size of headrace dam, and whether they were having dam in the
catchment area or not. I also asked them to name the closest station for meteorological
observations, how large their total investment had been, and what percentage of total
investment had been spent on connecting the plant to the electricity grid.
21 As I described in the introductory chapter, an important difference that goes beyond the difference in size is
that micro-power plants are exempted from paying 6 øre (almost one cent) in taxes (in Norwegian:
forbruksavgift) for every kWh they seil.
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In the latter part of the questionnaire, I asked the respondents about personal characteristics
such as year ofbirth, education level, and ifbuilding of the plant was a one-man project or
not. To discern whether the entrepreneurs were novices in the area ofbuilding small-scale
hydroelectricity, I asked them ifthey had previously been involved in a similar project. Only
two respondents reported any such experience. Finally, l asked, as described earlier, ifthey
knew about other micro-power start-ups in the region that were not among those already listed
in the questionnaire.
Data Collection
The data collection instrument was mailed to the respondents in the beginning of September
2002 (except for a few that were mailed later). Together with the questionnaire, l attached a
cover letter where there was a reference to previous telephone conversation(s) and thanked
them for participating in the studyagain. I briefly, and in general terms, described the purpose
of the project, guaranteed the respondents full anonymity, and finally promised those who
returned the questionnaire participation in a lottery where the prize was a gift certificate for
NOK 10,000 with a tour operator. The respondents also received a letter of confirmation from
one of my supervisors and an addressed and prepaid envelope in which they could return the
questionnaire. Finally, all the candidates for the study received a lottery ticket (in Norwegian:
flax-Iodd) in the state lottery with a value of NOK 20.
After about a month, I phoned the candidates who had not yet returned the questionnaire, and
after waiting another period of time, I called again. I also sent new questionnaires to those
who had not yet responded. Out of 25 candidates, I received 23 usable questionnaires for
modeling network data, representing a response-rate of92% (88.5% ifwe consider the micro-
power start-up that I was unable to reach). I described above that I was unable to gain
monthly total electricity production from a large number of the respondents, and consequently
decided to register yearly production instead. This change in strategy was an easy task for
those who had already provided me with reliable monthly data. Here I just summed reported
production for each month. Same of the respondents, who were unable to report monthly
production, reported also yearly production of their own accord.
With the aim of gaining reliable data from as many respondents as possible, I mailed them a
letter in December 2002 informing them that I would make another phone call in early
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January 2003. In this telephone roundup I intended to access more data on electricity
production and gain other information that had not been reported in some of the returned
questionnaires. The strategy turned out rather successfully, resulting in data on yearly
production from 20 respondents. I also received reliable data on other issues enabling me to
model both the dependent variable and the control variables. Altogether, this represented data
on autonomous characteristics from 80% of the respondents; but note, regarding network data
- from which l modeled the independent variables and a control variable - the response rate
was 92%.
In addition to gathering data from micro-power start-ups on network ties and autonomous
characteristics, I also accessed data from Statistics Norway (SSB) on the consumer price
index. Moreover, the Norwegian Institute of Meteorology (MET) provided me with data on
yearly precipitation from a number ofweather stations in the Western region of Norway. The
following describes how I applied data from these external sources in modeling the dependent
variable and a control variable.
Modeling Network Ties and Variables
Modeling Network Ties
Wasserman and Faust (1994) argued that substantive concerns and theories motivating a
specific network study usually determine which variables to measure, and which techniques
are most appropriate for their measurement. Figure 4.1 portrays two different dimensions to
consider when modeling a one-mode network. A relation can be considered symmetrical or
asymmetrical, valued or non-valued (dichotomized). An example ofan asymmetric network
tie is that A gives money to B, but the contribution is not reciprocated. Examples ofvalued
network ties can be frequency of contact, duration of contact, level of intimacy, level of
multiplexity in the relation, size oftransaction between organizational actors, etc. It is, of
course, up to the researcher to decide how to measure different values of network ties. We end
up with four different alternatives ofhow to model a one-mode network: Symmetric and
valued (a), asymmetric and valued (b), symmetric and dichotomized (c), asymmetric and
dichotomized (d).
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Symmetric tie
Yes No
Yes a b
Valued
No c d
Figure 4.1 Different alternatives ofhow to model one-mode network data.
In the introduction, I stressed that this study focuses on the formal structure of the ties that
make up the social network in the emerging hydroelectric micro-power field, rather than
focusing on the content of these ties. Hinde (1976: 8) referred to the term structure "as a
patterning ofrelationships that is independent of the particular individuals concerned ... ",
He further stated that "[i}n moving to this more abstract level wefocus on aspects of the
content that show regularities across individuals and across societies ... " I accordingly
modeled the network data as symmetric and dichotomized (c), and this implies that I intended
to uncover among which pair of actors contacts have been reported.
Reported relations in this study, however, were not inherently symmetrical. For instance, if A
contacts B for advice in building a micro-power plant, this does not necessarily mean that B
contacts A for advice. According to Krackhardt (1990: 352), there are two ways to treat these
asymmetries when modeling network properties such as actor-centrality measures:
"On the one hand, one could assume that information only travels in the one direction specified by the
asymmetric relation. For example, if A goes to B for advice, then one could assume that relevant information
flow is from B to A and not vice versa. On the other hand, it may be more reasonable to assume that information
flows in both directions as a result of an exchange, independent ofwho initiates the exchange. That is,just
because A defers to B (by going to B for advice) does not mean that no information is passed from A to B in the
exchange. In fact, by the very act of asking for advice, A is providing B with information about what A is doing
or what is going on around A. For this reason, I assume ... that the presence of a relationship from A to B
indicates an opportunity for an exchange of information in both directions, from A to B and from B to A."
As stated above, this study models symmetric relationships. Therefore, I have applied
Krackhardt's (1990: 352) operational definition of actor-centrality in the network based on
following equation of R*:
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I if
R * si., = R*i,j=1 or R*;,i=1
O otherwise
(4)
According to Equation 4, this implies that a network tie exists between A and B if one or both
report that a relationship exists. This approach enabled me to model network data between
micro-power start-ups and actors outside the identified sample, which in practical terms
implies that 1also identified relationships that included vendors, consultants, and miniature
power plants. This approach expands the strategy of only studying the focal population of
start-ups to also include an aggregate of what constitutes a recognized area of institutional
life, consistent with the organizational field paradigm (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Note that
the relations are also dichotomized.
Since this study intended to uncover the development of a network structure in an emerging
field, rather than merely focusing on static network properties measured at one point of time, I
had to develop a strategy ofhow to capture such an unfolding dynamic process. This led me
to focus on the initiation and duration of the reported network ties. For almost every identified
contact, the respondents reported the year it had been established, except in very few cases. In
those few cases where year of initiation was lacking, the relationships were modeled as ties
established in the very early phase of the emerging field. The argument behind such an
approach is that it is easier to - everything else being equal - correctly identify the time
dimension of more recent events compared to events that took place (or were initiated) in the
distant past. I therefore interpreted the few ties that were lacking year of initiation as enduring
events that were established such a long time ago that the actor was unable to record the exact
year.
With regard to handling network ties that are reported as terminated, perhaps the most
intuitive way of handling this issue is to model the year oftermination. This, however,
underestimates important aspects of the enduring influences a network tie is expected to have
on the involved actors. For instance, let us assume that an established contact between A and
B was reported as terminated in 1997. Does this imply that there was no influence ofthis tie
after this year? I argue that this is not so. Ifwe assume that two years later B establishes a
contact with C, it is most likely that the experiences and skills B gained through cooperation
with A will be passed on and developed further to a certain extent in working with C. To
account for the expected enduring influence ofterminated network ties, I added 5 years
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duration from the year oftermination to those relations. In order to assess the validity ofthis
strategy, I also modeled network data where I added 3 years and 7 years, respectively, but
unreported analyses indicated by and large no substantial differences in the results.
Interestingly, for a number ofmodels explained variance was considerably larger when I
added 5 (and also 7) years as compared to only adding 3 years.
\
a) 1995 b) 1997
c) 1999 d) 2001
Figure 4.2 A graphic display of the network structure in the emerging field.
By following the strategies that I have described above, I identified 115 network ties between
59 actors that were established before 2002. Figure 4.2 shows the network structure from the
years 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001, respectively, illustrating the dynamic of the developing
network structure in the emerging field. We can observe - with the exception of one dyad that
was unconnected to the rest of the structure in 1995 (which is also the case for 1996) - a
coherent and connected network. We can also notice a steady increase in both the number of
actors entering the network, and the increased density in contacts.
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Independent Variables
Network Distance to the Center o/the Field. Hypothesis 1 suggests a curvilinear relationship
with the shape of a negative 2nd degree polynomial between network distance to the center of
the field at start-up and electricity production per financial capital invested. I have defined the
center of the field as a position of strategic significance in the overall network (Scott 2000).
Closeness centrality is a centrality measure of how close an actor is to all other actors in the
network in terms of the number of steps the focal actor has to pass through to reach each other
node. By drawing upon the works of a number of scholars (Bavelas 1950; Beauchamp 1965;
Harary 1959; Moxley and Moxley 1974; Rogers 1974; Sabidussi 1966), Freeman (1979)
proposed that actor closeness should be measured as a function of geodesic distance, i.e. the
shortest number of steps between a given actor to all other actors in the network. As geodesic
distance increases in length, the closeness centrality of the actor decreases. Thus, this
centrality measure depends not only on direct ties, but also on indirect ties in the network.
I argue that closeness centrality captures essential aspects of whether the focal actor has a
position of strategic significance in the overall network. Everything else being equal, an actor
at the center of the field will have to go through fewer steps than marginal actors do to reach
each other node due to average shorter geodesic distance. Graph theorists have also simplified
this concept of centrality and talked about the center of a graph (i.e. the network), using the
graph-theoretic notion of distance (Jordan 1869). To determine the actors' distance to the
center of the field, I applied Freeman's (1979) closeness centrality measure, where closeness
is the inverse sum of the distances so that infinite distances contribute a value of zero. High
values denote proximity to the center, whereas low values denote distance to the center.
As we see in Figure 4.2, the number of actors entering the network increases throughout the
life of the emerging field. I therefore applied the normalized closeness centrality score,
achieved by multiplying the initial measure with the maximum possible closeness value for
each given year. A maximum possible closeness centrality value is the case when the actor is
adjacent to all other actors (Beauchamp 1965). An unconnected graph produces infinite
geodesic distances, and as I have described, this is the case for 1995 and 1996. However,
these disconnected nodes were not among the start-ups for these two years, so I decided to
delete them from centrality calculations for 1995 and 1996. From 1997 and beyond, the graph
is connected.
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Niche Density. Hypothesis 2 proposes that actors in densely connected niches have higher
electricity production per financial capital invested than actors in sparsely connected niches.
Burt and Talmud (1993) defined an ecological niche as a subset of structurally equivalent
actors, and block model techniques can be applied to identify such partitions (White, Breiger
and Boorman 1976). A block-model splits actors in the network into discrete ecological
niches, and each such pair states the presence or absence of ties within them or between them
(Wasserman and Faust 1994).
In this dissertation, I applied what is called the Concor (convergence of iterated correlations)
technique to identify structurally equivalent niches. This is one of the earliest approaches to
partitioning actors into structurally equivalent subsets, and was developed by White and
colleagues (White, Boorman and Breiger 1976; White, Breiger and Boorman 1976). The
method has been extensively used by network researchers in many fields (Wasserman and
Faust 1994), and is based on the observation that repeated calculations of correlations
between rows or columns of a matrix will eventually result in a correlation matrix consisting
of only + I 's and -1' s. The procedure starts with a matrix (or a collection of matrices) and first
computes the correlations among rows and columns. Then it uses this new matrix and again
calculates the correlations on rows or columns and continues until all correlations in the
matrix equal I or -L Concor can be repeated on the sub-matrices defined by an earlier
partition. Thus, this technique may be thought of as a divisive hierarchical clustering method.
It is, however, rare that a given set of actors are perfectly structurally equivalent in a set (or
sets) ofnetwork data, so Concor is intended to uncover actors that are approximately
structurally equivalent.
As described, an important decision when using Concor is to decide how fine the partition
should be. Wasserman and Faust (1994: 378) held that "[t}heory and interpretability o/the
solution are the primary considerations in deciding how many ... [partitions} to produce. "
They furthermore argued that making too many splits can lead to unstable correlations, due to
the small number of elements. I used the Concor method to divide the field into 4 niches, i.e. I
conducted two splits. This measure is open to interpretation, and - as we shall see - clearly
indicates that a certain degree of clustering took place within a number of the niches, yet with
varying density levels. Moreover, in unreported analyses, I increased the number of splits, but
the change in R-square indicated no specific saturation point.
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To my knowledge there are no explicit recommendations for the application ofConcor (or
other structural equivalence measures) on network data that possess a dynamic structure, for
both the number of actors entering (or leaving) the network and the relational structure
between them. Wasserman and Faust (J 994: 366) warned that the use of static models for the
representation of dynamic systems may lead to measurement errors, and in order to face this
challenge, I undertook two different tasks. First, I modeled the entire static network structure
as it was reported before 2002. Next, Imodeled a matrix of the network structure for each
respective year from 1995 through 2001. Altogether, this provided me with 8 data matrices,
which Itreated as multirelational networks in the software program Ucinet 6.12 (Borgatti,
Everett and Freeman 2002). This gave me the advantage of inspecting the overall structure
within and between different niches, as well as portraying the dynamic in this pattern over
time.
By applying the above strategy, the accumulated network and the networks for different time
periods were transformed into different block-models, as illustrated in Tables 4.1- 4.8. Table
4.1 shows the reduced block matrix with densities within blocks (diagonal) and between
blocks for the accumulated network structure in the emerging field. Density is the number of
relations (I) among (n) actors that exist compared to the maximum possible number of
relations, 1/[n(n-I)/2], and the overall density level (block alpha) is .067. The total number of
actors within each niche - including micro-power start-ups, vendors and consultants - is 23 in
Niche I, 15 in Niche 2,9 in Niche 3 and finally, 12 in Niche 4. The table reveals a number of
interesting issues. First, for Niches 1,2, and 3, we observe density levels well above the
overall density level- reported in bold letters - indicating that a certain degree of clustering
has taken place within these niches. However, while the density level in block 1 is about 40%
higher than overall network density, the levels are roughly 245% and 190% higher in Niches
2 and 3, respectively. This static picture indicates substantially higher niche densities in
Niches 2 and 3 as compared to Niche 1.
Niche 1 Niche 2
Niche 1 .092
Niche 2 .052 .228
Niche 3 .000 .027
Niche4 .005 .021
Niche 3 Niche 4
.192
.189 .000
Table 4.1 Density matrix for the years 1995 to 200 I. Block alpha = .067
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It is somewhat surprising to note that the density level in Niche 4 is zero, but by inspecting the
actors in this subset, we learned that they were vendors and consultants of micro-power
systems, and were not a part of the micro-power start-ups from which I gathered data. In
addition, Table 4.1 teaches us that actors in Niche 3 were not only densely connected to each
other, but also seem to have had extensive contacts with the vendors and consultants in Niche
4.
If we now take a closer look at the dynamics in the block structure between 1995 and 200 l,
the picture from Table 4.1 is generally confirmed. In Tables 4.2 - 4.8 we observe that some
clustering was already taking place in Niches 2 and 3 in 1995, and throughout the whole
period, the same niches were substantially more densely connected than Niche l. Note,
however, that both overall density level (alpha) and density levels within and between the
niches are underreported in these tables due to the fact that in the early life of the field a
number of nodes would not yet have made their appearance into the network. This would
particularly depress the numbers reported in the early years, but since this is the case for
overall density (alpha) and densities within and between blocks, the general tendencies we
observe will not be substantially affected.
Niche I Niche 2 Niche 3 Niche 4
Niche l .013
Niche 2 .020 .051
Niche 3 .000 .005 .090
Niche 4 .000 .000 .035 .000
Table 4.2 Density matrix for 1995. Block alpha = .016
Niche 1 Niche 2 Niche 3 Niche 4
Niche 1 .026
Niche 2 .029 .059
Niche 3 .000 .009 .103
Niche 4 .000 .000 .042 .000
Table 4.3 Density matrix for 1996. Block alpha = .022
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Niche 1 Niche 2 Niche 3 Niche 4
Niche l .039
Niche 2 .039 .081
Niche 3 .000 .014 .115
Niche 4 .000 .000 .070 .000
Table 4.4 Density matrix for 1997. Block alpha = .030
Niche 1 Niche 2 Niche 3 Niche 4
Niche l .046
Niche 2 .049 .154
Niche 3 .000 .023 .141
Niche 4 .000 .011 .105 .000
Table 4.5 Density matrix for 1998. Block alpha = .044
Niche l Niche 2 Niche 3 Niche 4
Niche 1 .072
Niche 2 .052 .206
Niche 3 .000 .023 .154
Niche 4 .005 .021 .147 .000
Table 4.6 Density matrix for 1999. Block alpha = .057
Niche 1 Niche 2 Niche 3 Niche 4
Niche 1 .078
Niche 2 .049 .213
Niche 3 .000 .023 .167
Niche 4 .005 .021 .182 .000
Table 4.7 Density matrix for 2000. Block alpha = .061
Niche 1 Niche 2 Niche 3 Niche 4
Niche l .092
Niche 2 .046 .221
Niche 3 .000 .027 .167
Niche 4 .005 .021 .175 .000
Table 4.8 Density matrix for 200 l. Block alpha = .063
Altogether, Tables 4.1- 4.8 teach us that a certain clustering has taken place within Niches 1,
2, and 3, but with a substantially lower density level in Niche l compared to the other niches
with micro-power start-ups. I therefore concluded that Niches 2 and 3 had high-density levels,
whereas Niche l had a low level of density.
Access to Non-Redundant Information. Hypotheses 3 and 4 contain the concept of access to
non-redundant information, which I defined to be a positive function of the level of
nonadjacent relational ties (Freeman 1979). This intuition grew out of the idea that actors in a
network are somehow central to the degree they stand between others on the paths of
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interaction (Anthonisse 1971; Bave1as 1948; Cohn and Marriott 1958; Freeman 1977;
Friedkin 1991; Shaw 1954; Shimbel 1953). Among other things, such actors have access to
parts of the network that are not strongly connected to each other, allowing richer and more
differentiated information to reach them (Krackhardt 1990). Freeman (1977; 1979)
operationalized the concept of actor betweenness centrality as the number of geodesics (i.e.
shortest paths) between each pair ofnodes in a network that passes through the given actor. In
a later contribution Freeman, Borgatti et al. (1991) further developed the measure to include,
not only the geodesic paths, but all independent paths between pairs of points in the network.
They stated, "the flow [of information and other resources} between twopoints is a global
phenomenon; it depends, not just on the capacity of the channellinking the points directly,
but on the capacities of all the channels on all paths - both direct and indirect - that connect
the two" (Freeman, Borgatti and White 1991: 146). This refined measure they called actor
flow betweenness. As with actor closeness centrality, it is possible to measure a normalized
score of flow betweenness, allowing comparisons between different graphs and graphs of
different sizes (for details, see Freeman, Borgatti and White 1991). Accordingly, in this
dissertation I have adopted the normalized score of flow betweenness to measure the focal
actor's access to non-redundant information.
Being an Early or Late Adopter. The last independent variable I have applied in this
dissertation is reflected in Hypotheses 5 and Salt. Here Ihave argued that there is either a
positive or a negative relationship between being an early or late adopter on electricity
production per financial capital invested. The way I operationalized this variable was simply
to model the year of start-up. As we shall see later, in one model Iapplied the start-up year as
a nominal variable and in others as a continuous variable.
Dependent Variable
Ihave mentioned a number of times that the dependent variable I applied in this study is
electricity production per financial capital invested, discounted in real terms. For the 20 actors
from whom data was accessed on yearly electricity production, Ialso accessed data on their
total investment in building the plant. Moreover, I gained information about how much of the
total investment eventually was incurred in connecting the plant to the electricity grid. Since
these costs could vary as a result ofproximity to already established infrastructure, Idecided
to subtract this amount from their total investment. Data on investment is a nominal measure
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and does not take into account inflation throughout the period. I therefore divided these values
on the deflator of consumer price index - accessed from Statistics Norway (SSB) - at the year
of start-up for each plant.
Concerning modeling the year of start-up there are two exceptions. One is the actor who
reported to have started the plant in 1994. Between 1994 and 1999, he claimed that he was
merely experimenting with two small turbines, before upgrading the plant to its present form
in 1999. Itherefore divided his total investments on the consumer price index for this year,
which Ialso modeled as start-up year. The other exception is the actor who informed me that
he started electricity production in the very beginning of2001. Since practically all his
investments had taken place prior to this, Imodeled 2000 as the start-up year.
Among the 20 start-ups from which Ihad data on electricity production - along with other
autonomous characteristics - 3 were started in 1995, 1 in 1996, 4 in 1997, 2 in 1998,4 in
1999 (including the one who was merely experimenting from 1994), 4 in 2000 (including the
one who claimed that he started electricity production at the very beginning of 200 I), and 2 in
2001. Idivided their yearly electricity production in kWh by their real investments, as
described above. For the entrepreneurs from whom Iaccessed more than one yearly
observation, Iapplied the average production from their total reported years of operation.
Control Variables
So far, I have only focused on variables that are reflected in the hypotheses from Chapter 3.
However, it was likely that a number of other factors could affect the dependent variable. I
therefore found it reasonable to include a number of control variables, which will be discussed
below.
The Size a/the Plant. First, Ihave included the size of the plant's maximum capacity in
kWh. The largest plant in this study had a size of99 kWh, the smallest 7 kWh. There were a
number of reasons for including this control variable. First, discussions with both an engineer
and micro-power start-ups taught me that - everything else being equal - the larger the size of
the plant, the more efficient it is. Itwas therefore reasonable to expect that this would be
reflected in larger production per financial capital invested. Clients that invested in larger
plants could also perhaps gain certain rebates, due to their relatively larger investments.
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On the other hand, a large plant would require a higher flow-through to be more efficient than
a small plant, and would accordingly be more vulnerable to variations in precipitation. Thus,
as long as there is plenty ofwater in the river this would have no impact, but in seasons with
little water, the efficiency of a small plant would likely be superior, compared to a large plant.
Total Head Difference. It is intuitive to think that the effect from the plant would increase
with increased total head difference, due to higher pressure on the turbines. On the other hand,
total head difference would also increase total investment, due to longer pipelines. I
accordingly controlled for this variable and the parameter is measured in meters.
Human Capital. I have included three control variables that capture possible effects from
human capitalon the dependent variable. First, I included a dummy variable, which indicated
whether building the micro-power plant has been a one-man project or not. Cooper and Bruno
(1977) found team size to be associated with growth in the high-tech industry, and in an
ecological study, Singh, House et al. (1986) found that the board size at birth depressed the
death rate for Canadian voluntary social service organizations. Eisenhardt, Bird et al.( 1990)
furthermore showed that the size of the founding top-management team influenced the growth
of new semiconductor firms.
In this particular study, I found it reasonable that the number ofpeople involved in building a
micro-power plant could produce two possible effects. Perhaps the most intuitive
interpretation from the above review is that the presence of more than one person in the
project adds knowledge, experience, and participates in adding a variety of perspectives about
how to solve the task at hand. This would enable the entrepreneurs to pick the better solution
from a variety of available alternatives, and would likely be reflected in high production per
capital invested. On the other hand, since practically all the entrepreneurs in this study had no
previous experience with micro-power, the presence of a number of people in the project
could constrain the process due to the lack of an established platform of competence from
which these individuals could benefit in exchanging ideas. So, if a number of persons are
directly involved in the project, this could constrain the flow of knowledge and competence
that is being established throughout the field. A lone entrepreneur, on the other hand, would
probably pay greater attention to his external network ties, due to lack of input and ideas from
other sources.
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Secondly, I have included a variable on the level of formal education. In the questionnaire, the
respondents were asked to indicate on a scale whether they had completed secondary school
(in Norwegian: grunnskole), high school (in Norwegian: videregående skole), 1-3 years in
college/university, or 4 years or more in college/university. Ifmore than one person were
involved in the project, I included the length of education for the person with the most years
of schooling. I modeled this scale as a continuous variable, and in accordance with other
studies that include measures of human capital (e.g. Greve, Golombek and Harris 2001), I
found it likely to expect that level of formal education would positively predict the dependent
variable.
In a study of German business founders, Bruderi, Preisendorfer et al. (1992) found that years
ofwork experience reduced the failure rate for venture firms in Upper Bavaria, and other
studies have also shown a positive relationship between work experience and performance
(Eisenhardt, Bird and Schoonhoven 1990; Greve, Benassi and Harkola 2001; Roure and
Maidique 1986). To apply a control variable for work experience l modeled the
entrepreneurs' age in years at start-up. Ifmore than one person was involved in the project, I
included the age of the eldest person. I decided to include this variable instead of
"professional" work experience as a consequence ofthese actors' predominant background in
non-academic work. A large number ofthem were farmers who had been involved in practical
and mechanical farm work - often since childhood. Work experience per se became a slippery
concept due to ambiguity about when a large number ofthese people actually started working.
Moreover, studies have shown that on a number of occasions older workers seem to
outperform their younger colleagues in solving novel and complex tasks such as strategic
decision-making and negotiations (Haukedal 1990; Røvang 2003).
Deviations in Precipitation. I have also included a variable where I have controlled for
average deviations in yearly precipitation. Intuitively we understand that dry periods
negatively affect the production ofhydroelectricity, whereas abundant rainfall enables stable
and high production. The Norwegian Institute of Meteorology (MET) provided me with data
on yearly precipitation from a number ofweather stations in the Western region of Norway. I
modeled the percentage deviation in yearly precipitation from the most geographically
approximate weather station in the region that I was able to discover, from which I also
gained sufficient data. Next, I applied average deviation for the plants from which I accessed
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data for more than one year of electricity production. MET calculates deviations in yearly
precipitation by dividing total rainfall for each respective year on average yearly precipitation
from 1961 to1990.
Local Network Centrality. In a number of models, I also included a network measure of local
centrality. As described, an actor is locally central if he has a large number of connections
with other nodes in the immediate environment, i.e. if he has a neighborhood of many direct
contacts (Freeman 1979). Whereas network distance to the center of the field concerns
prominence in the whole network, local centrality is concerned with the relative prominence
of a focal point in the neighborhood (Scott 2000). Freeman (1979) conceptualized it as a
measure of activity and involvement in the network. Brass and Burkhardt (1992) argued that
local centrality represents the number of alternatives available to an actor, in addition to
avoidance of relying on mediating positions for direct access to vital information. A great
number of studies have shown positive relationships between local network centrality and
performance (e.g. Ahuja 2000a; Baum, Calabrese and Silverman 2000; Choonwoo, Lee and
Pennings 200 l; Shan, Walker and Kogut 1994; Smith-Doerr, Owen-Smith and Powell 1999;
Stuart 2000; Stuart, Hoang and Hybels 1999).
The major reason for having included this measure is that it would most likely correlate with
closeness centrality and flow betweenness. For instance, an actor that has many contacts will
- everything else being equal- be closer to each node in the network. Ifhe is connected to
every actor, he will of course gain a maximum score of closeness centrality for the given
graph. In Chapter three, I suggested a curvilinear relationship with the shape of a negative 2nd
degree polynomial between network distance to the center of the field and electricity
production. Despite the fact that most studies showa linear relationship between local
centrality and performance, it would not be unlikely to expect that local network centrality
could also produce a similar curvilinear relationship. Whereas possessing some network
contacts can be positive, it is not unlikely that the effect could become negative beyond a
certain maturation point as a result of a possibly negative, marginal effect from each new tie.
Finally, being active in the network beyond a certain point can indicate "a cry for help";
entrepreneurs that are really struggling in their project may have a tendency to search for
more help, and therefore would establish more contacts than more fortunate start-ups.
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Flow betweenness will probably also correlate with local centrality. Everything else being
equal, the more contacts an actor has means he will also stand between other pairs of nodes in
the network to a larger extent.
I operationalized the parameter by applying Freeman' s (1979) normalized degree centrality
measure, which counts all the contacts a given node has, divided by the size of the graph
minus one.
Conclusion
This chapter has presented the methodology that I have applied in this dissertation. I have
described in detail the strategies that l undertook in order to gather data as well as how l
modeled independent variables, the dependent variable and a number of control variables. The
hypotheses are empirically tested in the next chapter.
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5. Results
The major focus in this chapter is to empirically test the hypotheses that I developed in
Chapter 3. First, Ipresent the results from a number of statistical analyses. All statistical
calculations have been conducted in the software program JMP5 (2003), whereas network
variables have been calculated in Ucinet 6.12 (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 2002). Next, I
present a lengthy discussion of my interpretations and the implications from the findings in
the study. The chapter also emphasizes other potentially interesting findings that are not
necessarily reflected in the hypotheses.
The Hypotheses
Normal Distributions and Correlation Matrix
Table 5.1 shows calculations of skewness and kurtosis from the continuous variables in the
data set, and we observe that the absolute value for kurtosis and skewness for normalized flow
betweenness along with kurtosis for the dependent variable (Mean Production), are larger than
±1.96. This indicates that for these two parameters we can reject the assumption about normal
distributions at a probability levellarger than .05. However, by modeling the natural
logarithm (nFlow BetweennessLn and Mean ProductionLn) we observe a marked decrease in
the absolute value ofkurtosis (and skewness), so now these variables, along with the other
variables, fulfill the requirements for normal distribution. This enabled me to conduct
ordinary least square regressions (OLS) or standard least square which it is also called (JMP
Version 5.0.1.2 2003}.22
22 Two actors had normalized flow betweenness centrality scores of zero, so calculating the natural logarithm for
this variable was not straightforward. In order not to lose data from these actors, I added l to each respondent's
score and calculated the natural logarithm from the new values.
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Continuous Variables Skewness Kurtosis
Mean Production 1.718 5.235
Mean ProductionLn -.474 .9543
nCloseness -.743 -.441
nFlow Betweenness 2.874 9.830
nFlow BetweennessLn -.070 -.490
Start-up year -.280 -1.040
Size of the Plant .568 -1.093
Total head difference .378 -1.198
Formal Education .537 .820
Age of the Actors -.458 1.125
nDe ree .435 -.286
Table 5.1 Calculations ofskewness and kurtosis for continuous variables. n=20
Moreover, I have to emphasize that later in this chapter the variable "Start-up year" has been
modeled as a nominal variable. Yet since this implies a relatively great loss in degrees of
freedom, and the data set is relatively small, I also conducted calculations where "Start-up
year" was modeled as a continuous variable.
Table 5.2 shows a correlation matrix for all the continuous variables that have been included
in this study. The relatively high and significant correlation between formal education and the
size of the plant indicates that the more educated the entrepreneur is, the higher the propensity
to build large plants. This can give us a clue that other factors than merely hydrological and
climatic conditions are at play when deciding upon the size of micro-power turbines. It is
likely to expect that novel entrepreneurs perceive a certain level of risk when deciding to
build a micro-power plant. On the average, the larger the plant the more expensive it is, and
reported investments in this study vary between NOK 50,000 and 1,100,000. Thus for a
number of entrepreneurs this can definitely be considered to be more than a hobby, so the
higher the level of formal education (particularly in natural science), the better ability the
candidate has to reduce the risk by conducting calculations on hydrologic and climatic
conditions. In tum, these reduced risks possibly induce (novel) entrepreneurs to go for a larger
investment than they otherwise would have spent.
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There was, moreover, a significant correlation between the size of the plant and local network
centrality (nDegree), which I find reasonable. It is not surprising that entrepreneurs who aim
for large and accordingly more expensive plants are more active in the network in order to
reduce the risk involved and to ensure that they are doing the "right" thing. An alternative or
complementary explanation could be that entrepreneurs who are active in the local network
for some reason tend to build larger plants, because they seek information or receive network
ties from others. For instance, such an amount of activity could create a certain involvement
and enthusiasm for micro-power, which in turn leads to a desire attempt something that is
beyond what was initially planned. The significant correlation between nCloseness and size of
the plant could imply that entrepreneurs building large plants also seek an overall more
central position in the field, or it could merely be a reflection from local network centrality
(which correlates strongly and significantly with closeness centrality). The lower and less
significant correlation coefficient between size of the plant and closeness centrality (as
compared to the correlation between size of the plant and degree centrality) gives support to
the latter argument.
The significant correlation between size of the plant and start-up year indicates a tendency to
build larger plants over the years. This could imply that the established knowledge among the
involved actors has matured, and that the emerging field has moved beyond merely the
experimental stage over the time span. Later in this chapter, I conduct multivariate analyses
where the size of the plant is the dependent variable and formal education, start-up year and
the three centrality measures constitute the independent variables. l do this in order to better
uncover the factors that might genuinely influence the size of the plant.
In addition, the correlation matrix indicates a positive relationship between closeness
centrality and start-up year, indicating that late adopters have a larger propensity to approach
the center of the field than do the early adopters. I return to this issue later in the chapter.
Unsurprisingly, we observe high correlations between the three centrality measures nDegree,
nCloseness, and nFlowBetwLn. As described, the more direct ties a focal actor has, the fewer
steps he has to pass in order to reach each other node in the network. It is therefore logical
that the network distance to the center of the field correlates strongly with the local centrality
measure. We also observe that degree centrality correlates with flow betweenness which is in
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accord with the previous statement; the more contacts an actor has, the higher degree he also
stands between other pairs of nodes in the network.
Between the applied network centrality measures and the dependent variable (MeanProdLn)
there are also strong and significant correlations, indicating that network predictors of social
capital are present. In the following sections I discuss these issues in detail.
We furthermore observe a strong and negative correlation between mean deviation in
precipitation (MeanDevPrec%) and start-up year. This can be explained as a result of a
number of overall dry years in the Western Region of Norway at the end of the 1990s and the
beginning ofthis decade; late adopters have accordingly spent a relatively larger time oftheir
existence under conditions of less rainfall than older plants. We also see that deviation in
precipitation correlates significantly with a number of other variables. First, the negative
correlation with both degree centrality and closeness centrality is not logical to assume.
However, I believe that this relationship has been reflected from the late adopters' relatively
higher closeness centrality scores that I have explained earlier, and the strong and significant
relationship between the two centrality scores. I furthermore believe that the significantly
negative relationship between deviation in precipitation and the size of the plant was produced
as a result of late adopters' propensity to build larger plants.
The remaining correlation coefficients are insignificant, but for a number ofpairs ofvariables
we observe relatively high coefficients, and it is not unlikely that some of them would have
been significant with a larger sample size. l therefore briefly describe some of them here. The
positive correlation between size of the plant and the dependent variable could indicate that
entrepreneurs who attempt relatively large systems get more out of the money they have
invested in terms of average yearly electricity production. The positive relationship between
closeness centrality and education teaches us that entrepreneurs with many years of formal
schooling have a tendency to approach the center of the field. On the other hand, older actors
seem to prefer to operate at the margin of the field. Finally, it is interesting to note that there
appears to be a positive relationship between formal education and venture success.
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Regression Analyses
Table 5.3 (pages 109 and 110) portrays a number ofregression analyses with t-values in
parentheses. In the following, I present the results from the different models.
Table 5.3 Regression analyses.
See pages 109 and 110. Dependent variable: MeanProdLn. n=20; §p<.lO; *p<.OS; ** p<.Ol; (two-tailed tests).
Models 1-3 include the reported control variables that have been applied in this study, except
local network centrality (degree centrality), which will be added later. The nominal variable
"Built alone" I have modeled the following way: 1=built alone, 2=not built alone. The reason
for measuring the control variables as illustrated in the first three models is that the
relationship between size of the plant and the dependent variables produced a significant lack
offit estimate in JMP5 (2003) (F-Ratio = 14.59; p<.OOI).23In order to account for this
problem I first decided to control for this possibly "inappropriate" variable alone. Next, I
included the other control variables (but excluded the size of the plant), and finally I included
all control variables. We observed, however, no significant parameter in any of the three first
models, and the explained variance was low and insignificant. Since the data set has only 20
observations and accordingly is sensitive to losses in degrees of freedom, l accordingly
decided to exclude these control variables from further analyses in Table 5.3.
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis l suggests a curvilinear relationship with the shape ofa negative
2nd degree polynomial between network distance to the center of the field and venture success.
In Model 4, I tested this hypothesis by including a 2nd degree polynomial of closeness
centrality. Compliant with Cronbach's (1987) recommendations about how to avoid severe
multicollinearity problems, throughout the analyses I have mean-centered all polynomials and
interaction effects that include continuous variables. A significantly negative 2nd degree
polynomial from closeness centrality would have gained empirical support for the hypothesis,
but in Model 4, no such result was observed. For the time being, we can therefore conclude
that Hypothesis l is rejected.
23 For detailed description of the lack offit function in JMPS (2003) and its interpretation, see the user manual,
pages 188-189.
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In Model S, I tested ifthere is a linear relationship between closeness centrality and venture
success, and now we observe a statistically significant positive regression coefficient. It is
therefore reasonable to assume a positive linear relationship between network distance to the
center of the field and the dependent variable, rather than a negative 2nd degree polynomial, as
suggested. Nevertheless, I argue that such a conclusion can be premature and misleading.
From the correlation matrix (Table 5.2), we remember that closeness centrality and degree
centrality were strongly correlated. Since degree centrality was also strongly correlated with
the dependent variable, the significant estimate we observe in ModelS can therefore be a
reflection from a genuine linear relationship between degree centrality and venture success.
The high correlation between degree centrality and closeness centrality might have caused
problems in the statistical analyses ifboth ofthem had been included in the same model. In
particular, this can be the case ifthe number of observations is low, as it was in our case. I
therefore conducted a lack of fit test between these parameters, but the estimate appeared
insignificant (F-Ratio=.342; p=.894). By regressing closeness centrality on degree centrality I
furthermore discovered only 43% explained variance, and altogether this indicated that it was
defendable to include both parameters in the same model. Model 6 accordingly includes the
control variable for degree centrality along with the 2nd degree polynomial effect of closeness
centrality. In accordance with the correlation matrix (Table 5.2), we observed a significant
and genuine linear effect from degree centrality on the dependent variable, but now we also
observe that the polynomial estimate for closeness centrality is significantly negative. This
has gained empirical support for Hypothesis l.
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Modell Model2 Model 3 Model4 ModelS Model6 Model7 Model8
Intercept -.959 .264 .023 -1.614 -2.232 -.372 -.382 -0.666
(-4.907) (.210) (015) (-1.657) (-3.043) (-456) (-457) -5406
Size of the plant .006 .002
(1.678) (300)
Built alone .183 171
(1.316) (1148)
Education .280 .234
(1598) ( 991)
Age of actors -001 .000
(- 057) (003)
Head difference -001 -.001
(-600) (- 604)
MeanDevPre% - 016 - 013
(-1227) (-.838)
nDegree (nD) .077** .070·
(3658) (2781)
nD"nD .002
(.513)
nCloseness (nCI) .029 .043* - 027 -.026
( 1154) (2.123) (-I 123) (-1.019)
nCI·nCI -.004 -.006§ - 007§
(-.967) (-1.859) (-1.810)
nFlowBetwLn (nFB)
Niche 1 (NI) -.153
(-.896)
Niche2 (N2) 227
(1.222)
Niche 3 (N3) -075
(-451 )
Nl"nFB
N2·nFB
N3·nFB
Start-up 1995
Start-up 1996
Start-up 1997
Start-up 1998
Start-up 1999
Start-up 2000
Start-up 2001
Start-up year (Sy)
SY·SY
RSquare .135 .258 .263 .242§ .200· .587·- .594-" .084
RSquareAdj .087 .007 .077 153§ .156· .510·· .486** .024
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Model 9 ModeilO Modeill Model12 Modell3 Model14 ModeliS Model16 Model17
Intercept -1.132 -1.177 -1.267 -0.948 -0.650 37.737 290.116 306.871 240.329
(-1.084) (-6105) (-6846) (-3.666) (-4750) (307) (2327) (2813) (2180)
Size of the plant
Built alone
Education
Age of actors
Head difference
MeanDevPre%
nDegree (nD)
nD*nD
neloseness (nei) .020 0.034 0.031
(.750) ( 1.374) ( 1.399)
nel·nel -.009· -008 -.009*
(-2144) (-1.607) (-2.366)
nFlowBetwLn (nFB) .279** .344** .203 .129
(2.948) (3750) (1.665) (1.133)
Niche 1 (NI) -.380· -.325· -.199 -.413* -.444** -.186
(-2.193) (-2386) (-1.270) (-2288) (-3.064) (-1335)
Niche2 (N2) .120 .264§ .180 .305 .333§ .348*
( 663) (1885) (1.238) (1581) ( 1.984) (2321)
Niche 3 (N3) .260 .060 .019 107 .112 -.163
(1.457) (467) (145) ( 659) ( 714) (-1.130)
NI·nFB -.250 -.384§
(-1.247) (-2040)
N2*nFB .026 .127
(148) ( 784)
N3*nFB .225 .257§
{1.649) (2.114)
Start-up 1995 .365
(1.221)
Start-up 1996 .353
(734)
Start-up 1997 -.141
(-.525)
Start-up 1998 -.559
(-1581)
Start-up 1999 -.079
(-296)
Start-up 2000 -.214
(-.798)
Start-up 200 I .274
( 775)
Start-up year (SY) -.019 -.146· -.154* -.121-
(-315) (-2343) (-2.823) (-2.188)
SY*SY .064§ .011
(1.901 ) (316)
RSquare 433§ .326*- .512-- .597- .286 .204 .641* .638** .705*-
RSquare Adj .281§ .288*- .421** 453- .043 .110 .476* .509** .569·-
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In Model 7, I added local centrality as a 2nd degree polynomial, but this effect was
insignificant. This accordingly rejects the previous statement where I - due the possible
negative, marginal effects from each new tie - suggested a curvilinear relationship on venture
success.i" The non-linear effect for closeness centrality - on the contrary - remained
signiflcant." Furthermore, visual inspection of the data-plots in Models 6 and 7 did not
indicate collinearity problems, and we did not have significant lack of fit estimates in any of
these models. So far, the conclusion is that after controlling for local network centrality,
Hypothesis I has gained overall empirical support.
Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 suggests that entrepreneurs in densely connected niches will be
better performers than entrepreneurs in sparsely connected niches, and in the previous chapter
I showed that Niches 2 and 3 were relatively densely connected whereas Niche 1was sparsely
connected. Model 8 tested Hypothesis 2 by including a dummy variable for each of the three
niches. Nominal factors are accordingly expanded to all levels where the regression estimate
for Niche 3 represents the negative sum of the other niches.
JMP5 (2003) is programmed in a way that estimates to what extent each nominal factor
deviates from the sum of the remaining observations in the regression analyses, and the
estimates for Model 8 indicated no significant effects. However, in order to dig deeper into
the deviations between each respective niche and to uncover if and eventually how the three
niches deviated from each other, I conducted what are called "contrast effects" in JMP5
(2003). For the parameters in Model 8, the contrast effect between niche l and 2 produced a t-
value of -1.202 where p=0.246. The contrast effect between Niche l and 3 produced at-value
of -.28 where p=.783. The contrast effect between Niche l and the totality of observations for
Niches 2 and 3 produced a t-value of -.896 (which we can also observe in Model 8) where
p=.383. So far, all analyses have gained no empirical support at all for Hypothesis 2.
Explained variance for the model was furthermore low and insignificant.
24 In unreported models where I have deleted closeness centrality - first the polynomial effect and next also the
linear effect - the polynomial effect from degree centrality on venture success remained insignificant.
25 In an unreported model, I also tested closeness centrality as a linear variable together with degree centrality as
a linear variable. However, closeness centrality was insignificant here.
Model 9 included the polynomial effect for nCloseness, and we now observe significant
effects from the nominal niche variable on venture success; start-ups in Niche l were
significantly less productive than their colleagues in Niches 2 and 3 were. This is in
accordance with what Hypothesis 2 predicted and the least square means (adjusted means)
reported in Table 5.4 also confirmed the pattern observed from Model 9.
Niche Mean Least Square Mean Std. Error
1 -.819 -.795 .175
2 -.439 -.295 .279
3 -.741 -.156 .263
Table 5.4 Means, least square means (adjusted means) and standard deviations for the three niches.
Least square means and standard deviations are adapted from Model 9, Table 5.3. n=20.
To get a more detailed picture of the deviations between the different niches I again
conducted contrast effects on the nominal factors. The genuine contrast effect between Niches
l and 2 was insignificant (t-value=-1.632; p=.124), but we must nevertheless keep in mind
that the number of observations was low. In Niche 1, there were 7 start-ups while Niche 2 had
only 5 (Niche 3 had 8 start-ups), The insignificant difference between Niches l and 2 was
most likelya result oftoo few observations. The contrast effect between Niches l and 3, on
the other hand, was significant (t-value = -2.123; p<O.lO [p=.051]). Finally, I conducted the
contrast effect between Niches 2 and 3, but as expected, the effect was far from significant
here (t-value = -.443; P = .664). The overall significant difference in venture success between
actors in the sparsely connected Niche 1 compared to their superior colleagues in the densely
connected Niches 2 and 3, gained empirical support for Hypothesis 2.
In addition, Model 9 showed that the negative polynomial effect from closeness centrality
remained significant. Moreover, whereas the adjusted R-square was practically zero in Model
8, it became higher than 28% in model 9. This is well above Model 5, which only included
the polynomial effect from closeness centrality (an increase of almost 13%). The findings
altogether illustrate the importance of including different levels of analysis when researchers
approach the concept of social capital (and other concepts in the field of social sciences, for
that matter). Iffor some reason we had overlooked the focal actor's external relations (in this
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case the extent to which his external relations connected him to the center of the field), we
would probably (wrongly) have concluded that relational characteristics for collectives (in
this case the density of contacts within niches) had no predictive power at all on the
dependent variable. So far, however, social capital has appeared to be a mixed determinant
phenomenon where both the focal actor's network distance to the center of the field
(nCloseness) and the niche to which he belongs significantly predict venture success.
Niche Means nCloseness Standard Error
I 37.073 1.827
2 40.468 2.162
3 32.601 1.709
Table 5.5 Means and standard deviations in nCloseness for actors within the different niches. n=20
Table 5.5 shows mean scores (and standard deviations) in nCloseness for actors within the
respective niches. On the average, actors in Niche 3 seemed to have positioned themselves at
the margins of the field, whereas entrepreneurs in Niche 2, overall, are the most central
players. Analyses also revealed that the deviations were statistically significant (l present
these results in a later section). These large differences in overall closeness centrality between
Niches 2 and 3 were perhaps the explanatory factors that have masked the genuine difference
in output for the subsets. We have so far learned from theoretical arguments, supported by
regression analyses, that being too close or too distant to the center of the field is negative. By
controlling for this factor in Model 9, we discovered that belonging to Niche 2 or 3 was
positive. Thus, if an entrepreneur manages to position himself in Niche 2 or 3, but at the same
time avoids the margins or the center of the field, he should be in a fairly good position to
become a successful micro-power start-up.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to warn that drawing conclusions that are too firm from the
reported effects in Model 9 could be misleading. In an unreported analysis, I found that actors
in Niche 2, on the average, had an approximately 50% higher degree centrality score than
their colleagues in Niches l and 3, and the difference was also significant (t-value = 2.073;
p<.10).26The niche effects observed in Model 9 could accordingly be a reflection of local
26 I return to the details ofthis analysis in a later section.
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network centrality, which we know from previous models has a strong predictive effect on the
dependent variable. In another unreported model, I also included degree centrality in addition
to the parameters from Model 9. What I observed here was that degree centrality - as before-
had a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable, closeness centrality still
appeared as a significant negative 2nd degree polynomial, yet the niche effect now became
insignificant. In a third unreported model, I only included the niche variable and degree
centrality, but also here local network centrality was positive and significant whereas the
niche effect again appeared insignificant. My conclusion is that the significant niche effect
observed in Model 9 is possibly a reflection of an overall high level of degree centrality
within Niche 2. Altogether, these discoveries have rejected Hypothesis 2 whereas Hypothesis
1 still has empirical support.
Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 suggests a positive relationship between access to non-redundant
information and venture success, and in Model 10this hypothesis was tested by including
Freeman et al.'s (1991) normalized centrality measure offlow betweenness. We observed
strong significant effects for both the parameter and explained variance, so our conclusion is
that Hypothesis 3 has been empirically supported. Nevertheless, this might also be a
preliminary and misleading conclusion. Table 5.2 reveals that degree centrality and flow
betweenness were strongly correlated, therefore what we observed in Model 10 could be a
reflection of the strong relationship between these centrality measures. The ideal situation
would be to test these centrality measures against each other in the very same model (as we
did between degree centrality and closeness centrality), but a significant lack of fit estimate
between these two variables constrained us from doing so (F-Ratio=87.673; p<.l O).Later I
will come back to how I dealt with these two centrality measures.
Hypothesis 4. From Chapter three we remember that Hypothesis 4 proposed a strong positive
effect on venture success ifthe entrepreneur is positioned in a densely connected niche and at
the same time accesses high level of non-redundant information, a medium effect ifhe is
positioned in a densely connected niche but accesses low level of non-redundant information,
a medium effect ifhe is positioned in a sparsely connected niche accessing high level of non-
redundant information, and finallya low effect on venture success if he is positioned in a
sparsely connected niche with low access to non-redundant information. It is now time to
empirically test this hypothesis, and I have done this by conducting interaction effects
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between the niche variable and normalized flow betweenness. Before this, I present in Model
11 the additive effect from these two variables.
Since flow betweenness appears significantly positive here as well, we have again gained
strong and significant support for Hypothesis 3. As before, Niche 1was significantly less
productive than the actors in Niches 2 and 3 were, indicating support for Hypothesis 2. We
now also observe that Niche 2 was significantly more productive that the sum ofNiches 1and
3, but the contrast effect between Niches 2 and 3 was still insignificant (t-value=.875;
p=.394). The contrast effect between Niches 1 and 2 was significant (t-value=-2.412; p<.05),
and the contrast effect between Niches 1 and 3 was "almost" significant (t-value=-1.708;
p=.107). We accordingly conclude that we have gained overall empirical support for
Hypothesis 2 again. The empirical analyses also teach us that with regard to simultaneously
measuring the focal actor's access to non-redundant information (i.e. lower level aggregate)
and niche effects (higher level aggregate), we still observe that we are dealing with an
empirical phenomenon that is mixed-determinant in nature.
In Model 12, Itested Hypothesis 4 by including interaction terms between the niche factor
and flow betweenness. Surprisingly, we observe that no parameter appeared significant, nor
did any contrast effect between each respective niche?7 However, the adjusted R-square
actually increased as compared to the previous model (though the significance level was
slightly decreased), and this might indicate that the loss of degrees of freedom by adding the
interaction term explains the insignificant parameters."
27 Contrast effect between Niches l and 2 produced a t-value of -1.395 where p=.185. Contrast effect between
Niches l and 3 produced a t-value of -.868 where p=.400.
28 The lack offit function in JMP5 (2003) was nevertheless insignificant for Model 12 (F-ratio= 1.341; p=.597).
115
N3
O
,
~.~ N2
........;;...".
......... filii"""
::t »Dep. Var. -1
-2
I
O
I
1
I
2
I
3 4
nFlow Betw.
Figure 5.1 Interaction effects between niche (N) and flow betweenness. Adapted from Model12, Table 5.3.
The interaction terms between the niche effect and flow betweenness in Model 12 are
illustrated in Figure 5.1. We observe that in the densely connected Niches 2 and 3 it was
positive to access non-redundant information whereas it had no effect at all in Niche 1. Thus,
the dotted lines for Niches 2 and 3 granted directional support for Hypothesis 4a, which stated
that production will be high at plants in densely connected niches ifthe focal actor accesses
non-redundant information. On the other hand, entrepreneurs in Niche 1 accessing non-
redundant information (i.e. high flow betweenness) were expected to have medium outcome
according to Hypothesis 4b. In Figure 5.1, however, we observe that these were low
performing start-ups. The same can be said about entrepreneurs in Niches 2 and 3 with low
access to non-random information. Yet according to Hypothesis 4c, these actors were also
expected to be medium performers. Finally, we observe that players in Niche l with low
access to non-redundant information were also low in outcome, which is in accordance with
Hypothesis 4d.
Altogether, Model 12 gave somewhat mixed directional support to Hypothesis 4. It seems to
be most beneficial to belong to a densely connected niche and at the same time have access to
non-redundant information. On the other hand, ifthe start-up lacks non-redundant
information, it appears it does not matter at all in which niche he is positioned. Finally, access
to non-redundant information in the sparsely connected Niche 1 apparently had no effect on
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venture success at all. Nevertheless, due to insignificant parameters in the statistical analyses,
we must be extremely careful to draw conclusions that are too firm from these discoveries. I
find it reasonable to believe, however, that a larger sample size most likely would have
produced significant results.
Hypothesis 5 and 5alt. We remember from Chapter three that Hypotheses 5 suggested that
late adopters would outperform early adopters as a result of increased density (Hannan 1986)
of micro-power start-ups (reflected in increased competence and learning throughout the
emerging field). Hypothesis Salt, on the other hand, suggested that the relationship might be
the opposite as a result of mimetic behavior among late adopters (DiMaggio 1991). In Model
13, Itested these competing hypotheses by including a nominal variable for the start-up year.
Network variables will be included in later models.
Start-up year Means Standard Error
1995 -.284 .315
1996 -.297 .545
1997 -.790 .273
1998 -1.208 .386
1999 -.729 .273
2000 -.864 .273
2001 -.376 .386
Table 5.6 Means and standard deviations for start-up year.
Standard deviations adapted from Model13, Table 5.3.
The results from the regression analysis indicated no significant effects, but if we take a closer
look at the means in output for start-ups within each yearly cohort in Table 5.6, we observe
that entrepreneurs who started in 1995 seem to be the superior performers. From this year on,
we see a steady decrease in venture success that continues until 1998. Contrast effects in
JMP5 (2003) actually revealed that the entrepreneurs who started production in 1998 were
significantly less productive than their colleagues who started in 1995 (t-value = 1.856;
p<.10). However, beyond 1998 the curve becomes positive and we observe the contours of a
non-linear relationship with the shape of a positive 2nd degree polynomial between start-up
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year and venture success, where 1998 is the turning point." The described effect is perhaps
best illustrated in Figure 5.2
-2.041
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Start-up year
Figure 5.2 Means for start-up year. Adapted from Model 13, Table 5.3.
The results so far give partlya directional support for both of the competing hypotheses.
Between 1995 and 1998, the trend was negative which according to Hypothesis Salt supports
the argument behind mimetic behavior (DiMaggio 1991). From this year on, however, the
curve becomes positive, indicating support for the density argument (Hannan 1986). It thus
seems that these latter entrepreneurs have benefited from an overall increase in learning and
competence that has been established throughout the emerging hydroelectric micro-power
field.
Model 13 taught us that there is probably a non-linear relationship with a shape of a positive
2nd degree polynomial between start-up year and venture success. Therefore, in Model 14 I
modeled the start-up year as a continuous variable and included it in the regression analyses
as a polynomial effect. The major reason for doing this was the loss in degrees of freedom
that the nominal start-up year variable represented, constraining me from simultaneously
testing this parameter against network predictors of social capital in later models. First, we
observe an increase in adjusted R-square from practically zero to about Il %. The explained
variance, however, was still insignificant, but I again found it reasonable to explain this as a
29 The small decrease from 1999 to 2000 was far from being statistically significant (t-value=-.349; p=.733).
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result oftoo few observations (F-Ratio = 2.176; p=.144). Next, we observe a significantly
positive polynomial effect that confirmed the findings from the previous model. Thus, again
we have gained partly empirical support for both Hypothesis 5 and Salt. After decreasing the
number of parameters, the non-linear effect is now also significant. Altogether, this indicates
that in the first phase of the emerging hydroelectric micro-power field there was a negative
trend in output for adopters, which supports the argument behind mimetic behavior. Beyond
1998, however, we observe a general increase in venture success for subsequent adopters,
which most likely was a result of a general increase in knowledge and legitimacy that had
been spreading throughout the emerging field.
Since average deviation in precipitation (MeanDevPre%) correlated strongly with the start-up
year variable (Table 5.2), I decided to test this effect in isolation in two separate models.
These are reported in Table 5.7 (t-values in parentheses), in the first as a linear effect, and in
the second as a polynomial effect. We observe, however, no significant effects at all, neither
from the parameters nor in explained variance."
Modell Model2
Intercept .167 .427
(.147) (.316)
MeanOevPre% (MOP) -.009 -.012
(-.760) (-.833)
MOP*MDP -.001
(-.381)
RSquare .031 .039
RSquare Adj .023 .074
Dependent variable: MeanProdLn. n=20; § p<.10 (two tailed tests).
Table 5.7 The effects from deviations in precipitation.
In Model15, I conducted the somewhat bold task of simultaneously including start-up year as
a 2nd degree polynomial along with the closeness centrality variable as a 2nd degree
polynomial and the niche factor. In other words, I included the parameters from both Models
9 and 14, and I did this to uncover possible genuine effects on venture success when we
JO In unreported models I also replicated Models 15 through 17, but replaced start-up year with deviations in
precipitations. In all models, however, the parameter was far from being statistically significant, as both a linear
and a polynomial effect.
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simultaneously model network predictors along with a parameter capturing elements from
institutional theory and population ecology. The results were - at least in my opinion-
interesting. Ifwe look at the parameters for the start-up variable, we observe that the linear
regressor has now become significantly negative, whereas the polynomial effect is practically
zero and far from significant. Thus after controlling for network predictors of social capital,
we have learned that there seems to be a genuine negative relationship between late versus
early adopters and venture success.
Next, wt: observe that explained variance for the model was both high and significant. Then
we see that the 2nd degree polynomial effect from closeness centrality is still negative (but the
effect is now insignificant). Thirdly, we observe that entrepreneurs in Niche l - in line with
Model 9 - were significantly inferior in performance compared with their colleagues in
Niches 2 and 3. The contrast effect between Niches l and 2 was significant (t-value = -2.133;
p<.10 [p=.OS23])which was also the case between Niches 1 and 3 (t-value=-1.833; p<.l O).
Finally, the contrast effect between Niches 2 and 3 was insignificant (t-value=-.644; p=.S31).
Altogether, this gave directional support for Hypothesis 1 and significant support to
Hypothesis 2. Overall, the results are in accord with the previous analyses.
Since the polynomial effect for start-up year now appeared unnecessary, I decided to delete
this effect in Model 16. First, we observe that the adjusted R-square has steadily increased
and was more significant. The start-up year variable here also appears to be significantly
negative. We furthermore see that the polynomial effect from closeness centrality now
appears to be significantly negative, which is in accordance with Hypothesis 1. As before,
actors in Niche 1 were significantly less productive than the sum of actors in Niches 2 and 3.
The contrast effect between Niches 1 and 2 was significant (t-value = -2.86; p<.OS), as was
the contrast effect between Niches 1 and 3 (t-value = -2.22; p<.OS). Again, the contrast effect
between Niches 2 and 3 was insignificant (t-value = .762; P = .4S9). Visual inspections of the
data-plots in JMPS (2003) indicated no collinearity problems, and there were no warnings of
significant lack of fit estimates.
In an unreported model, I included degree centrality - in addition to the parameters in Model
16 - yet all the variables remained stable and significant, and there was no substantial change
from the reported effects in Model 16. This is also interesting, I argue. We remember from
120
previous discussion that when degree centrality was included, in addition the parameters from
Model 9 (niche effect and closeness centrality as a 2nd degree polynomial), the genuine niche
effect became insignificant. After controlling for start-up year, however, the niche effect
remained stable and significant even when the parameter for local network centrality was
included in the model. This gained empirical support for Hypothesis 2 and indicated that the
start-up year parameter was an important parameter, which definitely "belonged" to the
model. For degree centrality, there was also a positive and significant effect on the dependent
variable, which is in accord with previous analyses. Finally, the adjusted R-square has
increased to 60.1% (p<.O1). Visual inspections of the data plots in JMPS (2003) indicated no
multi-collinearity problems for this unreported model, nor did the lack of fit function give us
any warning regarding losses in degrees of freedom.
Perhaps the most interesting and novel finding from Models IS and 16was that the positive
polynomial effect on venture success seemed to become genuinely negative when I controlled
for network predictors of social capital. Later, I will give a lengthy discussion of the
implications ofboth this (and other) findings, but my preliminary interpretation is that to gain
from the increased level of organizational learning that has taken place in the emerging field
over the last years (i.e. after 1998), it is essential to acquire this competence through access to
social capital. In other words, despite the fact that an overall increase in knowledge has been
established over the latter years, this asset does not benefit late adopters per se, but has to be
gained through the specific network constellations that this dissertation has discovered.
Model 17 includes the parameter for start-up year in addition to the interaction effects
between the niche variable and flow betweenness from Model 13. As in the previous model,
we observe that there was a significantly linear negative relationship between start-up year
and venture success, and in an unreported model that included a 2nd polynomial effect for
start-up year, the nonlinear effect was also far from being significant (t-value = .62; P= .S48).
We furthermore observe that the adjusted R-square has increased by almost 12% from Model
12 and more significant now."
3l Despite relatively many parameters, the lack of fit function in JMP (2003) gave no warning of loss of degrees
offreedom. Visual inspection of the data plots in the statistical program indicated no multicollinearity problem.
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Compared with Model 12, the effects from the network predictors were very much the same,
but a number of parameters appeared significant in this model, which also controlled for start-
up year. The nominal parameters show us that Niche 2 was significantly more productive as
compared with the actors in Niches 1 and 3. Contrast effects furthermore show that Niche 2
was significantly more productive than Niche 3 (t-value = 1.801; p<.l O), but the contrast
effect was insignificant between Niches 1 and 2 (t-value = -1.656; P = .124). Altogether, this
indicated mixed support for Hypothesis 2; actors in Niche 2 now seem to have outperformed
their colleagues in the two other niches, in particular Niche 3. l do not know why it seems that
entrepreneurs in Niche 2 have outperformed their colleagues in Niche 3, which was also
densely connected. However, a plausible explanation could be that Niche 2 had a slightly
higher density level than Niche 3; at least this was the case in the latter years of the emerging
field.
To get a more comprehensive picture ofhow entrepreneurs within each respective niche
performed, Idecided to graphically illustrate the interaction terms with flow betweenness in
Figure 5.3. Here we can see - as described above - that start-ups in Niche 2 outperformed
their colleagues in Niche 3, but access to non-redundant information was positive in both
niches. Actors in Niche 3 outperformed their colleagues in Niche 1, given that they had access
to non-redundant information. If not, they were actually outperformed by Niche 1. Comparing
the interaction effects by applying a what is called a custom test in JMP5 (2003), we actually
find that there was a significant difference between Niches 1 and 3 (t-value = -2.35; p<.05).
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Figure 5.3 Interaction effects between niche (N) and flow betweenness. Adapted from Model 17, Table 5.3.
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Ifwe compare actors in Niches I and 2, we observe that their performance was more or less
equal ifthey had low access to non-redundant information. However, when access to non-
redundant information increased, so did venture success in the densely connected Niche 2,
whereas it actually decreased in Niche I. The custom test effect, however, was insignificant,
which is most likely explained by too few observations, particularly in Niche 2 (t-value = -
1.55; P = .145).
Altogether, the interaction effects described above are generally similar to what we have
previously discovered, indicating partial support for Hypothesis 4. Now, however, we observe
a number of significant effects. Figure 5.3 reveals that we are dealing with network predictors
of social capital that are both cross-level and mixed-determinant in nature; mixed-determinant
since Niche 2 seems to have outperformed Niche 3 and cross-level since access to non-
redundant information was negative in Niche 1, but positive in Niches 2 and 3. Finally, it is
interesting to observe that access to non-redundant information did not seem to have a
genuine effect on venture success, but seemed to be contingent upon niche characteristics.
This rejects Hypothesis 3, and the findings again illustrate that a researcher can lose important
insight in his study of social phenomena by ignoring that different levels of aggregates could
possibly be at play.
Previous models have taught us that local network centrality - degree centrality - seems to
appear as an important control variable, and seems to have strong genuine effect on the
dependent variable. We have furthermore observed in Table 5.2 that flow betweenness and
degree centrality were highly correlated. What we observe in Model 17 could accordingly be
a reflection between possible genuine interaction effects between niche characteristics and
local network centrality. In order to find out more about this issue, I decided to replicate
Model 17, with the important difference that I included degree centrality instead of flow
betweenness. The results are shown in Table 5.8 with t-values in parentheses.
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Intercept 163.789 (1.407)
nDegree (nD) .0406 (1.569)
Niche 1 (NI) -.188 (-1.254)
Niche 2 (N2) .256 (1.280)
Niche 3 (N3) -.068 (-.457)
NI*nD -.025 (-.576)
N2*nD -.019 (-.548)
N3*nD .044 (1.555)
Start-u ear -.083 -1.417
.642*
.477*
Dependent variable: MeanProdLn. n=20. § p<.IO; * p<.05; (two tailed tests).
Table 5.8 Interaction effects with degree centrality.
Without going into detail about the parameters, contrast effects and custom tests, the overall
picture from Table 5.8 is that none of the variables appeared significant, not even start-up
year. The explained variance was still high, but the adjusted R-square was actually reduced by
more than 9% from Model 17 (Table 5.3). I accordingly concluded that access to non-
redundant information most likely had a genuine effect on the dependent variable through its
interaction with the niche variable.
In two unreported models, Iconducted the interaction effect between closeness centrality - in
the first model as a 2nd degree polynomial and in the second as a linear variable - and the
niche parameter. As in Model 17, the start-up year was also included in the analyses. The new
interaction terms, however, produced an even worse explained variance than what we
observed in Table 5.8. In the first, the adjusted R-square was 43.8% (p<.05) and in the second
42.4% (p<.05). Moreover, there were no significant interaction terms to observe. It
accordingly seems that access to non-redundant information is the only lower level network
predictor that interacts significantly with the niche parameter.
Further Analyses
So far, the regression analyses have revealed to what extent different predictors might induce
venture success for micro-power start-ups. We have thus tested the hypotheses that I
developed in Chapter 3, in addition to the effects of a number of control variables. In this
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section, I intend to go somewhat beyond the strictly hypothesized relationships and conduct
an exploratory approach on other variables in the dataset.
Regression Analyses Il
We remember from the correlation matrix in Table 5.2 that the size of the micro-power plant
correlated significantly with education level, start-up year, closeness centrality, and degree
centrality. This indicates that perhaps the dimension of the hydro turbines was not only
decided exogenously as a result of river conditions or other hydroelectric and meteorological
considerations; endogenous characteristics as described above could also be at play.
Therefore, Idecided to conduct a number of statistical analyses that included the following
independent variables as candidates: whether the plant had been built as a one man project or
not, start-up year, formal education, degree centrality, closeness centrality, flow betweenness,
age of actors at start-up, and head difference. The size of the plant was modeled as the
dependent variable. Lack offit tests in JMP5 (2003) had indicated that flow betweenness and
closeness centrality produced significant estimates when tested against the size of the plant;
therefore I decided to treat them separately in the analyses.f
In Model l (Table 5.9) we observe no significant effect from flow betweenness on the
dependent variable (t-values in parentheses). The explained variance was also practically zero
and insignificant. Accordingly, Iconcluded that access to non-redundant information had no
effect at all upon the decision to build a large or small plant. In Model 2, on the other hand,
we observe that closeness centrality significantly predicted the dependent variable. It thus
seems that the entrepreneurs who were approaching the center of the field had a tendency to
build large plants. However, due to a significant lack of fit estimate, we must be cautious
about drawing conclusions that are too firm; this finding could also be a reflection of the
strong and significant relationship between degree centrality and closeness centrality.
Therefore, in Model 3, I tested the effect from degree centrality on the dependent variable,
and here we observe both better model fit and more significant parameter estimate than in
Model2.
32 For flow betweenness F-Ratio = 76.789 (p<.l O)and for closeness centrality F-Ratio = 445.62 (p<.05).
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In order to reduce the risk and to ensure that they are doing the "right" thing, it is not
surprising that entrepreneurs who build larger and accordingly more expensive plants would
be more active in their local network. Yet an alternative explanation could be that
entrepreneurs who are active in the local network, either by seeking information or receiving
network ties from others, for some reason tend to build larger plants. For instance, such an
amount of activity could create a certain involvement and enthusiasm for micro-power, which
in turn could lead to a desire to attempt something that was beyond what was initially
planned.
Modell Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6
Intercept 27.386 -35.008 12.500 -12687 -11951 -12017
(2.125) (-.807) (.897) (-2.206) (-1.832) (-2.327)
nF10wBetwLn 8.146
(1.287)
nCloseness 2.120§ .327
(1.784) (.268)
nDegree 2.701 * 2.138*
(2.323) (2.272)
Start-up year 6.347* 5.973§ 6.003*
(2.204) (1.825) (2.322)
Education 2l.173* 20.304* 18.382*
(2.696) (2.333) (2.572)
RSquare .084 .150§ .231 * .428** .430* .567**
RSquare Adj .033 .103§ .188* .361** .324* .486**
Dep. var: Size of the plant: n=20; § p<.IO; * p<.05; **p<.OI (two tailed tests)
Table 5.9 Regression Analyses Il.
In order to produce Model 4, I first conducted what is called forward stepwise regression in
JMP5 (2003) where the candidates for independent variables were: whether the plant was
built as a one-man project or not, start-up year, formal education, age of actors at start-up, and
head difference. The significance probability to enter was set to .25, whereas the probability
to leave is .10. The model produced (Model 4) shows that the tendency to build larger plants
throughout the lifespan of the emerging field was significant, and every year the size
increased by about 6 kWh maximum capacity. This could imply that established knowledge
among the involved actors was maturing, and that the emerging field over the time span
moved beyond the merely experimental stage. Perhaps late adopters perceived lower risk as a
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result of the competence that had been established throughout the field and consequently felt
comfortable to attempt overalliarger (and more expensive) solutions than early adopters.
Ifwe now look anew at Figure I.l in the very beginning ofthis dissertation, the results we see
in Model 4 can explain why we observed a marked increase in the building of miniature
plants at the end of the nineties, whereas the number of micro-power start-ups peaked. This
can actually imply that new entrants, to an increasing extent, were moving beyond what can
strictly be defined as micro-power.
We furthermore observe that the more educated the entrepreneur was, the larger the plant he
tended to build. As described earlier, this is logical. Everything else being equal, the better
educated the entrepreneur is, the better scientific skills he will possess. In turn, these would
enable him to better calculate and predict the outcome from different sizes of the hydro
turbines, and to altogether reduce the risk of attempting relatively large investments. On the
other hand, entrepreneurs with a low formal education face higher risk and uncertainty of the
outcome due to lack of formal competence. They would consequently feel inclined towards
smaller (and less expensive) solutions.
To test the robustness of the parameters presented in Model 4, first l tested closeness
centrality together with size of the plant and education (Model 5), and next I replaced
closeness centrality with degree centrality (Model 6). We observe in Model 5 that the
parameters for education and year of start-up remained stable and significant, whereas the
effect from closeness centrality has now become insignificant. In Model 6, however, we
notice that local network centrality, along with start-up year and education level, remained
significant and had similar parameter values as before. High explained variance furthermore
indicated good model fit.
Finally, in an unreported modell tested ifthere was tendency within some of the niches to
build either small or large plants, but no contrast effects between any of the three niches
produced significant effects.
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Regression Analyses III
My conclusion so far is that there most likelyare a few endogenous factors that seem to
predict the size of the micro-power turbines. Therefore, it is not unlikely to expect that similar
factors might also influence the head difference. Consequently, in unreported models] first
tested separately the centrality measures, degree centrality, closeness centrality and flow
betweenness on this parameter, but none ofthese variables had any effect on head difference.
Next, I undertook the task of conducting stepwise regression as described above with head
difference as the dependent variable. Variables that were candidates for the model were:
whether the plant had been built as a one-man project or not, start-up year, formal education,
size of the plant, and age of the actors. ] found, however, that none ofthese variables was
close to significantly predicting the dependent variable. Finally, ] included the niche factor as
an independent variable, but again I found no significant contrast effect between any of the
three identified niches. Altogether, it seems that the question about head difference was
totally exogenously decided (i.e. by climatic and hydrological conditions).
When modeling degree centrality as the dependent variable and conducting forward stepwise
regression on the parameters "built alone", start-up year, education, age of actors, and head
difference, I found that none ofthese variables seemed to predict the focal actor's local
network centrality. In Table 5.10 (Modell), however, we observe that the size of the plant
seemed to predict local network centrality, but this is actually what we already knew from
previous analyses; there was a positive relationship between these variables, but we did not
necessarily know the causal direction. As previously mentioned, the entrepreneurs that were
active in the local network, either by seeking information or receiving network ties from
others, tended to build larger plants. For instance, such an amount of activity could create
certain involvement and enthusiasm for micro-power, which in turn could lead to a desire to
attempt something that is beyond what was initially planned. Alternatively, entrepreneurs
building larger, and accordingly more expensive plants, were possibly more active in the local
network with the aim of reducing the risk involved in the project.
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Modell Model2
Intercept 7.200 11.202
(3.830) (9.552)
Size of the plant .085*
(2.323)
Niche 1 -1.875
(-1.155)
Niche 2 3.673§
(2.073)
Niche 3 -1.799
(-1.143)
RSquare .231* .202
RSquare Adj .188* .108
Dependent variable: nDegree. n=20; § p<.10; * p<.05 (two tailed tests). T-values in parentheses.
Table 5.10 Regression analyses Ill.
Next, I included the Niche effect in Model 2, and as I have previously described, we observe
that actors within Niche 2 were more active overall in their local network then their
colleagues in Niches 1 and 3. Moreover, contrast effects showed that actors in Niche 2 had a
significantly higher degree centrality score than entrepreneurs in Niche 1 (t-value = 1.842;
p<.IO) and Niche 3 (t-value = 1.866; p<.1O),respectively. The contrast effect between Niches
1 and 3 was insignificant (t-value = .029; P = .977).
Regression Analyses IV
Again, I undertook similar explorative procedures as described above, but this time with
closeness centrality as the dependent variable. The initial variables for stepwise regression
analysis were: "built alone", start-up year, education, age of actors, size of the plant, and head
difference. The result from the stepwise procedure is presented in Model I, Table 5.11 (t-
values in parentheses).
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Modell Model2
Intercept -1969 36.714
(-1.725) (33.316)
Start-up year I.OO5§
( 1.759)
Education 2.813§
(1.823)
Age of actors -.161
(-1.569)
Niche 1 .359
(.235)
Niche2 3.754*
(2.255)
Niche 3 -4.113*
(-2.781)
RSquare .381 * .335*
RSquare Adj .265* .257*
Table 5.11 Regression analyses IV.
Dep. var: nCloseness; n=20; § p<.IO; * p<.05 (two tailed tests)
We learn from Modellthat late adopters had a larger tendency to search the center of the
field than early adopters did. I have no obvious explanation for this observed pattern, but a
plausible reason might be that a few vendors, consultants and perhaps also previously
established micro-power plants appeared to be the most visible operators within the emerging
field. Such a kind of implicit branding has in turn been a motivational factor for newentrants
to approach these central actors.
We moreover observe that relatively highly educated entrepreneurs had a tendency to search
the center of the field. I have no good rationalization for why there was a significant
relationship between these parameters either, but a tentative explanation could be that years of
schooling inspired the entrepreneurs to behave in a more "professional" manner, which in turn
induced them to approach the more established, well-known, and "reputable" vendors and
other micro-power plants.
The relationship between age of the actors and closeness centrality was negative but
insignificant. However, the insignificant relationship was possibly a result of low sample size.
Earlier in this chapter, I briefly mentioned that there was a significant relationship between
closeness centrality and which niche the actors belonged to, and in Model 2 (Table 5.11), I
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have formally presented these results. As previously described, we observe that micro-power
plants in Niche 2 were generally closer to the center of the field than the other actors were,
whereas the case was the opposite for start-ups in Niche 3. Nichel fell somewhat between the
other niches. Moreover, the contrast effects between each respective niche revealed that Niche
2 was significantly more central than Niche 3 (t-value = 2.855; p<.05), and that Niche 1 was
significantly more central than Niche 3 (t-value = 1.788; p<.l O).The contrast effect between
Niches I and 2, on the other hand, was insignificant (t-value = -1.200; p=.247). Note,
however, that the results I presented in Model 2 (Table 5.11) did not necessarily reveal causal
direction between these parameters, but rather indicated a relationship between to which niche
the actors belonged to and the focal actor's overall centrality within the emerging field.
Ifwe now compare the analyses from Model2 in Table 5.10 with Model2 in Table 5.11, the
overall pattern is that actors in Niche 2 were the more central actors overall, both with regard
to degree centrality and closeness centrality.
I furthermore conducted step-wise regression where flow-betweenness was modeled as the
dependent variable. Candidates for independent variables were: "built alone", start-up year,
education, age of actors, size of the plant, and head difference. However, none of these
parameters significantly predicted the focal actor's access to non-redundant information.r'
There was furthermore no significant effect from the niche predictor on flow betweenness as
the dependent variable.
Discussion
Figure 5.4 sums up what the statistical analyses have revealed in this chapter. The dotted
arrows represent relationships that were either weak or unstable throughout the analyses.
Double-headed arrows indicate relationships where there was not necessarily a clear causal
direction. Since the major focus in this dissertation has been to uncover possible network
predictors of social capital, I will pay the most attention to these issues throughout the
33 As previously described, the relationship between flow betweenness and size of the plant produced a
significant lack offit estimate (F-Ratio 6.111; p<.OS), so in the unreported models I first decided to include this
parameter separately. Next, I included the remaining parameters separately in the stepwise procedure, and finally
I included all parameters in the stepwise procedure. I found, however, no significant estimates at all.
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discussion. Next, I will debate to what extent being an early or late adopter in the emerging
field seemed to influence venture success, and finally, I will include a discussion of the results
from the exploratory approach that I undertook in the previous section. Note however, as the
model in Figure 5.4 reveals, there seemed to be a number of indirect effects where certain
parameters appeared as intermediate variables. This will most likely be reflected throughout
the discussion where some issues might be repeated, but hopefully in different and
informative contexts.
Some readers will perhaps raise objections that the model presented in Figure 5.4 is both
complex and not easily interpretable, and I can fully understand such demurs. Yet what I
actually intend to do here is to discuss the information uncovered by a number of analyses
throughout this dissertation. In Chapter 3, I developed a few hypotheses that narrowly focused
on a number of network predictors on venture success and questioned to what extent being an
early or late adopter might influence the same effect variable. Below, l discuss the empirical
findings in light ofthese hypotheses, in addition to - in my opinion - other interesting results.
However, in the concluding chapter, I again constrain the focus to the research question that I
presented in Chapter 2, as well as how ( have interpreted the interplay between institutional
issues and the concept of social capital. In other words, the next chapter focuses on what I
believe is the very core contribution from this research project.
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Figure 5.4 Model of the empirical analyses.
The Hypothesized Effects
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis l suggested a curvilinear relationship with the shape of a negative
2nd degree polynomial between network distance to the center of the field and venture success.
In Table 5.3, we observe that this hypothesis gained empirical support when I controlled for
local network centrality (Models 6 and 7) and the niche effect (Models 9 and 16). I
accordingly maintain that this hypothesis has gained overall empirical support. Thus, it seems
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that start-ups operating either at the margins or at the center of the field were inferior in
performance, as compared to entrepreneurs who were placed in intermediate positions.
To my knowledge, this is the first contribution that explicitly argues that there is a non-linear
relationship between the extent to which an actor possesses a position of strategic significance
in the overall network and outcome. Yet as described, other contributions have revealed
similar empirical findings. Greve, Golombek et al. (2001) discovered a curvilinear
relationship with the shape of a positive 2nd degree polynomial between pollution levels and
network centrality in the Norwegian pulp and paper industry. The centrality measure they
applied in their contribution was information centrality (Stephenson and Zelen 1989), and is
identical with the measure that I applied in the Florentine case from Chapter 2. Despite
deviating slightly from closeness centrality in conceptual interpretation, the pattern was
nevertheless similar to the empirical findings that this dissertation has uncovered. Actors in
central and marginal positions had high pollution levels (i.e. they were inferior performers)
whereas actors in intermediate positions polluted less (i.e. they were superior performers).
The authors described these findings as a cry for help from actors with high pollution levels
(and also financial problems), which of course might be the case. Nevertheless, this
dissertation partly takes into account this issue since each entrepreneur's network
configuration has been modeled at the year of start-up, and the dependent variable has been
calculated from the average yearly electricity production in subsequent years. In other words,
since the independent variable was measured prior to the effect variable, this revealed with
relative certainty that the causal direction went from the focal actor's strategic significance in
the overall network to venture success, and not the opposite.
Altogether, I argue that a probable (though not possibly the only) causal agent between the
non-linear effects revealed in both these contributions is that actors who strive towards the
center place themselves in an inferior position due to asymmetric information and lack of
bargaining power. They accordingly become vulnerable to over investment or suboptimal
solutions.
Table 5.5 and 5.11 (Model 2) reveal that entrepreneurs in Niche 2 were the most central actors
overall in terms ofnetwork distance to the center of the field, start-ups in Niche 3 were the
most distant, whereas actors in Niche l fell somewhat between the two other niches. We are
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not dealing with a clear causal direction here, and this is reflected in the double-headed arrow
between the parameters in Figure 5.4. It is perhaps not particularly surprising to learn that
start-ups within the 3 identified niches were encountered in different locations throughout the
resource space, yet what I believe is most interesting to note is that we observe a significant
negative polynomial effect from the closeness variable on venture success, even after
controlling for this higher level aggregate.
Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 suggested that entrepreneurs embedded in densely connected
niches will outperform entrepreneurs in sparsely connected niches. In this empirical study, we
did not have the possibility to model the niche factor as a continuous variable, so the three
niches identified have been included as nominal variables. The density matrices in Chapter 4
categorized Niche 1 as a sparsely connected niche, whereas Niches 2 and 3 were described as
densely connected. Regarding the statistical analyses, it is interesting to note that when we
only included the niche factor in Model 8 (Table 5.3), we observed practically no effect on
venture success. However, when we also included closeness centrality (as a polynomial
effect) in the following model, the niche factor became significant.
This finding illustrates the importance of considering level issues when conducting research
in the social sciences. If a researcher had stopped his analyses in Model 8 and had not
simultaneously considered the different level aggregates - in this example the focal actor's
network distance to the center of the field and to which niche each actor belonged - he could
have (wrongly) concluded that niche characteristics had no effect at all on venture success.
The overall pattern throughout the subsequent models, on the other hand, showed that the
niche factor does matter. In Models 9, Il, 15 and 16 (Table 5.3) we learn that start-ups in
Niche l were significantly inferior to their colleagues in Niches 2 and 3. Previously reported
contrast effects largely indicated significant differences between Niches l and 2 and l and 3,
respectively, whereas the difference between Niches 2 and 3 was insignificant. Altogether,
these findings have given support to Hypothesis 2.
I have described that when degree centrality was included in addition to the parameters from
Model 9 (Table 5.3), the genuine niche effect became insignificant. This model, however, did
not control for start-up year. Thus, after also controlling for this parameter, the niche effect
remained stable and significant (along with the 2nd degree polynomial for closeness
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centrality), even when degree centrality was included. Altogether, this has gained support for
Hypothesis 2 and furthermore indicates that the start-up year parameter was an important
control variable and definitely "belonged" to the model.
Nevertheless, in Models 12 and 17 (Table 5.3), which included the interaction effect between
niche and flow betweenness, the genuine distinction in venture success between the sparsely
connected Niche l and the densely connected Niches 2 and 3 became somewhat masked and
less clear respectively. Yet in Figure 5.3 we observe that it was positive to belong to the
densely connected Niches 2 and 3 - in particular to Niche 2 - when it was a given that the
focal actor accessed non-redundant information. We do not know why it seems that
entrepreneurs in Niche 2 outperformed their colleagues in Niche 3, which was also densely
connected. Previously, I have suggested that the slightly higher density level in Niche 2, at
least in the latter years of the emerging field, could explain this pattern. Yet other plausible
causal mechanisms were also possibly at play, such as the very size of the niche or relational
characteristics within these collectives, that went beyond the simplified density approach that
I have applied in this study. In the next chapter, I discuss these issues in length.
Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 suggested that access to non-redundant information will predict
venture success, and the dissertation operationalized this independent variable by applying
Freeman, Borgatti et al.' s (1991) centrality measure of flow betweenness. In Models 10 and
11 (Table 5.3) we observe significant support for this hypothesis, but in Models 12 and 17
(Table 5.3), which included interaction effects between the niche factor and flow
betweenness, the genuine positive effect became insignificant. Accordingly, Hypothesis 3 has
only gained partial support and it seems that access to non-redundant information did not have
genuine explanatory power on venture success, but was contingent upon niche characteristics.
I also return to this issue later.
Hypothesis 4. We remember that Hypothesis 4 proposed a strong positive effect on venture
success ifthe entrepreneur is placed in a densely connected niche and at the same time
accesses high level of non-redundant information, medium effect if he is placed in a densely
connected niche but lacks non-redundant information, medium effect if he is placed in a
weakly connected niche accessing high degree of non-redundant information, and finally low
effect on venture success ifhe is placed in a weakly connected niche and at the same time
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lacks non-redundant information. Models 12 and 17 (Table 5.3) tested this hypothesis by
including the interaction effect between the nominal niche variable and flow betweenness.
What is perhaps most noteworthy here is that there definitely seemed to be cross-level effects
between the parameters, and after controlling for start-up year (Model 17, Table 5.3) the
effects were also significant. Figure 5.5 below (adapted from Model 17, Table 5.3 and
identical with Figure 5.3) perhaps best illustrates the interaction effects uncovered. Between
Niches l and 3, we actually observe a purely cross-level effect, similar with what was
illustrated in Figures 2.3c and 2.4c, and this effect was also significant. On the other hand, the
cross-level effect between Niches l and 2 was insignificant, but we have clear directional
support for a cross-level effect. The significant contrast effect between these two respective
niches furthermore indicated that we were dealing with an empirical phenomenon that was
also mixed-determinant in nature.
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Figure 5.5 Interaction effects between niche (N) and flow betweenness. Adapted from Model I7, Table 5.3.
Dependent variable: MeanProdLn.
The findings presented in Model 17 (Table 5.3) and Figure 5.5 reveal that it is positive to be
placed in a densely connected niche (Niches 2 and 3) and at the same time access non-
redundant information. This supported Hypothesis 4a. We observe, however, that actors in
densely connected niches who lacked access to non-redundant information were actually low
in performance. Hypothesis 4b, on the other hand, suggested that they would be medium in
performance. In Hypothesis 4c, I predicted that start-ups in a sparsely connected niche that
accessed a high degree of non-redundant information would be medium in performance. Yet,
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according to Figure 5.5, they were also low in performance. Finally, in Hypothesis 4d, I
predicted that actors in a sparsely connected niche with little access to non-redundant
information would be low in performance, whereas we observe that they were actually
medium to high in performance (Niche l, Figure 5.5).
Altogether, this indicates that there was somewhat mixed support for Hypothesis 4. However,
we again definitely seem to be dealing with an empirical phenomenon that is both cross-level
and mixed-determinant in nature. Furthermore, ifwe keep in mind that the lower level
aggregate variable, network distance to the center of the field, appeared as a negative second
degree polynomial, the totality of the findings demonstrated the importance of carefully
considering level issues in network research.
Finally, it is interesting to note in Table 5.8 - where the flow betweenness parameter from
Model 17 (Table 5.3) was replaced with degree centrality - that the adjusted R-square was
reduced by more than 9%. Moreover, the parameters in Table 5.8 were insignificant
indicating - at least regarding interaction effects between the niche parameter and centrality
measures - that access to non-redundant information seemed to have genuine predictive
power on the dependent variable. The reported results also illustrate that different centrality
measures not only varied in their conceptual content (Freeman, Borgatti and White 1991;
Freeman 1979; Scott 2000; Wasserman and Faust 1994), but also revealed substantial
differences throughout the statistical analyses.
Hypothesis 5 and 5alt. The two final hypotheses suggest that late adopters will outperform
early adopters due to increased density and competence in the emerging field (Hannan 1986).
Alternatively, the relationship is the opposite as a result ofmimetic behavior among late
adopters (DiMaggio 1991). In Models 13 and 14 (Table 5.3) partial support has been gained
for both arguments. Adopters in the early life of the emerging field seemed to be prone to
mimetic behavior and were accordingly inferior in performance. Yet, the pattern changed in
1998 and in the following years we observe an increasing trend in venture success. Therefore,
the most likely interpretation of these findings is that the opposing causal forces predicted in
both Hypotheses 5 and Salt were at play. In the early years, it seems that the negative effect of
mimetic behavior was superior in predictive power, whereas the increased competence and
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learning that was developed throughout the field more than outweighed this negative trend
beyond 1998.
In Model 15, I included start-up year as a 2nd degree polynomial simultaneously along with a
selection of network variables. Whereas the previous two models had revealed a non-linear
effect with a shape of a positive 2nd degree polynomial (illustrated in Table 5.6 and Figure
5.2), the non-linear effect from the start-up year has now faded away and we observe a linear
negative trend. This pattern furthermore remained robust in Models 16 and 17 (Table 5.3)
where the polynomial regressor of start-up year has been deleted.
The way I interpret the totality ofthese findings is that throughout the life of the emerging
field there seemed to be a negative trend on the dependent variable, venture success, as a
result ofmimetic behavior. Nevertheless, Table 5.6 and Figure 5.2 give us a clear indication
that some learning has taken place. It is accordingly reasonable to state that competence
developed throughout the field could reach the entrepreneurs, but only to the extent that they
possessed certain network constellations, which have been uncovered throughout this
dissertation. I think that Figure 5.6 is a good illustration of the observed pattern. The dotted
line is similar with what we learned from Table 5.6 and Figure 5.2 and illustrates how
difference in venture success between early and late adopters took the form of a positive 2nd
degree polynomial. In the early years, we observe a negative trend as a result of mimetic
behavior and low level of competence. For late adopters, however, the increased competence
level throughout the field more than outweighed this negative trend.
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Figure 5.6 Legitimacy and mimetic process in the emerging field.
The negative line in Figure 5.6 crystallized the genuine effect from mimetic behavior on
venture success when we controlled for learning and legitimacy effects, and was also
analogous with the linear and negative effect from year of start-up, which we observed in
Models 15-17 (Table 5.3). In other words, this reveals what happens when we controlled for
the focal actor's access to social capital through his network constellations. To my
knowledge, this is the first attempt where two such divergent approaches in the area of
organization studies have been simultaneously tested against each other; so despite the
application of a simple empirical approach to network density and mimetic behavior (i.e.
modeling start-up year as the independent variable), I believe that the findings discussed
above can spur an avenue of further research in a dual context that is ripe to provide increased
insight in the area of organization studies.
The Exploratory Approach
Local Network Centrality. The control variable I discuss first in this section is the local
centrality measure, degree centrality. This is perhaps one of the most important control
variables in this study due to its high correlation with both closeness centrality and flow
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betweenness (see Table 5.2). Of course, in the area of social science we can never control for
"everything", but ifwe had excluded this parameter we would never have known to what
extent the predictive effects from the other centrality measures were merely produced as a
correlate of the focal actors' direct ties. Accordingly, l argue that this represents a major
strength in this study.
Models 6 and 7 (Table 5.3) included degree centrality and we observe strong and significant
effects on the dependent variable. We furthermore observe that the explained variance was
high and strongly significant in these two models. Moreover, in an unreported model where l
only included degree centrality, the adjusted R-square was 47% and highly significant
(p<.OOI). Therefore, l conclude that local network centrality had a genuine effect on venture
success. This is also in accordance with a number of other contributions investigating the
relationship between the focal actor's portfolio of direct ties and performance (Ahuja 2000a;
Baum, Calabrese and Silverman 2000; e.g. Baum and Oliver 1991; Choonwoo, Lee and
Pennings 2001; Shan, Walker and Kogut 1994; Smith-Doerr, Owen-Smith and Powell 1999;
Stuart 2000; Stuart, Hoang and Hybels 1999). It is also worth noting that modeling degree
centrality as a 2nd degree polynomial in Model 7 (Table 5.3) produced an insignificant non-
linear effect, whereas the positive linear trend remained strongly significant. This rejects
previous arguments that suggested a possible negative marginal effect from additional ties
beyond a certain maturation point.
Yet as Ihave described, when we compare the interaction effects between degree centrality
and the nominal niche variable in Table 5.8, we observe that the interaction effect between
flow betweenness and the niche parameter produced a better model fit (Model 17, Table 5.3).
I therefore conclude that whereas local network centrality most likely had a genuine effect on
venture success, it seems that there was no interaction effect between this variable and the
niche to which the entrepreneur was embedded.
There were not only strong and significant correlations between degree centrality and
closeness centrality and between degree centrality and flow betweenness (Table 5.2); Ialso
argue that the causality went in the direction illustrated in Figure 5.4. Thus, degree centrality
predicted both flow betweenness and closeness centrality, but not the other way around. My
reasoning behind this line ofthinking is that with regard to either possessing an overall central
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position in the field or accessing non-redundant information from disparate parts of the
system, such positions can only be acquired through the focal actor's direct external ties,
whereas the opposite is impossible.
In addition, the double-headed line between degree centrality and the niche variable illustrates
that actors within Niche 2 were more active overall in their local network than their
colleagues were in Niches l and 3 (Model 2, Table 5.10). Previously described contrast
effects show that actors in Niche 2 had a significantly higher degree centrality score than
entrepreneurs in Niche 1 and Niche 3 had, respectively. Note, however, as with the described
relationship between the niche variable and closeness centrality, I do not claim any particular
causal direction between the observed relationships, and that is the reason for having included
a double-headed arrow also in Figure 5.4.
Moreover, Figure 5.4 illustrates a relationship between degree centrality and the size of the
plant, but as I have discussed earlier, the causality can go both ways, therefore the double-
headed arrow. Being active in the local network could spur enthusiasm for micro-power and
accordingly motivate the entrepreneur to attempt a larger plant than initially planned, but
start-ups that decided to attempt relatively large (and expensive) plants could also feel a need
to reduce the risk they had taken by gaining as much knowledge as possible through their
local network.
Formal Education. The correlation matrix (Table 5.2) and Models 2 and 3 (Table 5.3) gave
directional but insignificant support for a positive relationship between formal education and
venture success. However, ifwe considerer Tables 5.9 and 5.11, it also looks as iflevel of
education could have an indirect effect on electricity production per capital invested. Highly
educated entrepreneurs seemed to have a propensity to approach the center of the field, and as
long as they did not become "too" central (in terms of closeness centrality), this would have
had a positive influence on venture success. I have no good rationalization for why there was
a significant relationship between formal education and the propensity to approach the center
of the field, but a tentative explanation could be that years of schooling inspired the
entrepreneurs to behave in more "professional" manner, which in turn induced them to
approach the more established, well-known and "reputable" vendors and other micro-power
plants.
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Educated actors were overall also likely to build large plants and I have earlier portrayed how
this might spur the entrepreneur to become more active in the network, which in tum was
related to venture success. As I have said previously, the better educated the entrepreneur was,
the better scientific skills he would possess. Consequently, this would enable him to better
calculate and predict the outcome from different sizes of hydro turbines, and altogether reduce
the risk of attempting relatively large investments. Entrepreneurs with a low formal education,
on the other hand, would face a higher risk and uncertainty of the outcome due to lack of
formal competence, and would accordingly feel inclined towards smaller (and less expensive)
solutions.
Early versus Late Adopters. Previously, I have discussed how being an early or late adopter
seemed to affect venture success and the size of the plant, but from Table 5.11 we furthermore
observe that the parameter seemed to affect the closeness centrality variable. I have no ready
explanation for this pattern, but a plausible reason might be that a small number ofvendors,
consultants and perhaps also previously established micro-power plants had appeared as the
most visible operators in the emerging field. Such a kind of implicit branding has in turn been
a motivational factor for newentrants to approach these central actors. Note that in the
described step-wise procedure where degree centrality was the dependent variable, start-up
year did not qualify as independent variable at all. This -I argue - supports my above
argument. Late adopters did not seem to access a higher closeness centrality score as a result
of being more active in their local network, but as a result of approaching previously
established actors that had an overall more strategic position in the emerging field.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have tested the hypotheses that were developed in Chapter 3. After presenting
and discussing the results of the statistical analyses, I have given emphasis to other potentially
interesting findings that were not necessarily reflected in the hypotheses. In the last section of
the chapter, I have given a lengthy discussion of the findings throughout this study.
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6. Conclusion of the Dissertation
This chapter concludes the dissertation. As opposed to the latter part of the previous chapter,
the discussion has now been narrowed down to deal with - in light ofwhat the statistical
analyses have revealed - the research question from Chapter two and the hypotheses that I
developed in Chapter three. Thus, I refer to what I believe is the core contribution from this
research project, namely whether the concept of social capital can be inferred as a multilevel
phenomenon or not.
In addition, the chapter discusses the interplay between network research and institutional
issues such as population density (Hannan 1986) and mimetic behavior (DiMaggio 1991). I
believe that the dissertation - ifnot fully and comprehensively -has given us a clue that these
different approaches can reveal more about social phenomena when combined than when
treated separately.
In the latter part of the chapter, I portray a few practical implications from the findings in this
study, discuss some limitations, and also point out avenues for further research.
Contribution
The limited focus I conduct in this concluding chapter is perhaps best illustrated in Figure 6.1.
As compared to Figure 5.4, a great number ofboth variables and relationships have been
deleted, and we now only observe one dependent variable, namely venture success. The niche
effect, flow betweenness, and closeness centrality remain as network predictors on the
dependent variable. Moreover, the upper part of the figure is similar to Figure 2.9 in Chapter
2, which summed up the research question. As the closeness centrality variable, the niche
effect and the interaction effect between the niche variable and flow betweenness portray, this
study has taught us in particular that social capital appears to be both a cross-level and mixed
determinant phenomenon. The parameter "early or late adopter" reflects Hypotheses 5 and
Salt, and below I discuss these different issues in turn and in combination.
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Niche
Close-
ness -, Flow.> betw...........................
Venture
success
Early or late
adopter
Figure 6.1 Simplified empirical model.
Contribution to the Concept of Social Capital and Network Research
Aldrich (1978), Knoke and Rogers (1979) referred to the tendency of inter-organizational
networks to develop "stable action sets" or "central cores" of dominant organizations,
whereas DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 471) referred to "the emergence of sharply defined
interorganizational structures of domination and patterns of coalition" in the development of
organizational fields. Thus, partition of corporate and organizational actors is often desirable
on practical grounds as a means of representing complex relational patterns with clarity
(Aldrich and Whetten 1981: 385). Partition is moreover considered to be of importance for
research on flows ofinnovation (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), personnel (Baty, Evan and
Rothermel 1971), or information (Boorman and Levitt 1983).
145
DiMaggio (1986) held that a preferable way to partition an organizational field is to identify
what Burt and Talmud (1993) defined as ecological niches of structurally equivalent actors.
Structural-equation approaches can: indicate roles distributed among actors according to
similarity in communication structures (Greve and Salaff2001), discern patron-client patterns
at the subpopulation level, identify occupants of positions in center-periphery structures
where outliers transact only with dominant actors (Meyer 1979), and elucidate brokerage or
agency structures (White 1983). Structural equivalence also indicates groups of actors with
shared cognitions (Carley 1986; Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991). In this research project, I have
applied the block-modeling technique Concor (Convergence of iterated correlations) (White,
Boorman and Breiger 1976; White, Breiger and Boorman 1976) to identify subsets of
structurally equivalent actors in the emerging hydroelectric micro-power field in Western
Norway.
Cross-level models predict, implicitly or explicitly, that individual group members can
respond to a group-level characteristic in a disparate, rather than homogenous fashion. The
model's independent variable can accordingly be homogenous within groups, but the
dependent variable is not; it varies both within and between groups (Klein, Danserau and Hall
1994). In other words, characteristics of individual group members moderate the relationship
of the group characteristic to individual behavior or outcome. Group members for whom the
moderator is high respond to the group characteristic in one way, whereas group members for
whom the moderator is low respond in a different fashion (Bedeian, Kermery and Mossholder
1989; Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Tate 1985).
In this dissertation, independent characteristics for individuals are analogous to characteristics
of the focal actor' s external ties. Among other things, external ties can provide him with
access to non-redundant information, and in this study I have operationalized the concept by
applying Freeman, Borgatti et al.' s (1991) centrality measure of flow betweenness. Niches of
structurally equivalent start-ups are analogous to the group level aggregate, and in this study,
the extent to which each niche was densely or sparsely connected identified relational
characteristics for the collectives. Tables 4.1- 4.8 show that a certain degree of clustering took
place within the 3 identified niches with micro-power start-ups. However, the intensity of
contacts was relatively low in Niche 1 and high in Niches 2 and 3. Accordingly, I have
portrayed Niche 1 as sparsely connected and Niches 2 and 3 as densely connected.
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Models 12 and 17 (Table 5.3) - including the interaction terms between the niches the
entrepreneurs belonged to (i.e. higher level aggregate) and the focal actor's access to non-
redundant information (i.e. lower level aggregate) - illustrate that the lower level parameter
behaved differently on venture success, dependent upon to which niche the entrepreneurs
belonged. In Model 17 (Table 5.3), we furthermore observe that this effect was significant.
The parameters did not always behave perfectly in accordance with what I hypothesized, but
the results indicate that cross-level issues are at play in predicting venture success. The
Florentine case from Chapter 2 gained further empirical support for the cross-level issue; it
was when the interaction term of different level aggregates was included in the model (Model
4, Table 2.5) that we first observed a dramatic increase in explained variance.
Mixed-determinant models suggest that predictors at a variety of levels can influence a
criterion ofinterest. For instance, market characteristics (e.g. the availability of jobs), group
characteristics (e.g. diversity within the group), and individual characteristics (e.g. job
satisfaction) have all been hypothesized to influence employee turnover (Hulin, Roznowski
and Hachiya 1985). Thus, whereas the interaction term in cross-level models produces
combined effects on individual behavior or outcome from homogenous group characteristics
and independent individual characteristics, mixed-determinant models generate additive
effects from the same (or other) levels. In this study, a mixed-determinant approach implied
that the higher level aggregate (niche effect) and the lower level aggregate (e.g. focal actor's
access to non-redundant information) would have an additional effect on venture success. In
addition, the regression analyses in Table 5.3 largely show us that we were also dealing with
mixed-determinant network predictors ofventure success. Start-ups in Niche l seemed to be
inferior in performance, start-ups in Niche 2 superior, whereas their colleagues in Niche 3 fell
somewhere between the other niches - at least according to the latter models.
The focal actor's network distance to the center of the field was another variable that
comprised the lower level aggregate and was operationalized by applying Freeman' s (1979)
closeness centrality measure. A number ofmodels in Table 5.3, including the 2nd degree
polynomial effect ofthis parameter, showed significant effects on venture success. This is in
accordance with Hypothesis 1, which suggested that entrepreneurs approaching either the
margins or the center of the field would be low performers, whereas actors positioning
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themselves in intermediate positions would be high performers. The robustness of this result,
even after controlling for the higher level aggregate, niche effect, gave us further indication
that we were dealing with an empirical phenomenon that was mixed determinant in nature.
Multilevel issues admittedly go far beyond the simple cross-level and mixed-determinant
model that I have developed and tested in this dissertation, but the findings clearly indicate
that valuable information can be lost by not simultaneously considering multiple levels in
network- and social capital studies.'" From Table 2.5 we learn that when cross-level terms
between actor centrality (i.e. lower level aggregates) and which niche the Florentine families
belonged to (i.e. higher level aggregate) were first included, we observed that the different
level aggregates also had genuine additive (i.e. mixed-determinant) effects on family wealth.
Table 5.3 reveals similar findings; the niche effect first became significant when we
controlled for lower level aggregates, i.e. the focal actor's network distance to the center of
the field (Model 9). Whereas some models indicate that access to non-redundant information
had no genuine effect on venture success, the interaction term with the niche variable
nonetheless shows that the effect was contingent upon characteristics of higher level
aggregates.
To summarize, we can state that the concept of social capital is (at least) a cross-level and
mixed-determinant phenomenon. It is tempting to claim that the term can be identified only as
long as we observe a positive outcome for the subject under study, in our case, electricity
production per capital invested (in real terms) at the focal micro-power plant. However, as I
have previously described, Lin (2001: 28) warned that such a view "may implicate a
tautology ... It would be impossible to build a theory in which causal effectual factors are
folded into a singular function [and} incorrect to allow the outcome variables to dictate
the specification of the causal variable." To my knowledge, there has not yet been developed
a coherent and agreed-upon theory of social capital, but seminal works of both Granovetter
(1973) and Burt (1992a) have stimulated researchers to consider the actor's access to non-
redundant information when (explicitly or implicitly) dealing with the concept. Despite the
fact that the causal agent behind their argument diverges - Burt maintained that the player
34 For an excellent and comprehensive review of level issues in the field of social science, see Klein, Danserau et
al. (1994).
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gains access to non-redundant information by spanning structural holes, whereas Granovetter
emphasized the bridging of weak ties to disparate parts of the system - both agreed upon the
importance of non-redundancy. 35
In this study, a major contribution to our understanding of the concept ofsocial capital is that
the focal actor' s access to non-redundant information seemed to be dependent on the higher
level aggregate; i.e. the niche effect. Accordingly, I argue that the attempt to build a coherent
social capital theory should consider the interplay between non-redundant information and
relational characteristics for collectives. The dissertation has argued that perhaps the best way
to identify collectives of actors within a larger network structure is to apply block modeling
techniques in order to uncover niches of structurally equivalent actors. I am, however, not
dogmatically claiming that researchers should always undertake such an approach. The
research question as well as the methodological issues might encourage scholars to consider
natural boundaries (e.g. departments or project teams within a firm, organizational [or other]
actors within a given geographical area), cohesion techniques or other approaches, for
instance.
Moreover, I am careful not to maintain that density levels within identified collectives or
higher level aggregates should be the only causal agents to be considered. On the contrary, the
density approach that I have undertaken in this research project is both a simplistic and rough
measure, and it can very well be that future contributions, applying more sophisticated lines
of attack, will uncover possible reasons for why the interaction effects in this dissertation only
gained partial support for Hypothesis 4. In addition, the characteristics for collectives could
go beyond merely investigating the distinctiveness within these structures to also focusing on
relationships between the higher level aggregates identified. I slightly touched upon this issue
in the discussion of the Florentine case in Chapter 2, where I questioned ifBurt's (I992a)
35 The reason for applying the Freeman, Borgatti et al. (1991) centrality measure of flow betweenness in this
paper rather than Burt' s (1992a) measure of structural holes, is that I have dealt with a connected graph that
considered all nodes in the network. Burt's approach, on the other hand, merely dealt with the players'
egocentric network, i.e. it focused on the focal actor and to what extent his immediate network ties were
connected to each other. In a number ofunreported models, I applied Burt's network measure of structural holes
instead offlow betweenness. The findings were mostly in line with what has been reported throughout this
paper, but the explained variance was much lower.
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structural hoies theory or Granovetter's (1973) weak tie argument was manifest at different
levels of analyses. For instance, density of contacts between niches can give us information
about to what extent there are strong or weak ties between different collectives, and the
degree to which different niches are connected to other niches that are disconnected can teach
us which collective or collectives possess brokering positions (for further details, see Scott
2000; Wasserman and Faust 1994). Altogether, I argue that a variety of approaches in how to
identify collective actors as well as relational characteristics for these higher level aggregates
can provide a fruitful, comparable insight to our understanding of social capital as a
multilevel phenomenon.
Ifwe now flip the coin, another contribution in this dissertation is the discovery that relational
characteristics for collectives not only affected individual performance or outcome per se;
individual characteristics such as the focal actor' s access to non-redundant information
seemed to interact with these higher level aggregates. After having identified the given
collectives of organizational actors, it was not sufficient to merely identify general relational
characteristics within or between these structures. This study has revealed that researchers
would most likely gain fuller insight ifthey also undertake the task of examining how the
different actors are connected to other actors both within and beyond the identified collective
or collectives.
A further important contribution in this dissertation, I argue, is that there is not necessarily a
positive linear relationship between being close to the center of the field and outcome.
Despite the fact that Freeman (1979), in his influential contribution on network centralities,
did not explicitly relate the different measures to the concept of social capital, his work has
had strong influence in relating actors' network position to power and performance. To the
extent that a theorist could claim that social capital can be operationalized and measured as
the focal actor's network distance to the center of the field, an implication from this study-
along with Greve, Golombek et al.' s (2001) contribution from the Norwegian pulp and paper
industry - is that access to social capital is not necessarily positive per se. By comparing
actors at the margins or intermediate positions of the network, we see that social capital had a
positive effect on performance, but by comparing actors in intermediate positions with
colleagues at the very center of the field, we learn that "too much" social capital hampered
outcome.
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A significant contribution ofthis study is the discovery that access to non-redundant
information interacted with the niche factor on venture success, whereas neither the focal
actor's network distance to the center of the field (closeness centrality) nor local network
centrality (degree centrality) seemed to be contingent upon relational characteristics for the
identified collectives. This teaches us that whereas some network characteristics at the focal
actor level were likely to interact with higher level aggregates, other lower level
characteristics seemed to predict the dependent variable in a consistent manner, independent
of to which niche the entrepreneurs belonged. Thus, if a theorist intends to build a social
capital theory which treats the concept as a multilevel phenomenon, a lesson from this study
is that one individual network characteristic - i.e. access to non-redundant information -
interacted with higher level aggregates, whereas others - i.e. network distance to the center of
the field and local network centrality - probably did not.
In line with the discussion above, I believe that another important contribution is the inclusion
of different centrality measures in the regression analyses. Despite that the correlation matrix
in Table 5.2 indicates high correlation between degree centrality, closeness centrality, and
flow betweenness, the concepts are considerably distinctive in conceptual content. Thus, by
applying these different measures in separate models (and to some extent also
simultaneously), we furthermore learn that they behaved quite differentlyon the dependent
variable. Not only was there a difference in the interplay with the higher level aggregate, as
described above, but we also observe that the relationship between closeness centrality and
the dependent variable was non-linear with the shape of a negative 2nd degree polynomial,
whereas the relationship between degree centrality and the same effect variable was positive
and linear.
As I have warned a number of times throughout this dissertation, including parameters that
are highly correlated, which is the case between degree centrality and closeness centrality, can
cause severe multicollinearity problems in the analyses. Yet, visual inspection of the data-
plots in JMP (2003) indicated no such problems in any of the described models. In this regard,
I hold that the different outcomes from the applied centrality measure can give us a hint that it
is misleading to assume that items or parameters, which load on the same factor, necessarily
imply that they portray the same theoretical concept. This contribution, on the other hand, has
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illustrated that such an approach could lead to significant loss in the information that we gain
from our statistical analyses.
The Interplay with the Institutional Approach
If we now look beyond the very concept of social capital, a final important contribution in this
dissertation is the inclusion of institutional issues such as network density and mimetic
behavior. From Chapter 3, we remember that I hypothesized that late adopters would
outperform early adopters as a result of the increased density ofmicro-power start-ups
(Hannan 1986). An alternative hypothesis, on the other hand, suggested that the relationship
might be the other way around due to mimetic behavior among late adopters (DiMaggio
1991).
Initial analyses (Models 13 and 14, Table 5.3) gave partial support for both hypotheses and in
particular, we remember from Table 5.6 and Figure 5.2 that between 1995 and 1998 the trend
was negative, supporting the argument behind mimetic behavior (DiMaggio 1991). From this
year on, however, the curve became positive, indicating support for the density argument
(Hannan 1986). It thus seems that late entrepreneurs were benefiting from the overall increase
in learning and competence being established throughout the emerging hydroelectric micro-
power field. We accordingly observe the contours of a non-linear relationship with the shape
of a positive 2nd degree polynomial between start-up year and venture success, where 1998
was the turning point (this is also statistically significant in Model 13, Table 5.3). The most
likely interpretation ofthis finding is that both of the opposing causal forces were at play. In
the early years, it seems that the negative effect from mimetic behavior was superior in
predictive power, whereas the increased competence and learning that was developed
throughout the field more than outweighed this negative trend beyond 1998.
However, we learn in later models (Models 15-17, Table 5.3) that the inclusion ofnetwork
variables changed the picture described. The positive polynomial effect faded away, and a
genuine negative and significant linear trend between start-up year and venture success
appeared. The way I have interpreted this picture is that to gain from the increased level of
organizational learning that had taken place in the emerging field, it was essential to acquire
152
competence through certain network constellations. Ifnot, the entrepreneur faced the risk of
low performance as a result of the mimetic processes.
Thus, the latter models in Table 5.3 reveal in a way what happened to predictors reflecting
institutional forces when we controlled for the focal actor's access to social capital through
his network ties. To my knowledge, this is the first attempt where two such divergent
approaches in the area of organization studies have been simultaneously tested against each
other. So despite the application of a very simplified empirical approach to network density
and mimetic behavior (i.e. modeling start-up year as independent variable), l believe that
these findings can spur an avenue of further research in a dual context that is ripe to provide
increased insight in the area of organization studies.
Practical Implications
Above, 1have implicitly pointed out some practical implications from the findings in this
study, and in this section my intention is to explicitly portray a few such considerations.
We can begin with the novel entrepreneur in the process ofbuilding a micro-power plant. As
are the majority of organizational actors, he is of course interested in building an efficient and
profitable plant. So, in terms of gaining the best competence achievable for micro-power
systems, what shou Id he do? The regression analyses in this dissertation (Models 13 and 14,
Table 5.3) indicate that a certain level of knowledge has been developed throughout the
emerging field, but this competence per se will not automatically benefit the focal actor; it
must be gained through certain network constellations. Thus, in order to become a successful
entrepreneur he has to access the right players, with the right knowledge at the right time; but
who are these? First of all, the strong and significant relationship between local network
centrality and venture success indicates that it is far better to collaborate with a number of
other actors than with merelya few, no matter whom they are. A plausible explanation for this
relationship may be that many direct ties to a larger extent provide the entrepreneur with rich
information from both successful and not so successful colleagues and also from competent
and not so competent vendors and consultants. It is well established knowledge that we not
only learn from successful others, but also from those who are not so successful (as well as
we learn from our own successes and failures). If an actor possesses only one or a few ties, he
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is less likely to access overall knowledge. Instead, he risks accessing only superior knowledge
(constraining him from knowledge about which pitfalls he is vulnerable to) or inferior
knowledge (constraining him from knowledge about better and more efficient solutions at
hand). Thus, my first practical advice is: be active in your local network and try to learn as
much as possible from as many others as possible.
Another finding from this research project is that the most successful entrepreneurs seem to
be positioned in network positions intermediate to the center of the field, whereas inferior
entrepreneurs operate at the margins or the very center of the field. Remember that this effect
was only significant after controlling for local network centrality or the niche effect, and a
plausible explanation from this finding could be that there are possibly one or a few highly
profiled vendors in the field. Their visibility is in turn correlated with their overall central
network position since many other nodes are likely to approach them. Everything else being
equal, if a start-up wishes to collaborate with this (or these) central actor(s), this will, in turn,
give him an overall central position (as compared to collaborating with less central vendors).
Furthermore, as I described in Chapter 3, a possible reason that venture success for such start-
ups can be depressed is that the most high-profile vendors and consultants charge a premium
price for their products due to asymmetric knowledge and power between the involved actors.
Perhaps the best way to exemplify this issue is to take another look at the network structure in
the emerging field, which I illustrated in Figure 4.2. For the years 1995 and 1997 in particular,
we observe that there was at least one very central actor, and examination of the raw-data
shows that this was a vendor ofmicro-power systems (and not a micro-power start-up).
Cautious advice to a potential start-up would be that it is not necessarily the best decision to
try to get the first and best systems this vendor - or other highly central and well-known
vendors - provides. At least, it would be highly recommendable to carefully compare the
products, services, and competence this actor offers with other solutions available throughout
the field.
The dissertation has also revealed that structurally equivalent start-ups in densely connected
niches are likely to outperform their colleagues in a sparsely connected niche, and in
particular, this seems to be the case ifthe focal actor accesses non-redundant information. It is
of course unrealistic to expect a potential start-up to undertake the task (which I have
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conducted in this thesis) of identifying and examining different ecological niches, but a more
reasonable undertaking would be to investigate ifthere is some level of collaboration and
information-sharing among a given set of actors that the entrepreneur would like to approach.
Ifthe answer is yes, the next step would be to not only focus on this identified collective, but
also to approach one or more actors that are disconnected from the identified group.
Ifwe now look beyond the emerging micro-power field and ask ifthe results from this
research project could also be applicable to other sectors, the answer to this question is: only
by replications ofthis study on other organizational actors. Nevertheless, I believe that the
recommendations described above are also applicable for entrepreneurs in other emerging
fields such as shellfish farming, for instance.
Limitations and Further Research
As the previous section has emphasized, this dissertation has by no means intended to develop
or empirically test a comprehensive social capital theory. The intention has rather been to
focus on the concept of social capital as a multi-level phenomenon and furthermore inspire a
greater awareness of the interplay between structural network research and institutional issues
such as population density (Hannan 1986) and mimetic behavior (DiMaggio and Powell
1991). I therefore hope that the contribution can spur further research in these areas. In the
last section of this dissertation, I discuss possible avenues where I believe fruitful knowledge
is most likely to be acquired. Nevertheless, as with all research, this project has been
constrained with certain limitations, and I will first debate same ofthese issues.
Limitations
With regard to relational characteristics for collectives, this dissertation has merely focused
on niche density, and as previously described, this is a rather rough measure, which can partly
mask other possible causal mechanisms. Tables 4.2 - 4.8 reveal that some clustering had taken
place within all three niches from 1995, and that there seemed to be a consistently higher
degree of density in Niches 2 and 3 as compared to Niche 1. We do not know, however, if the
niche factor was constant on venture success throughout the early life of the emerging field.
Thus, is it arbitrary for a micro-power plant to start electricity production in a given niche any
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year, or could it be that the density factor is particularly important in the early years of the
emerging field, whereas the overall increase in knowledge and competence in the latter years
deflates this effect? Controlling for start-up year partly accounts for this possible effect, but
the relatively low number of observations in this study did not allow me to simultaneously
include the interaction effects between the niche factor and flow betweenness, and the niche
factor and start-up year'"
In Chapter 4, I mentioned that the total number of actors within each niche - including micro-
power start-ups, vendors and consultants - was 23 in Niche 1, 15 in Niche 2 and 9 in Niche 3.
In other words, Niche 1 - which was sparsely connected - had substantially more nodes than
the relatively densely connected Niches 2 and 3. Wasserman and Faust (1994: 413) held that
it is useful to consider the relative size of the identified blocks when examining the tendency
ofnetwork ties within (and between) collectives. We remember that this dissertation has
identified network density as the number relations (l) among (n) actors compared to the
maximum possible number of relations, l/[ n(n-1 )/2]. Using some algebra, it can be shown that
(Na-I )/(Nb-1) can be used as a baseline for evaluating the tendency for the density of ties
within niche a,Ne, relative to niche b, Ne (for further details, see Wasserman and Faust 1994:
414).
Thus, the size of the niches can influence network density, and after applying the above
baseline, the relationship in size between Niches 1 and 2 was 1.571, between Niches 1 and 3 it
was 2.750, and between Niches 3 and 2 it was .571. At the same time, the relationship in
density between Niches 2 and 1was 2.402, between Niches 3 and 1 it was 1.815, and between
2 and 3 it was 1.323.37 Ifwe now account for niche size when comparing the relationship in
densities between the three niches, we get the following scores: 1.529 between Niches 2 and
1, .660 between Niches 3 and 1, and 2.316 between Niches 2 and 3.
The above revised calculations reveal some interesting issues. First, we observe that even
after accounting for niche size, Niche 2 is still more densely connected than Niche 1.Niche 3,
on the other hand, actually seems to be less connected than Niche 1when accounting for
3~evertheless, in unreported models where I included interaction effects between start-up year and niche,
instead of interaction effects between flow betweenness and niche, the effects were insignificant.
37 Niche densities were adapted from Table 4.1.
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niche size. In other words, the relatively high density level in Niche 3 compared to Niche I
can be explained as a result of the large difference in niche size, whereas the difference in
density level between Niches I and 2 seems to be robust. If we now look back the findings
from this study, we remember that comparisons between Niches I and 2 to a large extent were
in accordance with what Hypothesis 2 predicted; start-ups in the densely connected Niche 2
were generally better entrepreneurs than their colleagues were in the sparsely connected
Niche I. On the other hand, there were less clear findings when considering Niche 3 - where
start-ups fell somewhat between their colleagues in Niches 1 and 2, which we can possibly
explain as a lack of "genuine" high density level within this niche. However, from the above
calculations we observe that after accounting for niche size, Niche 2 appears to be more than
twice as densely connected than Niche 3 (2.316 times more connected, to be precise), and this
can also explain why actors in Niche 2 were more productive than their colleagues in Niche 3.
Another liability regarding the identified niches is that I did not manage to find a particular
saturation level in explained variance when deciding on the number of splits in Concor
(White, Boorman and Breiger 1976; White, Breiger and Boorman 1976). In the Florentine
case, I discovered a steady increase in explained variance when I increased the number of
splits from one (i.e. two identified niches) to two (i.e. four identified niches), whereas the
increase in explained variance was substantially lower when I increased the number of splits
from two to three. The network identified for the emerging micro-power field, however,
revealed a linear trend in explained variance when increasing the number of splits. Since no
other particular saturation level was identified, I therefore decided to conduct two splits. As
previously stated, a relatively low number of splits is in accordance with Wasserman and
Faust (1994: 378) who argued that "[t}heory and interpretability of the solution are the
primary considerations in deciding how many ... [partitions} to produce." They furthermore
held that making too many splits can lead to unstable correlations, due to the small number of
elements.
The number of splits that I have applied is open to interpretation, and - as we have observed -
clearly indicates that a certain degree of clustering had taken place within a number of the
niches, yet with varying density levels. Moreover, statistical analyses illustrated that by
applying two splits I have identified niches that clearly portray both cross-level and mixed-
determinant effects on focal actor venture success within the emerging field. Thus, conducting
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two splits was not only easily interpretable, but the identified niches seemed to make sense
empirically as well.
The "perfect" network study should have collected data on relationships between all identified
nodes, yet this represents a great challenge for the researcher since it is not always obvious
how to define the natural boundaries of a given network structure. In this dissertation, my
intention was to overcome this obstacle by applying what have been described as snowball
sampling techniques (for further details, see the methodological section in Chapter 4).
Nevertheless, by conducting this procedure I have focused on gathering relevant data on
relationships between the micro-power start-ups and data on relationships between micro-
power start-ups and vendors and consultants (plus ties to small scale hydro-power plants). An
advantage to applying this procedure was that I gained information on relationships that went
beyond the boundaries of the population of micro-power start-ups. The "perfect" network
study, on the other hand, should also have gathered network data from all nodes that were
included in this study. The problem, however, was where to draw the line, and the number of
nodes could possibly have exploded if I had approached all the reported players. In this
dissertation, I have accordingly focused on the micro-power start-ups and the relational ties
between themselves and to vendors and consultants (plus ties to "somewhat" larger plants).
This represents the very core of the emerging field, and the high explained variance from a
number ofmodels in Table 5.3, including network variables, indicates that I have been able to
identify the essential part of the network structure.
With regard to gathering network data, another limitation in this study is that I asked the
respondents to report, not only about present ties, but also about the historyand the eventual
termination of different relationships. An ideal solution (but impossible ex post facto) would
have been to follow the emerging field throughout its life span and gather network data from
the relevant plants on a regular basis, for instance once every year. This would possibly have
given a larger degree of accuracy in reporting the history of different network constellations.
Nevertheless, the strong and significant relationship between different network measures and
venture success in a number of models again seems to indicate that respondents have
managed to be fairly accurate in reporting the history oftheir network ties. As described
earlier, previous research has shown that people are good at recalling regularly occurring
relations as opposed to ad hoc contacts (Freeman, Romney and Freeman 1987). The
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procedure applied of gathering data on a longitudinal and dynamic network structure is also in
accordance with scholars' recommendations (Burt 1992a; Podolny and Baron 1997).
Moreover, analyzing a network structure that has been dichotomized is a simplistic approach
in how to uncover how different network configurations affect venture success. From Chapter
4, we remember that I asked the respondents to indicate a variety of characteristics regarding
the different contacts. Therefore, it would have been interesting to dig further into the
embedded structure ofmultiplexity in relationships. This could have been done by modeling
layers of network structure that differed in content, and Icould have conducted a variety of
network analyses on these different matrices of contacts to examine how they varied or
diverged in the regression analyses. As the data collection instrument reveals (Appendix I), I
furthermore asked the respondents to report how different relationships had changed over
time. The major reason for not conducting the above strategies, however, was the increased
complexity this would have represented in the network analyses. Since the network was
relatively sparsely connected - at least in the earlier years of the emerging field - Iwould
most likely have also encountered the problem of unconnected graphs, a well-known problem
for network scholars.
The dependent variable that I applied in this study was average yearly electricity production
per capital invested (discounted in real terms), and personally, I hold that this is both an
informative and relevant measure for venture success. Nevertheless, Iby no means hold that it
is a perfect performance measure.l" If, for instance, we assume that the price of electricity on
the whole has been relatively high throughout the life of the emerging field (as compared to
previous years), the entrepreneur at a large micro-power plant with low production per capital
invested, could still perceive his project to be a success, whereas a colleague at a small plant
with high production per capital invested would perhaps consider his investment to be a
failure. The reason is that the "low performing" large plant will sell more electricity than the
small "high performing" plant, and the higher the electricity price, the less the "too high"
investments at the large plant and the "low" investments at the small plant matter. In
particular, this will be the case ifthe electricity remains high indefinitely. Having said this, if
38 For an interesting discussion of the use of "performance" as the dependent variable in organization studies, see
March and Sutton (1997).
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we had included the price of electricity when modeling the dependent variable, this would
also have included a causal factor ofventure success that could be considered exogenous and
which is also highly volatile. The distinction between a successful and a not-so-successful
entrepreneur could therefore have been rather arbitrary.
It is moreover worth noting that the applied sample, from which I have accessed both network
variables and autonomous characteristics, was relatively low. Thus, having only conducted
statistical analyses on 20 start-ups, we should of course be cautious in the interpretations from
the statistical analyses. As we have observed, in a number of models I merely gained
directional support for certain hypotheses. Nevertheless, despite relatively few observations,
we definitely observed significant parameters in a number of models, along with high
explained variance. In particular, this was the case after controlling for start-up year. I
therefore argue that we are dealing with an empirical phenomenon that is both strong and
robust in nature. The Florentine case from Chapter 2 - where we observed a dramatic
increase in explained variance on family wealth when interaction terms between centrality
and niche variable were included - gave further empirical evidence to my conception of social
capital as a cross-level and mixed-determinant phenomenon.
From the statistical analyses in Table 5.3 (Models 13 and 14), we remember that there was a
negative trend in start-up success in the early years of the emerging field (between 1995 and
1998), and I have previously described this as a possible effect of mimetic behavior.
However, we must bear in mind that there is (at least theoretically) a limited access to rivers
where it is feasible and economically defendable to establish micro-power plants. Over the
time span, we can therefore expect that the cost of investments will increase, not necessarily
as a result ofinferior competence (or disadvantageous network constellations), but as a result
of more complicated and demanding projects. In other words, it is reasonable to assume that
micro-power plants will be first established close to the "best" rivers, and that the second
wave of adopters will be the entrepreneurs with access to the "second best" rivers, and so
forth. At least theoretically, this can give us an alternative (or complementary) explanation of
the negative trend in venture success in the early life of the emerging field. Nevertheless, as I
described in the introductory chapter, the potential for hydroelectric micro- and miniature
plants in Norway is estimated to be about 3 billion kWh in electricity production, whereas the
actual production in 2000 was roughly estimated to be 235 million kWh (NVE). This implies
160
that only a marginal fraction of the estimated capacity has been built out, and it is accordingly
likely to assume that the above arguments regarding lack of "good" rivers for relatively late
adopters are not valid. We furthermore observe a positive trend in venture success beyond
1998 (when not controlling for network variables), which probably would not have been the
case ifthe quality of the remaining rivers was inferior in terms oftheir hydroelectric potential.
Whereas this study only collected data from entrepreneurs that had actually started electricity
production, it is nevertheless reasonable to assume that ex ante consideration of river quality
played an important role in the decision to attempt a project or not. We therefore know
nothing about potential entrepreneurs who - after extensively examining the possibilities of
building a micro-power plant - concluded that such a project involved a risk that was too
high. This factor accordingly indicates that there are other causal mechanisms that could
explain venture success than those portrayed in this dissertation. For instance, it could be that
the different network constellations described throughout this contribution did not merely
predict outcome; inferior start-ups might never have started at all ifthey were positioned in
advance in a densely connected niche and at the same time accessed non-redundant
information. This could have taught them that their river was perhaps not at all suitable for
electricity production, i.e. the investment would be too high compared to what they would
obtain from the project in terms of electricity production. Accordingly, more research is
needed to uncover such potential causal mechanisms. The ideal situation would be to access
network data, not only from "actual" start-ups, but also from all candidates that had ever
considered building a micro-power plant. By doing this, we would learn if different network
constellations also appeared as selection mechanisms for whether to attempt an
entrepreneurial project or not.
Further Research
The previous sections have indicated where I believe future research should go, and now I
will discuss some ofthese issues in detail. First, later contributions should try to include more
observations in their analyses than this study achieved. Ifthe number ofactors is low, one
way of doing this is would be to model panel data - i.e. access repeated observations from the
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same actors over a time-span." In addition to more robust statistical analyses, this could teach
us ifthere are any learning effects at the plants that were reflected in increased electricity
production over the time-span. And given that there are learning effects; do entrepreneurs
within densely connected niches learn at the fastest pace for instance, or does access to non-
redundant information or other centrality measures predict a similar pattern?
This study has focused on the network constellation at start-up, yet with panel data it would
also have been possible to investigate if network ties accessed post start-up had any genuine
effect on venture success. Previous contributions have discovered that many network ties in a
given time period increased the propensity of accessing more network ties in subsequent time
periods (Ahuja 2000b; Gulati 1999; Smith-Doerr, Owen-Smith and Powell 1999; Stuart
1998). To my knowledge, however, we have no clear understanding if such network dynamics
actually affect performance. In this regard, it could be interesting to investigate to what extent
independent variables at start-up have a persistent effect on the dependent variable when
controlling for present or lagged network variables. That is: to what extent will circumstances
around start-up forever affect venture success? Is it possible that entrepreneurs with not-so-
fortunate network constellations at start-up have possibilities to succeed later ifthey manage
to connect with the "right" players at the "right" time, or will they forever be losers? A
problem in my empirical context has been the very way I have modeled the dependent
variable. Since venture success was modeled as yearly electricity production per capital
invested, the denominator will forever affect the dependent variable. Accordingly, further
research addressing the above issues should consider other performance measures.
We remember that this study focused on the very structure of the ties that make up the social
network, rather than focusing on the content ofthese ties. Therefore, later contributions
should examine in what way the very content of contacts could create variations in venture
success. From the methodological chapter, I described how the respondents were asked to
indicate a variety of characteristics regarding the different contacts. It would therefore have
been interesting to dig further into the structure of the embedded and multiplex structure in
the relationships. This could have been done by modeling layers of network structure that
39 In this study, my intention was to conduct panel regression. However, little variance in the variables for each
actor constrained me from doing so.
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differed in content, for instance. In addition, I could have conducted a variety ofnetwork
analyses on these different matrices of contacts and examined how they diverged or
converged on performance parameters or other autonomous attributes.
The density approach that I have undertaken in this paper is both a simplistic and rough
measure, and it can very well be that future contributions that apply more sophisticated lines
of attack will uncover possible reasons as to why the interaction effects in this dissertation
only granted partial support for Hypothesis 4. Yet as described, one explanation can be the
way the size of the identified niches influenced density levels; i.e. the more nodes in a niche
the less densely connected it tended to be and vice versa. In addition, characteristics for
collectives can also go beyond merely investigating the distinctiveness within niches to also
focusing on relationships between them. l slightly touched upon this issue in the discussion of
the Florentine case in Chapter 2, where I questioned if Burt's (1992a) structural holes theory
or Granovetter's (1973) weak tie argument were manifest at different levels of analyses. For
instance, the density of contacts between niches could provide us with information about to
what extent there are strong or weak ties between different collectives. The degree to which
different niches are connected to others that are disconnected can furthermore teach us which
collective or collectives possess brokering positions (for further details, see Scott 2000;
Wasserman and Faust 1994). Altogether, Iargue that a variety of approaches in how to both
identify collective actors and relational characteristics for these higher level aggregates can
provide fruitful and comparable insight to our understanding of social capital as a multilevel
phenomenon.
Ihave stated earlier that the interplay between network predictors of social capital and
institutional issues can spur an avenue of further research in a dual context that is ripe to
provide us further insight in the area of organizational studies. In this dissertation, I have
merely investigated what happens when we simultaneously include different network
measures and start-up year as independent variables. Ibelieve that a fruitful path to gain fuller
insight in this area would be to investigate ifthere is any interaction effect between these
variables. For instance, is the observed relationship between network distance to the center of
the field and venture success constant for all micro-power entrepreneurs no matter what year
they started production, or do we observe that start-up year moderates this (or other) network
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variables? Further contributions should accordingly undertake the task of investigating such
Issues.
Finally, this dissertation has addressed the concept of social capital as a multilevel
phenomenon by modeling network centralities at the focal actor level and niche
characteristics at higher level aggregates as the independent variable. The dependent variable,
on the contrary, was merely venture success, measured by dividing average yearly electricity
production by real investments. In other words, independent variables were multilevel in
nature whereas the dependent variable was not. I thus intended to uncover how "good" an
entrepreneur is as a consequence of network configurations at different levels of analysis. Yet
another approach - which also extends the multilevel issue in network analysis - would be to
go beyond the question of how "good" the entrepreneur is and to also ask how "different" he
is from his colleagues. Can it be for instance that the closer the network distance between a
dyad of start-ups, the more similar venture success? And are dyads of start-ups belonging to
the same niche more similar in performance than dyads belonging to different niches? To
expand our understanding of social capital as a multilevel phenomenon, further studies should
accordingly conduct research where the dependent variable is also examined at different
levels of analyses, and this work is under way.
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8. Appendix I: Data Collection Instrument (in Norwegian)
Vegleiing for utfylling
På dei neste sidene har eg lista opp namn på ein del aktørar som opererer innanfor mikro- og
minikraft. Første delen inneheld ei oversikt over leverandørar, rådgivarar og liknande, medan
fylgjande del presenterer ulike mikro- og minikraftverk. Eg ber Dykk nemne med kven av
desse De har (eller har hatt) regelmessig kontakt.
Kolonne 3
Her set De årstalet då kontakten vart etablert for fyrste gong.
Kolonne 4
Har kontakten eventuelt opphøyrd å eksistere, set De årstalet for dette her.
Kolonne 5
I denne kolona set De omtrentleg hyppigheit for eksisterande kontaktar, eller den mest
vanlege hyppigheita for avslutta kontaktar. Set inn eitt tal.
1. Sjeldnare enn kvar månad.
2. Månadleg.
3. Kvar veke eller oftare.
Kolonne 6
Her ynskjer eg å få reie på den mest van lege type kontakt De hadde fram til kraftverket vart
sett i drift (for kontaktar oppretta etter at drifta kom i gong, set De type kontakt for denførste
tida). Set inn ein eller jleire talverdiar:
1. Kontakt i samband med spørsmål som vedkjem lovreguleringar og naturvern.
2. Kontakt i samband med val av produkt, tekniske løysingar og hydrologiske tilhøve.
3. Kontakt i samband med installering/bygging og oppstart.
4. Kontakt i samband med drift og vedlikehald.
Kolonne 7
Her ynskjer eg å få reie på den mest van lege type kontakt De har i dag (eller mest vanlege
type kontakt De hadde det året den vart avslutta). Set inn ein eller jleire talverdiar:
1. Kontakt i samband med spørsmål som vedkjern lovreguleringar og naturvern.
2. Kontakt i samband med val av produkt, tekniske løysingar og hydrologiske tilhøve.
3. Kontakt i samband med installering/bygging og oppstart.
4. Kontakt i samband med drift og vedlikehald.
I tomme rekker ber eg Dykk om føye til andre moglege aktørar De har (eller har hatt)
tilsvarande kontakt med. NB! For leverandørar, rådgivarar og andre relevante aktørar som De
fører opp, er det viktig å nemne kva type tenester/produkt som vert levert.
På dei siste sidene ber eg om informasjon frå kraftverket samt noko anna informasjon.
Dersom De ynskjer å få tilsendt forskingsrapport frå undersøkinga, kan De gje meg e-post
adresse eller vanleg adresse: -----------------------------------------------
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Ver venleg og svar på fylgjande spørsmål:
Kraftverket sitt namn, innehavar og kommunenamn: _
Når vart straumproduksjonen sett i gong ved kraftverket? mnd/år: _
Månadleg brutto (total) straumproduksjon i kWh frå kraftverket (legg eventuelt ved
utskrift/utskrifter):
Jan Feb Mars April Mai Juni Juli Aug Sept Okt Nov Des
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Fyll inn dei opplysningar De kjenner til ved kraftverket: Maksimal yting (kW): _
Slukeevne (m3/s): _
Brutto fall (m): _
Storleik på inntaksdam (m3): __
Nedslagsfelt (km2): _
Har De oppdemt magasin i nedslagsfelt? Dersom ja, om lag kor stort er dette? m3: _
Er det andre tilhøve som kan påverke straumproduksjonen (bruk evt. baksida av arket)? __
Namn og kommunenamn til næraste verstasjon: ------------------
Om lag kor store investeringar har De til saman hatt ved bygging av kraftverket? kr: _
Om lag kor mykje av desse investeringane har evt. gått med til å knyte seg til kraftnettet?
kr:-----
Om lag kor store driftskostnader har De per år? _
Har kraftverket vore råka av uføresette hendingar/ulykker (t.d. lynnedslag)? Dersom ja, i kor
mange månader stansa dette straumproduksjonen? (bruk baksida av arket til å nemne
kva som hende)
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Alt i alt, i kor stor grad meiner De at kraftverket har vore vellukka? (set eitt kryss)
I svært stor grad:
I nokså stor grad:
I nokon grad:
I nokså liten grad:
I svært liten grad:
Her ynskjer eg nokre opplysningar om De som har bygd kraftverket (dersom tleire personar
enn Dykk sjølv har vore med på prosjektet, set De tilsvarande opplysningar for den eller dei
til høgre for Dykk sjølv).
Kjønn: _
Fødselsår: ---
Kor mange år med yrkeserfaring har De? _
Lengd på utdanning
grunnskule:
vidaregåande skule:
1-3 år på universitet/høgskule:
4 år eller meir på universitet/høgskule: _
Innanfor kva område har De høgst utdanning?
tekn isk/naturvitskap leg
landbruk/skogbruk
økonomisk/administrativ
anna
Eventuelt namn på formell utdanning:
Har De vore med på å bygge andre kraftverk før De bygde Dykkar eige kraftverk? Dersom ja,
til saman kor mange? _
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Har De (eller har De hatt) jobb innanfor kraftbransjen utanom Dykkar eige kraftverk? Dersom
ja, kva type jobb? (bruk evt. baksida av arket)
Dersom fleire enn Dykk sjølv har vore med på å bygge Dykkar eige kraftverk. Har nokon av
desse personane vore med på å bygge kraftverk tidligare? Dersom ja, kor mange kraftverk har
dei til saman vore med på å bygge? _
Kjenner De til nybygde mikrokraftverk (mindre enn 100 kW) som allereie er i drift i fylka
Rogaland, Hordaland, Sogn og Fjordane eller Møre og Romsdalen som ikkje er med på lista?
Dersom ja, før opp namn/innehavar og kommunenamn (bruk evt. baksida av arket):
Hjarteleg takk for hjelpa! All innhenta informasjon vert handsama konfidensielt. Innan kort
tid tek eg kontakt for å avtale eit telefonintervju. Skjemaet kan eventuelt fyllast ut på eiga
hand, retumerast i frankert svarkonvolutt eller faksast på nummer 5595 9430.
Med venleg helsing Jarle Aarstad!
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9. Appendix Il: Syntax Files
Table 2.2
Modell: Fit Model(Y( :Outcome), Effects( :Centrality),
Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model(
:Outcome « {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l),
Plot Effect Leverage(l)}));
Mode12: Fit Model(Y( :Outcome), Effects( :Niche), Personality(Standard
Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model( :Outcome« {Plot
Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect
Leverage(l)}));
Mode13: Fit Model(Y( :Outcome), Effects( :Centrality, :Niche),
Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model(
:Outcome« {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l),
Plot Effect Leverage(l)}));
Model 4: Fit Model(Y( :Outcome), Effects( :Centrality, :Niche,
:Centrality * :Niche), Personality(Standard Least Squares),
Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model( :Outcome « {Plot Actual by
Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect Leverage(l)}));
Tables 2.3 and 2.4
CONCOR
Diagonal:
Max partitions:
Input dataset:
6\DataFiles\Foreløpig\Padgett
Reciprocal
2
C:\Programfiler\Ucinet
Ekteskap
Table 2.5
Modell: Fit Model(Y( :WealthLn), Effects( :InfoCentr),
Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model(
:WealthLn « {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l),
Plot Effect Leverage(l)}));
Mode12: Fit Model(Y( :WealthLn), Effects( :Niche), Personality(Standard
Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model( :WealthLn« {Plot
Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect
Leverage(l) l));
Mode13: Fit Model(Y( :WealthLn), Effects( :InfoCentr, :Niche),
Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model(
:WealthLn« {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l),
Plot Effect Leverage(l)}));
Mode14: Fit Model(Y( :WealthLn), Effects( :InfoCentr, :Niche, :Niche *
:InfoCentr), Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect
Leverage), Run Model( :WealthLn « {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot
Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect Leverage(l)}));
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Tables 4.1 to 4.8
CONCOR
Diagonal: Reciprocal
Max partitions: 2
Input dataset: C:\Programfiler\Ucinet
6\DataFiles\Foreløpig\Mikroakt 5 år tom 2001
Table 5.3
Model 1: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :Size of the plant),
Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model(
:MeanProdLn « {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l),
Plot Effect Leverage(l)}»;
Model 2: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :Built alone, :Education,
:Age of actors, :Head difference, :MeanDevPre%), Personality(Standard
Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model( :MeanProdLn« {Plot
Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect
Leverage(l)}»;
Model 3: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :Size of the plant, :Built
alone, :Education, :Age of actors, :Head difference, :MeanDevPre%),
Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model(
:MeanProdLn« {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l),
Plot Effect Leverage(l)}»;
Model 4: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :nCloseness, :nCloseness *
:nCloseness), Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect
Leverage), Run Model( :MeanProdLn« {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot
Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect Leverage(l)}»;
Model 5: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :nCloseness),
Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model(
:MeanProdLn« {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l),
Plot Effect Leverage(l)}»;
Model 6: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :nDegree, :nCloseness,
:nCloseness * :nCloseness), Personal ity (Standard Least Squares),
Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model( :MeanProdLn« {Plot Actual by
Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect Leverage(l)}»;
Model 7: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :nDegree, :nDegree *
:nDegree, :nCloseness, :nCloseness * :nCloseness), Personality(Standard
Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model( :MeanProdLn« {Plot
Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect
Leverage(l)}»;
Model 8: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :Niche), Personality(Standard
Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model( :MeanProdLn« {Plot
Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect
Leverage(l)}»;
Model 9: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :nCloseness, :nCloseness *
:nCloseness, :Niche), Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect
Leverage), Run Model( :MeanProdLn« {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot
Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect Leverage(l)}»;
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Model 10: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :nFlowBetwLn),
Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model(
:MeanProdLn « {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l),
Plot Effect Leverage(l)}»;
Model11: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :nFlowBetwLn, :Niche),
Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model(
:MeanProdLn« {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l),
Plot Effect Leverage(l)}»;
Model 12: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :nFlowBetwLn, :Niche,
:Niche * :nFlowBetwLn), Personality(Standard Least Squares),
Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model( :MeanProdLn« {Plot Actual by
Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect Leverage(l)}»;
Model 13: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :Name("Start-up year"»,
Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model(
:MeanProdLn« {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l),
Plot Effect Leverage(l)}»;
Model 14: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :Name("Start-up year"),
:Name("Start-up year") * :Name("Start-up year"», Personality(Standard
Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model( :MeanProdLn« {Plot
Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect
Leverage(l)}»;
Model 15: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :nCloseness, :nCloseness *
:nCloseness, :Niche, :Name("Start-up year"), :Name("Start-up year") *
:Name("Start-up year"», Personality(Standard Least Squares),
Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model( :MeanProdLn« {Plot Actual by
Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect Leverage(l)}»;
Model 16: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :nCloseness, :nCloseness *
:nCloseness, :Niche, :Name("Start-up year"», Personality(Standard Least
Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model( :MeanProdLn « {Plot Actual
by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect Leverage(l)}»;
Model 17: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :nFlowBetwLn, :Niche,
:Niche * :nFlowBetwLn, :Name("Start-up year"», Personality(Standard
Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model( :MeanProdLn« {Plot
Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect
Leverage(l)}»;
Table 5.7
Modell: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :MeanDevPre%),
Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model(
:MeanProdLn « {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l),
Plot Effect Leverage(l)}»;
Model 2: Fit Model(Y( :MeanProdLn), Effects( :MeanDevPre%, :MeanDevPre% *
:MeanDevPre%), Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect
Leverage), Run Model( :MeanProdLn« {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot
Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect Leverage(l)}»;
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Table 5.8
Fit Model{Y{ :MeanProdLn), Effects{ :Niche, :nDegree, :Niche * :nDegree,
:Name{"Start-up year")), Personality{Standard Least Squares),
Emphasis{Effect Leverage), Run Model{ :MeanProdLn« {Plot Actual by
Predicted{l), Plot Residual by Predicted{l), Plot Effect Leverage{l)}));
Table 5.9
Model1: Fit Model{Y{ :Size of the plant), Effects{ :nFlowBetwLn),
Personality{Standard Least Squares), Emphasis{Effect Leverage), Run Model{
:Size of the plant « {Plot Actual by Predicted{l), Plot Residual by
Predicted{l), Plot Effect Leverage{l)}));
Model 2: Fit Model{Y{ :Size of the plant), Effects{ :nCloseness),
Personality{Standard Least Squares), Emphasis{Effect Leverage), Run Model{
:Size of the plant « {Plot Actual by Predicted{l), Plot Residual by
Predicted(l), Plot Effect Leverage{l)}));
Model3: Fit Model{Y( :Size of the plant), Effects{ :nDegree),
Personality{Standard Least Squares), Emphasis{Effect Leverage), Run Model{
:Size of the plant « {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by
Predicted(l), Plot Effect Leverage(l)}));
Model4: Fit Model(Y( :Size of the plant), Effects{ :Name{"Start-up
year"), :Education), Personality{Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect
Leverage), Run Model( :Size of the plant « {Plot Actual by Predicted(l),
Plot Residual by Predicted{l), Plot Effect Leverage{l)}));
Model5: Fit Model(Y( :size of the plant), Effects( :nCloseness,
:Name("Start-up year"), :Education), Personality{Standard Least Squares),
Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model{ :Size of the plant « {Plot Actual by
Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect Leverage(l)}));
Model6: Fit Model(Y( :Size of the plant), Effects( :nDegree,
:Name("Start-up year"), :Education), Personality{Standard Least Squares),
Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model{ :Size of the plant « {Plot Actual by
Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted{l), Plot Effect Leverage{l)}));
Table 5.10
Model1: Fit Model(Y( :nDegree), Effects( :Size of the plant),
Personality(Standard Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model{
:nDegree« {Plot Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l),
Plot Effect Leverage(l)}));
Model2: Fit Model{Y( :nDegree), Effects{ :Niche), Personality(Standard
Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model{Profiler(l, Confidence
Intervals(l), Term Value(Niche(8.90104241143398e-307))), :nDegree« {Plot
Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted{l), Plot Effect
Leverage{l)}));
182
Table 5.11
Modell: Fit Model(Y( :nCloseness), Effects( :Name("Start-up year"),
:Education, :Age of actors), Personality(Standard Least Squares),
Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model( :nCloseness « {Plot Actual by
Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect Leverage(l)}));
Model2: Fit Model(Y( :nCloseness), Effects( :Niche), Personality(Standard
Least Squares), Emphasis(Effect Leverage), Run Model( :nCloseness « {Plot
Actual by Predicted(l), Plot Residual by Predicted(l), Plot Effect
Leverage(l)}));
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